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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Some of the things we do every day, such as singing, driving a car or 
reading on the train, are performed without much cognitive effort or without 
consciously making decisions about actions. However, in some conditions 
(when singing for a large audience, when a rabbit hops onto the road or when 
someone next to you is talking loudly on the phone) the task at hand becomes 
too important or too difficult for automatic processing and we need to take it 
up a notch. We need to focus attention on relevant stimuli while ignoring 
distracting information and we need to invest cognitive effort to take more 
control over our actions. To do this we rely on cognitive control. Cognitive 
control is a set of top-down mechanisms that can be implemented to 
coordinate more basic cognitive processes. Considering its importance for 
goal-oriented human actions, it is not surprising that cognitive control has 
been studied extensively over the past decades. Many important questions to 
do with cognitive control have been asked and studied in the field of 
experimental psychology and neuroscience. When and how is control 
implemented? What information is used to regulate control? What brain areas 
are involved in control, and how do these form networks to exercise control? 
Through which mechanisms and on what timescale can control be recruited?  
In what follows, I will first give an overview of experimental methods 
and neural measures that have been used to study control empirically. Stalking 
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people who read on the train and starting loud phone conversations, or 
sacrificing rabbits on the road might not be the ideal scientific settings to study 
control. Psychologists and neuroscientists have therefore retreated to the lab 
to study cognitive control in more manageable conditions. Next, I will review 
several influential theoretical frameworks, that have been proposed to unify 
and explain empirical findings. I will also discuss how control poses a cost to 
the cognitive system, and how this cost is weighed against benefits in the 
decision to implement control. Finally, I will address one of the main research 
questions of this dissertation: what is the time course of cognitive control? 
Theoretical models disagree when it comes to how fast control can operate, 
and although neural processes involved in control become increasingly well 
known, their time course remains elusive. Why and how this dissertation 
intends to specify the time course of control will be explained near the end of 
this introduction. To conclude this chapter, I will sketch the outline of this 
dissertation and give an overview of the three empirical chapters.  
COGNITIVE CONTROL IN THE LAB 
Congruency tasks offer a tool to study cognitive control experimentally 
 In an experimental environment, congruency tasks are often used to 
study control. In these tasks, such as the flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), 
Stroop (Stroop, 1935) or Simon (Simon, 1969) task, participants have to 
respond to a target stimulus (or stimulus feature) while ignoring distracting 
stimuli (or stimulus features). For instance in the flanker task, participants 
have to identify a stimulus presented in the center of a computer screen and 
are instructed to press the correct key on the keyboard. However, irrelevant, 
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possibly distracting stimuli are presented around the target stimulus. On 
incongruent trials, irrelevant stimuli trigger a different response than relevant 
stimuli, creating a response conflict. Participants are prompted by the target 
stimulus to push button one, but by the surrounding stimuli to push button 
two. On congruent trials no response conflict occurs since relevant and 
irrelevant stimuli are linked to the same response. The occurrence of response 
conflict makes a task more cognitively challenging and makes the response 
more difficult. This is reflected in slower response times (RTs) and a higher 
error likelihood for incongruent than for congruent trials (Hazeltine, Poldrack, 
& Gabrieli, 2000; MacLeod, 1991). The difference in RTs and error rates 
between congruent and incongruent trials is called the congruency effect, and 
serves as a marker for experienced response conflict and task difficulty. To 
maintain high task performance, more cognitive control is needed on 
incongruent trials than on congruent trials. Gratton, Coles, & Donchin (1992) 
show in their seminal paper that the congruency effect is reduced following 
incongruent trials, a phenomenon called the sequential congruency effect. This 
effect suggests that cognitive control is heightened as a result of conflict 
experienced on the previous trial. 
Not only response conflict, but also response errors provide researchers 
with the opportunity to study control. For this reason, errors are often studied 
alongside response conflict in the field of cognitive control research (Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002; Steinhauser, Maier, & Hübner, 2008; Yeung, Botvinick, & 
Cohen, 2004). Since the current dissertation does not focus on post-error 
adaptations, this part of cognitive control research and theory will not be 
discussed in detail, but a limited overview of main findings is provided here. 
When participants make an error, this indicates poor performance and 
signifies that cognitive control should be increased in the future, e.g. in the 
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next trial (Steinhauser et al., 2012). Researchers have therefore also studied 
behavioral and neural responses following errors, probing the implementation 
of cognitive control. Following an error, RTs usually slow down (Dutilh et al., 
2012; Rabbitt, 1966). This post-error slowing has previously been interpreted 
as a reflection of increased caution and controlled processing following an 
error. In line with this idea, response accuracy often increases following errors 
(Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011). However, accuracy decreases have also 
been observed, leading researchers to believe that perhaps errors do not only 
trigger increased control but might also disrupt processing (Jentzsch & 
Dudschig, 2009; Notebaert et al., 2009; Van der Borght, Braem, Stevens, & 
Notebaert, 2016). Directly following an error, processing is disrupted, but 
when more time to strategically adapt control is available, errors eventually 
lead to improved performance (Van der Borght et al., 2016). Finally, it has 
been suggested that the congruency effect is diminished following errors, 
indicating that control has been implemented (Ridderinkhof, 2002). However, 
this finding has recently been challenged, again questioning control processes 
following errors (Van der Borght, Braem, & Notebaert, 2014). 
Notwithstanding the seemingly contradictory findings and many unanswered 
questions in error research, it has become clear that errors are important events 
that almost certainly influence cognitive control.  
In sum, congruency tasks provide an excellent tool to study cognitive 
control. By comparing behavioral and neural responses for congruent vs. 
incongruent trials and by monitoring processes following errors, researchers 
have learned a lot about cognitive control. 
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Measuring neural processes involved in cognitive control 
To study not only behavior, but also the neural underpinnings of 
cognitive control, researchers have relied on various brain recording 
techniques, including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
electro-encephalography (EEG). fMRI can be used to measure the 
hemodynamic brain response (i.e. the BOLD response), revealing activation 
and deactivation in certain brain regions linked to events of interest. This 
technique offers high spatial resolution revealing activity in specific areas. 
Unfortunately, it offers only poor temporal resolution due to the slow nature 
of the BOLD response. On the other hand, EEG offers excellent, millisecond 
temporal resolution, but is much less spatially precise. One central aim of the 
current PhD was to gain insight into the neural time course of cognitive control 
and so I used EEG, exploiting its high temporal resolution.  
When neurons fire, a change in electrical potential occurs, creating a 
small temporary electrical dipole with a positive and a negative end. Since 
neurons are spatially aligned, these small electrical dipoles all point in the 
same direction, summing up to one larger dipole which can be detected at the 
scalp. The occurrence of these dipoles can be determined very precisely in 
time, but since the electrical signal has to pass through several layers of tissue 
before reaching the scalp, volume conduction makes the electrical signal 
spatially diffuse. In search of consistent activation of neurons locked to a 
certain event (e.g. the presentation of a stimulus), the event of interest is 
repeated and the average EEG signal following the event is calculated. As 
noise is cancelled due to the averaging procedure, what remains is a series of 
positive and negative deflections in the signal, marking reliably generated 
dipoles and thus neuronal activity. This is called an event-related potential 
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(ERP). ERP deflections (or components) have been named in the literature on 
the basis of their sign (positive or negative) and timing. Reliably evoked 
components have also been linked to a wide variety of cognitive tasks and 
events (Kappenman & Luck, 2011). For cognitive control, a component 
known as the N2 (or N200) marks the detection of response conflict (Folstein 
& Van Petten, 2007). The N2 is a negative deflection peaking around 200-350 
ms post stimulus onset. Although the sensitivity of the N2 is not limited to 
stimulus incongruency (the N2 also responds to stimulus novelty or mismatch) 
it is nevertheless a good marker for incongruency detection (Folstein & Van 
Petten, 2007). Another well-studied ERP component in cognitive control 
literature is the error-related negativity or error negativity (ERN or Ne), a 
component reliably evoked when an error is made (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, 
Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 
2000). The onset of the ERN occurs shortly before an erroneous response and 
the ERN peaks approximately 100 ms after the response. This component 
likely reflects awareness of an error. Also before stimulus onset, certain ERP 
components reflect attentional control. The contingent negative variation 
(CNV) and the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN) are slow going negative 
deflections in the ERP, with a central or centro-parietal scalp distribution 
(Brunia & van Boxtel, 2001; Tecce, 1972; van Boxtel & Böcker, 2004). These 
components occur when participants are attentively anticipating an upcoming 
stimulus. This stimulus might be an imperative stimulus requiring a response 
(CNV) or an informative stimulus, such as a feedback stimulus (SPN). 
ERP analysis provides only one possible way to look at the EEG signal. 
The EEG signal can be considered as a weighted sum of many sinusoidal 
signals oscillating at different frequencies. The contribution of each frequency 
to the total EEG signal varies over time. Time-frequency (TF) analysis of EEG 
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data identifies how certain events reliably change the strength or power of 
certain frequencies over time (Cohen, 2014). The variations of power over 
time of a range of frequencies are calculated and averaged over trials, locked 
to an event of interest. As in ERPs, averaging cancels noise and leaves only 
consistent power changes that can be mapped in time and frequency space. 
One advantage of TF analysis is that it captures both phase-locked and non-
phase-locked signals in the EEG, whereas ERPs only capture phase-locked 
signals (Cohen, 2014). When the phase of an oscillation is not fixed at the 
event of interest (e.g. because it is not reset by the event), the magnitude and 
sign of the signal amplitude following the event will differ over trials, and 
averaging will result in cancelling out this signal. Consequently, non-phase-
locked signals will not show up in the ERP. Whether or not the ERP captures 
only phase-reset oscillatory signals or also encompasses other evoked signals 
is under continuous debate (Fell et al., 2004; Makeig, 2002). 
Power in certain frequency bands has been linked to cortical activation 
or deactivation and to several cognitive processes. For instance, power in the 
alpha frequency band (8-14 Hz) is negatively correlated with BOLD activity 
measured by fMRI (Laufs et al., 2003, 2006; Ritter, Moosmann, & Villringer, 
2009; Zumer, Scheeringa, Schoffelen, Norris, & Jensen, 2014). In monkeys, 
neuronal firing is locked to the trough of alpha oscillations, and alpha power 
decreases in areas involved in the task at hand (Haegens, Nacher, Luna, Romo, 
& Jensen, 2011). Initially alpha oscillations were attributed to states of cortical 
idling (Pfurtscheller, Stancák, & Neuper, 1996), but later a more active 
inhibitory role was discovered for alpha oscillations (Cooper, Croft, Dominey, 
Burgess, & Gruzelier, 2003; Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007; Palva 
& Palva, 2007). The gating by inhibition theory states that alpha oscillations 
reflect inhibition of irrelevant input and can be strategically adjusted to admit 
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relevant information into processing (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010). In visual 
attention tasks, decreases in alpha power occur in cortical occipital regions 
that are actively involved in task performance (Foxe, Simpson, & Ahlfors, 
1998; Kelly, Lalor, Reilly, & Foxe, 2006; Worden, Foxe, Wang, & Simpson, 
2000). Moreover, alpha power modulations in these areas are predictive of 
target detection (Händel, Haarmeier, & Jensen, 2011; Thut, Nietzel, Brandt, 
& Pascual-Leone, 2006). In working memory tasks, alpha power is increased 
when distracting information is presented, and alpha modulations are again 
predictive of task performance (Bonnefond & Jensen, 2012, 2013). Also in 
cognitive control tasks, alpha power before task onset predicts performance 
and can be strategically adjusted, e.g. following errors, to increase cognitive 
control (Mazaheri, Nieuwenhuis, Van Dijk, & Jensen, 2009). These findings 
all support the idea that alpha oscillations can serve as an active inhibitory 
mechanism. 
Another frequency band that plays an interesting role in cognitive 
control is the theta frequency band (4-8 Hz). Theta power measured at frontal 
electrodes is increased in many cognitive control tasks, both following 
response conflict and errors (Cavanagh, Zambrano-Vazquez, & Allen, 2012; 
Cohen, van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, & Lamme, 2009). It has therefore been 
proposed that mid-frontal theta indicates situations where control is required. 
Furthermore, mid-frontal theta oscillations may entrain other brain areas 
involved in implementing cognitive control (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014). 
Oscillatory synchronization, has indeed been shown as an important 
mechanism for (long-distance) communication between brain regions 
(Bressler, 1995; Fries, 2005; Uhlhaas, Roux, Rodriguez, Rotarska-Jagiela, & 
Singer, 2010; Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, & Martinerie, 2001). Not only 
synchronization within one frequency, but also synchronization across 
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frequencies plays an important role in neural communication (Canolty & 
Knight, 2010). In monkeys, synchronization of neuronal spiking in distinct 
areas has been shown during attentional control (Phillips, Vinck, Everling, & 
Womelsdorf, 2014; Voloh, Valiante, Everling, & Womelsdorf, 2015; 
Womelsdorf, Ardid, Everling, & Valiante, 2014). In humans, increased theta 
synchronization between mid-frontal cortex and other cognitive control areas 
has been shown following response conflict (Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011; 
Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Nigbur, Cohen, Ridderinkhof, & Stürmer, 2012) or 
errors (Cavanagh, Cohen, & Allen, 2009; Cohen et al., 2009). Interestingly, 
frontal theta power has also been linked to occipital alpha power modulations: 
following errors, a correlation was observed between frontal theta power 
increases and occipital alpha power decreases (Mazaheri et al., 2009), 
suggesting that frontal theta can influence alpha oscillations. In sum, there is 
compelling evidence that cognitive control is a complex process, operating 
through several dynamic brain networks, where distant brain areas 
communicate through oscillations of varying frequencies, including frontal 
theta and posterior alpha oscillations (Cohen & Ridderinkhof, 2013). 
COGNITIVE CONTROL – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Experiments using congruency tasks, regularly in combination with 
diverse neuro-measurements, such as fMRI or EEG, have provided 
researchers with a very rich and intricate picture of cognitive control and its 
neural substrates and mechanisms. To unify and explain empirical findings, 
several theoretical frameworks on cognitive control have been proposed. 
These in turn provide new hypotheses that can guide future research.  
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The conflict monitoring theory 
 The conflict monitoring theory (CMT; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004), one of the most 
influential cognitive control accounts, states that response conflict or a 
response error is detected in the brain by a conflict detection unit. This unit is 
located in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). When activated, the conflict 
monitoring unit triggers cognitive control implementation in a general fronto-
parietal attentional control network, including the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) and posterior parietal cortex (including the intraparietal sulcus: 
IPS) (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dosenbach et al., 2007; MacDonald, Cohen, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Nobre et al., 1997). The CMT offers a valuable 
theoretical framework in the form of a computational model that can explain 
important empirical reaction time (RT) and error rate findings. The sequential 
congruency effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992) provides evidence for 
control updating following response conflict: cognitive control on the current 
trial has been heightened as a result of conflict experienced on the previous 
trial. This is in line with how the CMT conceptualizes the control 
implementation process. The neural substrates for conflict detection and 
control implementation proposed by the CMT are also supported by fMRI 
studies (Carter et al., 1998; Kerns, 2004; MacDonald et al., 2000). These 
studies show that on incongruent trials ACC activation is increased, reflecting 
activation of the conflict monitoring unit. Sequential effects also appear in the 
fMRI signal: when an incongruent trial is encountered, control is increased 
and less conflict is experienced on the next trial, resulting in less ACC 
activation following incongruent trials than following congruent trials 
(Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999). 
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In ERP research, source modelling revealed the ACC as the neural 
generator of classical response conflict related components such as the N2 and 
ERN/Ne component (Yeung et al., 2004). Conflict and error detection are also 
reflected in an increase of mid-frontal theta oscillations (Cavanagh et al., 
2012). The source for these theta oscillations was again estimated in the ACC 
(Debener et al., 2005). These source modelling studies provide compelling 
evidence that typical conflict detection EEG signals reflect ACC activation. 
Beyond conflict detection, EEG studies also support the idea that conflict 
detected in the ACC triggers a fronto-parietal control network. In monkeys, 
highly spatially precise neural measures have shown how frontal and parietal 
areas form a communicating network during attentional control. 
Synchronization of neuronal spiking in the beta and gamma band has revealed 
increased communication between the ACC and lateral PFC in attentional 
tasks (Womelsdorf et al., 2014). Communication between these two areas is 
further supported by increased cross-frequency coupling between theta and 
gamma oscillations (Voloh et al., 2015). Finally, also synchronization 
between frontal and parietal areas was observed during attention in monkeys 
(Phillips et al., 2014). Scalp EEG measures have revealed similar network 
dynamics in humans. The theta power increase generated by the ACC is 
followed by increased synchronization in the theta frequency band between 
ACC and lateral PFC (Cavanagh et al., 2009; Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011; 
Cohen et al., 2009; Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Nigbur et al., 2012). Also, cross-
frequency coupling between ACC and posterior parietal cortex was observed 
(Cohen & Ridderinkhof, 2013). These findings show how the conflict 
monitoring unit communicates with the control network through oscillatory 
synchronization. 
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The dual mechanisms of control framework 
The focus of the CMT rests heavily on control implementation triggered 
by response conflict. However, control can also be implemented strategically, 
before task onset. According to the dual mechanisms of control framework 
(DMC; Braver, 2012), control can be implemented in two ways: reactively 
and proactively. Reactive control acts when a challenging situation occurs, 
and is only implemented at the time it is needed. Proactive control on the other 
hand is exerted in anticipation of a cognitively demanding task, and is a 
sustained mode of goal-driven attentional selection. When response conflict 
is highly expected, either because it has been cued (Aarts & Roelofs, 2011; 
Aarts, Roelofs, & van Turennout, 2008) or in a context where a large 
proportion of trials are incongruent, a smaller congruency effect is observed 
(known as the proportion congruency effect: Gratton et al., 1992; Logan & 
Zbrodoff, 1979). This shows that when conflict is expected, proactive control 
is effectively implemented in preparation for the task. Like reactive control, 
proactive top-down control uses the fronto-parietal control network to focus 
attention and prepare for upcoming conflict (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 
2009; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Locke & Braver, 2008). 
Associative models of control 
Together, the CMT and DMC framework provide an idea of when 
control is implemented: when conflict is experienced or expected. To also 
answer the question how control is implemented, associative models of 
control were proposed (Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016; 
Egner, 2014; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). According to the associative 
control models, control is implemented via associations between perceptual, 
motor, and control representations. When response conflict occurs or is 
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expected, perceptual and/or motor input activates associated control 
representations. These representations initiate a boost in arousal that leads to 
increased binding between cortical areas that are active at the moment of the 
arousal boost, i.e. task-relevant cortical areas (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). 
Control is thus automatically implemented in the areas that play an important 
role specifically in the task at hand, since these areas are active when control 
is triggered.  
The involvement of task-specific areas in control is supported by the 
fact that sequential control effects only occur within the same task, showing 
that control acts locally to task-specific information (Notebaert & Verguts, 
2008). This idea is further supported by fMRI research, showing activation 
consistent with control implementation in sensory areas processing relevant 
and irrelevant stimulus material (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Polk, Drake, Jonides, 
Smith, & Smith, 2008; Weissman, Warner, & Woldorff, 2004). For instance, 
in a Stroop-like task using pictures of faces as relevant stimuli, activation in 
the fusiform face area processing these relevant stimuli was affected by 
stimulus congruency (Egner & Hirsch, 2005). Similarly, incongruency was 
reflected in auditory or visual processing areas when auditory or visual stimuli 
respectively were relevant to task performance (Weissman et al., 2004). 
Finally, in addition to increased processing in relevant areas, also suppression 
of processing in irrelevant areas has been found (Polk et al., 2008). EEG 
research shows that the ACC triggers control in distant specific sensory areas 
through oscillatory synchronization (Cohen & Van Gaal, 2013; Cohen et al., 
2009). For example, cross-frequency coupling between MFC and occipital 
areas processing stimuli increases following errors (Cohen et al., 2009). 
Finally, BOLD activity in the fronto-parietal control network is also correlated 
to modulations in alpha oscillations in specific visual areas processing relevant 
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or irrelevant stimuli. Higher alpha power is observed in areas processing 
irrelevant stimuli and lower alpha power is observed in areas processing 
relevant stimuli (Zumer et al., 2014). In conclusion, research suggests that 
control is implemented not only through a general fronto-parietal control 
network, but also acts locally, in areas specific to the task (Slagter et al., 2007; 
Weissman et al., 2004). 
THE COST OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
Cognitive control improves task performance, reducing errors and 
speeding RTs for challenging tasks. So why would control ever not be 
implemented? This is because control or mental effort, much like physical 
effort, also carries a cost (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010). So 
when making a decision about how much cognitive control to implement, 
potential benefits have to be weighed against the cost of control (Botvinick & 
Braver, 2015; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013; Westbrook & Braver, 
2015). The expected value of control model (EVC model; Shenhav et al., 
2013) states that a decision about control is based on the expected value of 
control (EVC). This EVC is the net value of control: benefits minus cost. The 
EVC can be calculated for different control settings (types and levels of 
control) to select the most optimal setting. In the EVC calculation, the benefits 
of a certain control setting are determined by two types of information: (1) the 
probability of successful task performance given the control setting and (2) 
the profit of successful task performance. This means that cognitive control 
will be implemented if this will increase the probability of success and if this 
success is valuable. To decide if this is the case, two types of information are 
especially relevant, namely information about task difficulty and information 
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about potential reward. Cognitive control is only implemented when needed 
(for a difficult task), because only then control can increase the probability of 
success. Control is also only implemented when good performance pays off 
(when high reward is likely).  
The importance of difficulty and reward information in the decision to 
implement control was formalized in the adaptive effort model (Verguts, 
Vassena, & Silvetti, 2015). This model states that the ACC and ventral 
striatum integrate information about difficulty and reward to allocate 
cognitive effort to cortical stimulus-action pathways, effectively 
implementing control and improving task performance. The model is able to 
explain a wide range of empirical findings, including classical cognitive 
control findings such as the sequential congruency effect and the proportion 
congruency effect. Importantly, this shows that the model exerts reactive as 
well as proactive control. It is therefore compatible with the DMC framework 
proposed by Braver (2012). fMRI research supports the interaction between 
reward and difficulty information and cognitive control, showing that reward 
and difficulty expectation trigger an overlapping brain network that contains 
areas of the fronto-parietal control network as well as subcortical areas likely 
involved in processing saliency (Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song, & Woldorff, 
2012; Vassena et al., 2014). 
The experience or expectancy of response conflict leads to increased 
cognitive control (Aarts & Roelofs, 2011; Aarts et al., 2008; Gratton et al., 
1992). Since we can view response conflict as a specific case of task difficulty, 
this provides evidence for the role of difficulty information in motivating 
control. Also reward plays an influential role in cognitive control. Reward has 
beneficial effects on control (Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2010; Botvinick & 
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Braver, 2015; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010, 2011) strongly suggesting that reward 
can provide the necessary motivation to implement control. In blocks of trials 
where reward is linked to task performance, control is increased (Leotti & 
Wager, 2010; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010) and also when a cue before a trial 
informs participants that a reward can be obtained, control is implemented 
(Aarts et al., 2014; Bijleveld et al., 2010; Knutson, 2005; Krebs et al., 2012; 
Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Schevernels, Krebs, Santens, Woldorff, & Boehler, 
2014).  
In conclusion, because cognitive control poses a cost on mental 
resources, it has to be motivated. Both task difficulty and reward play an 
important and interacting role in motivational cognitive control. 
THE TIME COURSE OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
Although cognitive control has been ardently studied in the past 
decades, and solid theoretical frameworks have provided clarity and structural 
insights into control, some aspects of control and neural control processes 
remain relatively unknown. The time course of control is such an aspect. 
Although the brain areas involved in control have been thoroughly studied, 
the timescale on which they operate has received less attention. Also, typical 
control experiments are not designed to investigate the (fast) timing of control. 
Consequently, there is not yet a theoretical agreement on the time course of 
control. To improve control frameworks, this dissertation aimed to determine 
on what timescale control can be implemented, and to define the time course 
of neural processes involved in control. 
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Classical models of attentional control conceptualize control as a serial 
and thus relatively slow process (Posner & Presti, 1987; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977). Consistently, the CMT typically predicts relatively slow reactive 
cognitive control adaptations, measured on a trial-by-trial basis. Within the 
DMC framework, proactive control is again conceptualized as rather slow. 
The CMT and DMC framework have inspired experiments exploring 
relatively slow control, such as the investigation of between-trial adaptation 
to response conflict (Gratton et al., 1992) or post-error adaptations for the next 
trial (Steinhauser et al., 2008). In contrast, associative models for control 
argue that control is implemented via associations between perceptual, motor, 
and control representations (Abrahamse et al., 2016; Egner, 2014; Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2008, 2009). A stimulus (for instance a conflicting stimulus) can 
trigger a control representation, which subsequently improves the signal-to-
noise ratio of current processing pathways and influences activation in areas 
relevant to the task. This perspective on control predicts that control might be 
implemented associatively. Depending on the type and exact connectivity 
structure of the associations, cognitive control can thus be implemented 
rapidly, perhaps even during task execution.  
To study the time course of cognitive control, EEG has proven very 
valuably due to its excellent temporal resolution. The timing of the N2 ERP 
component (Folstein & Van Petten, 2007) and of the peak of the frontal theta 
burst (Cavanagh et al., 2012) strongly suggest that conflict detection usually 
occurs around 200 to 300 ms post stimulus onset. It must be noted that this is 
also task-dependent: in the Stroop task conflict detection might occur later 
(Coderre, Conklin, & van Heuven, 2011; Rebai, Bernard, & Lannou, 1997). 
The timing of the ensuing control processes, and especially how fast these can 
occur is however less clear. Even ERP studies are usually not designed to 
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focus on fast within-trial control implementation (Larson, Clayson, & 
Baldwin, 2012; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). However, there is some evidence 
that fast control implementation can indeed occur. Fast control 
implementation was shown in an EEG frequency tagging experiment. On 
incongruent trials control was adaptively adjusted as attention towards task-
relevant information increased continuously throughout the trial (Scherbaum, 
Fischer, Dshemuchadse, & Goschke, 2011). Also following errors, fast 
control implementation has been reported. Increases in oscillatory synchrony 
between the ACC and visual areas during the trial were observed as soon as 
400 ms post stimulus onset (Cohen et al., 2009). Finally, it has also been 
suggested that reward can initiate fast within-trial cognitive control (Boehler, 
Hopf, Stoppel, & Krebs, 2012; Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). 
One of the main aims of this dissertation is therefore to further specify 
the time course of cognitive control, and to test the hypothesis of associative 
control models that control can occur very rapidly, within the trial. 
OUTLINE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
Based on the theoretical frameworks on cognitive control and the role 
of reward and difficulty information in motivating control, I hypothesized 
during my PhD that reward and difficulty information would influence 
cognitive control, both reactively and proactively. This created four possible 
research questions in a two by two structure: how will (1) reward and (2) 
difficulty information influence (1) reactive and (2) proactive control. As 
discussed above, the effect of reward on proactive control has been studied 
thoroughly in the past (Aarts et al., 2014; Bijleveld et al., 2010; Knutson, 
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2005; Krebs et al., 2012; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Schevernels et al., 2014), 
so this question will not be discussed in this dissertation. The three remaining 
questions in the two by two structure make up the three empirical chapters of 
this dissertation. 
A second question is how cognitive control processes occur in time. 
Classical control theories, such as the CMT, conceptualize control as a rather 
slow process, occurring between trials, whereas recent associative models 
hypothesize that control can also occur very rapidly, since it relies on 
associations between stimulus and control representations. The time course of 
cognitive control processes thus makes another important focus of this 
dissertation and is assessed in every empirical chapter. 
 
Figure 1. Outline of this dissertation. Theoretical models on control predict that both 
reward and difficulty information will influence reactive and proactive control, 
providing four possible research questions. Three of these questions are addressed in 
the three empirical chapters of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, the effect of reward on 
reactive control was investigated. In Chapter 3, the effect of difficulty information, 
again on reactive control was investigated. In Chapter 4, the effect of difficulty 
information on proactive control was assessed. 
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Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, the effects of reward information on reactive control were 
studied. In this behavioral study, the primary goal was to reveal the fast time 
course of control, triggered by reward information. Participants performed a 
visual discrimination task, requiring controlled attention. To test the 
prediction of fast control proposed by associative control models, reward 
information was presented either 200ms before, at the same time as, or 200ms 
after stimulus presentation. We investigated how a reward cue influences 
cognitive control in each timing condition, thus revealing the fast time course 
of control. Importantly, the reward manipulation was orthogonal to the 
response, ensuring that reward effects are not due to automatic activation of 
rewarded stimulus-response associations but truly reflect fast cognitive 
control implementation. 
Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, I studied the effects of difficulty information, again on 
reactive control. I show how the experience of difficulty triggers control. In 
this study, the experience of difficulty was manipulated through stimulus and 
response incongruency of the stimuli. Cognitive control frameworks state that 
the need for control is detected by mid-frontal brain areas and is implemented 
through a fronto-parietal network and sensory areas specific to the task. 
Associative control models further predict that this control implementation 
can occur on a fast timescale. In this chapter I used the temporal precision of 
EEG to investigate the time-course of control processes, with a focus on fast, 
within-trial control processes in sensory areas. Both an ERP and TF 
approached were used. A lateralized flanker task was applied to separate task-
relevant from task-irrelevant visual areas by containing these to separate 
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hemispheres. Mid-frontal theta power and the difference in alpha power 
between task-relevant and task-irrelevant areas were investigated to show how 
fast control is implemented in specific sensory areas following stimulus and 
response conflict. 
Chapter 4 
Finally, in Chapter 4 I again studied the effect of difficulty information, 
but this time one proactive control. Control theories state that difficulty 
information can serve as a cue for motivated control, implemented through a 
fronto-parietal control network. In this chapter a cued mental calculation task 
was used, where the cue provided participants with information about the 
difficulty of the upcoming calculation. Crucially, no motor preparation 
occurred in the cue-task interval, since the task did not require an immediate 
motor response. To identify a detailed and clear-cut (motor-free) 
electrophysiological signature of proactive control, EEG was recorded and I 
used both an ERP and TF approach. The effects of difficulty information on 
the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN) and power in the alpha frequency 
band during the cue-task interval were studied. These electrophysiological 
markers show the evolution of proactive control throughout this interval. In 
addition, intracranial local field potential recordings from a patient diagnosed 
with epilepsy were investigated. These recordings from cortical and 
subcortical areas, including posterior parietal cortex and striatum, provide 
electrophysiological data with both high spatial and temporal resolution. 
Hence these recordings presented an excellent opportunity to study the fronto-
parietal network and subcortical areas underlying motivated proactive control.  
 34     CHAPTER 1 
General discussion 
In the general discussion the results of the three empirical chapters are 
reviewed and their relevance for cognitive control theories is evaluated. What 
these chapters have taught us about the time course and nature of cognitive 
control processes, and about the relevance of reward and difficulty 
information in triggering proactive and reactive control is also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE TIME COURSE OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
IMPLEMENTATION
1 
Optimally recruiting cognitive control is a key factor in efficient task 
performance. In line with influential cognitive control theories, earlier work 
assumed that control is relatively slow. We challenge this notion and test whether 
control can also be implemented more rapidly by investigating the time course of 
cognitive control. In two experiments a visual discrimination paradigm was 
applied. A reward cue was presented with variable intervals to target onset. The 
results showed that reward cues can rapidly improve performance. Importantly, 
the reward manipulation was orthogonal to the response, ensuring that the 
reward effect was due to fast cognitive control implementation rather than to 
automatic activation of rewarded S-R associations. We also empirically specify 
the temporal limits of cognitive control, since the reward cue had no effect when 
it was presented shortly after target onset, during task execution. 
  
                                                     
1 Janssens, C., De Loof, E., Pourtois, G., & Verguts, T. (2016). The time course of 
cognitive control implementation. PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW, 22(6). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Humans are cognitive beings with intentions and goals. To achieve those 
goals, they monitor actions and their outcomes to adjust attention and effort levels 
to suit the situation (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). This set of top-down 
processes is referred to as ‘cognitive control’ as it allows controlling basic 
cognitive processes. Control improves task performance, but carries a cost (Kool, 
McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010). To decide if enhancing control is useful, 
humans integrate cues for difficulty and reward. Evidence for cue integration has 
been reported in several fMRI studies (Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song, & 
Woldorff, 2012; Vassena et al., 2014) and their influence on control 
implementation was formalized in computational reinforcement learning models 
(Verguts, Vassena, & Silvetti, 2015).  
Classical models of cognitive control conceptualize control as a serial and 
thus relatively slow process (Posner & Presti, 1987; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), 
as do more recent models where reactive control is updated between-trials in 
response to experienced task difficulty (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001; Botvinick et al., 2004). Also proactive control (in response to cues 
before task onset) is conceptualized as rather slow (Braver, 2012). These models 
have inspired experimental designs exploring relatively slow control, such as the 
investigation of between-trial adaptation (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). 
Conversely, recent associative models argue that control is implemented via 
associations between perceptual, motor, and control representations (Egner, 
2014; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). In this view, a difficult or potentially 
rewarding stimulus triggers a control representation, which subsequently 
improves the signal-to-noise ratio of current processing pathways. From such a 
point of view, control might be implemented more rapidly, perhaps even during 
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task execution. Yet, its exact time course was not clearly specified in such 
models, perhaps due to lack of empirical specification of this time course.  
Research has recently started to look at the time course of control. 
Evidence for fast control implementation was reported in an EEG frequency 
tagging experiment (Scherbaum, Fischer, Dshemuchadse, & Goschke, 2011) 
showing that on difficult, incongruent trials, attention towards task-relevant 
information increases continuously throughout the trial. A large literature shows 
that cues that are directly relevant for task execution are processed more 
efficiently (e.g. Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Spruyt, De Houwer, Everaert, 
& Hermans, 2012). Item congruency (as in Scherbaum et al., 2011) is in this sense 
directly relevant for task execution and can thus be expected to be processed 
efficiently. However it remains unclear to what extent also task-irrelevant cues  
such as reward cues, which are uninformative about the upcoming task  can 
induce control enhancements on a faster time-scale, as predicted by associative 
models. 
The influence of reward on performance has been extensively studied. 
Beneficial effects of reward on cognitive control were found consistently 
(Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2010; Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Padmala & Pessoa, 
2010, 2011) strongly suggesting that reward motivates participants to intensify 
control. This earlier work mostly demonstrated relatively slow adjustments. In 
many studies reward was manipulated between subjects (Huebner & Schloesser, 
2010) or between blocks (Leotti & Wager, 2010; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010).  This 
allows participants to deliberately increase control, but its time scale remains 
unknown. Another common procedure is to present cues indicating upcoming 
reward before task onset. Here also, there is ample time for cue processing as it 
is always presented with a long interval (several seconds) before task onset (Aarts 
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et al., 2014; Bijleveld et al., 2010; Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & 
Glover, 2005; Krebs et al., 2012; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Schevernels, Krebs, 
Santens, Woldorff, & Boehler, 2014). 
Studies investigating faster reward-based control implementation are 
scarce. Krebs et al. (2010) used a Stroop task in which trials with certain ink 
colors were rewarded and showed that responses were faster for those trials than 
non-rewarded ones. Since reward information was presented only at task onset, 
this suggests control can be implemented on a very short time scale. A similar 
fast reward effect was shown for response inhibition (Boehler, Hopf, Stoppel, & 
Krebs, 2012). In both studies however, specific rewarded stimuli were linked to 
specific responses. Hence, when a stimulus and subsequent response were 
rewarded, the S-R link was possibly strengthened. When the rewarded stimulus 
was then presented again, the associated response was automatically activated, 
possibly speeding task performance (Damian, 2001). Studies avoiding this issue 
by using an orthogonal S-R mapping are scarce and only report evidence for slow 
control (Neely, 1977). The latter priming study concluded that control 
implementation takes at least 400 ms.  
As mentioned above, associative models theoretically allow fast control 
but as the literature review illustrates, an empirical specification of its time course 
is currently lacking. Filling this gap is the aim of the current study. A visual 
discrimination task was used in combination with symbolic reward cuetass 
unrelated to the target stimulus and response. Three different fast cue timings 
allowed investigating the time course of cognitive control implementation. The 
reward cue was presented either 200 ms before, simultaneous to, or 200 ms after 
target onset. This third condition was included to study ultra-rapid control 
enhancement during a trial, when task execution has already been initiated. Note 
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that for all timing conditions, the cue-target interval was considerably shorter than 
in the reward studies discussed above (Aarts et al., 2014; Bijleveld et al., 2010; 
Krebs et al., 2012; Schevernels et al., 2014). Crucially, the cues were uncorrelated 
with responses so no S-R learning could occur for the cue. This ensures we 
measured control rather than automatic S-R effects.  
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
18 paid subjects participated. Reward consisted of points linked to winning 
a gift voucher. Stimuli were presented centrally on a black background in 18 
blocks of 48 trials. A trial (Figure 1) consisted of a full grey circle (1000 ms), the 
target, being an opening in the top and bottom of the grey circle (400 ms), a 
fixation cross (600 ms) and feedback (600 ms). Participants indicated the larger 
of the two openings with a button press. There were two difficulty levels, 
determined by the size difference in the openings. A reward cue was presented, 
indicating no information (+# in white, 50% of trials), reward (+4 in green, 25% 
of trials) or no reward (+0 in red, 25% of trials). Cue timing was variable: 200 ms 
before (pre), simultaneous to (at) or 200 ms after (post) target onset (all timings 
equally probable). Feedback depended on the reward manipulation and the 
response (+4 or +0 in green for correct and -4 or -0 for error trials). 50% of all 
trials were rewarded (if correct). All trial types were presented randomly 
intermixed. 
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Figure 1. Experimental paradigm. Participants made a visual target discrimination. A 
reward cue was presented with different timing relative to the target, either post, at or pre 
target onset. Cues could be informative (indicating reward or no reward) or neutral. 
 
A linear mixed effects (LME) model was fitted for reaction times (RTs) 
with several predictors: reward (reward vs. no reward vs. neutral), cue timing (pre 
vs. at vs. post target onset), location of the largest opening (location; top vs. 
bottom) and difficulty (easy vs. hard). Also, a random intercept across subjects 
was modeled. Although a maximal random effects structure has been proposed 
as optimal (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), it has recently been argued that 
this often results in overparameterized models that fail to converge (Bates, Kliegl, 
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Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015). Therefore a model building strategy was applied. The 
added value of a random slope per subject was tested by comparing the basic 
model to a model with a random slope for one of the predictors. This was then 
repeated for every predictor. Significant random slopes were obtained for 
location and difficulty, which were added to the final model. Effects in this final 
model were tested by ANOVA type III; F-statistics were calculated with 
Kenward-Roger adjustment of the degrees of freedom (Kenward & Roger, 1997).  
A generalized linear mixed effects (GLME) model for binary data was 
fitted for accuracy with the same predictors and model selection procedure as for 
RT analysis. The final model included a random slope for location. Since no 
small-sample adjustments of the degrees of freedom for binary responses have 
been proposed in the literature, chi-square statistics rather than F-statistics are 
reported. 
Results 
RT 
Results showed a main effect of difficulty, F(1, 17) = 127.66, p < 0.001 
(slower RTs for difficult trials), and cue timing, F(1, 13336) = 22.36, p < 0.001. 
RTs were slowest in the at condition (compared to post: t(1, 17) = 6.00, p < 0.001; 
compared to pre: t(1, 17) = 5.17, p < 0.001) and fastest in the pre condition 
(compared to post: t(1, 17) = 2.46, p = 0.03). Crucially, there was a significant 
main effect of reward information, F(1, 13335) = 4.04, p = 0.02 which interacted 
with cue timing, F(2, 13335) = 7.20, p < 0.001 (Figure 2a). To investigate this 
interaction, the effect of reward was tested for each cue timing separately. This 
revealed no significant effect for the post condition, F(2, 16) = 0.43, p = 0.66, a 
marginally significant effect for the at condition, F(2, 16) = 2.77, p = 0.09 and a 
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significant effect in the pre condition, F(2, 16) = 6.54, p = 0.008. To further 
qualify the effect of reward in the pre condition, paired t-tests were performed, 
revealing a difference between reward and no-reward cues, t(1, 17) = 4.52, p < 
0.001, and between reward cues and neutral cues, t(1, 17) = 2.30, p = 0.03 but not 
between no-reward cues and neutral cues, t(1, 17) = 1.76, p = 0.10.  
Accuracy 
There was a main effect of difficulty, 2(1, N = 18) = 74.76, p < .001 (more 
errors for difficult trials) and of cue timing, 2(1, N = 18) = 20.82, p < 0.001. 
Fewest errors were made in the post condition (compared to at: t(1, 17) = 3.18, p 
< 0.01; compared to pre: t(1, 17) = 3.61, p < 0.01). There was no difference 
between the at and pre condition, t(1, 17) = 1.28, p = 0.22. There was no main 
effect of reward,2(2, N = 18) = 2.46, p = 0.29, but there was an interaction of 
reward and cue timing,2(4, N = 18) = 10.02, p = 0.04 (Figure 2b). To investigate 
this interaction, the reward effect was modeled for each cue timing separately. 
There was no significant reward effect in the post and at conditions,2(2, N = 18) 
= 1.32, p = 0.52 and2(2, N = 18) = 1.04, p = 0.60 respectively, but there was a 
reward effect in the pre condition,2(2, N = 18) = 15.37, p < 0.001. 
Discussion 
We investigated how rapidly reward prospect can modulate task 
performance. The beneficial reward effect was clear when the cue preceded target 
onset, both for RTs and accuracy, indicating truly enhanced processing efficiency 
rather than a shift in speed-accuracy tradeoff. The reward effect was less clear 
when cue and target appeared simultaneously, with only a marginally significant 
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effect for RTs and no effect for accuracy, and disappeared altogether when the 
cue followed target onset. 
To explore the marginally significant effect in the simultaneous condition 
and to push the timing limits of the fast control adjustments observed in 
Experiment 1, cue processing was reduced to its simplest form in Experiment 2. 
In Experiment 1 participants distinguished between three intermixed cue types 
(neutral, reward and no-reward). In Experiment 2 we confined neutral cues and 
informative cues (reward or no-reward) to separate, alternating blocks, thus 
reducing the number of cues and making distinction easier. Further, we increased 
power by testing a larger number of subjects.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
27 paid subjects participated. The method was nearly identical to that of 
Experiment 1 (Figure 1), except that trials with neutral cues and trials with 
informative cues appeared in separate alternating blocks. The predictors and 
model selection procedure were identical to that of Experiment 1. Both the model 
for RTs and accuracy included random slopes for location and difficulty. 
Results 
In a preliminary analysis, neutral blocks were compared to informative 
blocks by fitting an LME model for RTs with block type (neutral vs. informative) 
as the fixed factor and a random slope for block type. Results showed an effect 
of block type, with faster RTs in neutral blocks compared to informative blocks, 
F(1, 26) = 7.49, p = 0.01. There was no block difference for error rates (tested 
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with a GLME model for binary responses), 2(1, N = 27) = 2.48, p = 0.11. 
Because of this block effect, neutral trials cannot be straightforwardly compared 
to reward and no-reward trials. Hence in the remainder of the results we focus on 
informative blocks only. 
RT 
A main effect was observed of difficulty, F(1, 26) = 115, p < 0.001 (slower 
RTs for difficult trials) and of cue timing, F(1, 26) = 74.24, p < 0.001. RTs were 
slowest in the at condition (compared to post: t(1, 26) = 5.16, p < 0.001; compared 
to pre: t(1, 26) = 7.68, p < 0.001) and fastest in the pre condition (compared to 
post: t(1, 26) = 3.15, p < 0.01). There was a main effect of reward, F(1, 9871) = 
14.88, p < 0.001. The interaction of reward and cue timing was marginally 
significant, F(1, 9872) = 3.65, p = 0.056 (Figure 2c; note that an F-statistic is by 
definition two-sided). To investigate the interaction further, separate models were 
fitted for each timing condition. These revealed no effect of reward in the post 
condition, F(1, 3372) = 0.56, p = 0.46, but did show an effect in the pre and at 
condition, F(1, 3250) = 11.69, p < 0.001, and F(1, 3260) = 4.72, p = 0.03, 
respectively.  
Accuracy 
There was a main effect of difficulty, 2(1, N = 27) = 133.87, p < .0001 
(more errors for difficult trials), and of cue timing, 2(1, N = 27) = 29.37, p < 
0.001. Fewest errors were made in the post condition (compared to at: t(1, 26) = 
3.37, p < 0.01; compared to pre: t(1, 26) = 2.20, p = 0.04). There was no difference 
between the at and pre condition, t(1, 26) = 0.22, p = 0.82. There was a main 
effect of reward,2(2, N = 27) = 6.35, p = 0.01, and an interaction of reward and 
cue timing,2(4, N = 27) = 7.93, p < 0.01 (Figure 2d). Tests for each cue timing 
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separately revealed no significant reward effect for the post or at condition,2(2, 
N = 27) = 0.005, p = 0.94 and2(2, N = 27) = 0.34, p = 0.56 respectively, but 
there was an effect for the pre condition,2(2, N = 27) = 15.37, p < 0.001 
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Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1: RTs (A) and error rates (B) were significantly influenced by 
reward in the pre condition. The reward effect is mainly driven by response speeding for 
reward trials relative to neutral trials (plotted in yellow and orange, A) and by an increase 
in error rate for no-reward trials compared to neutral trials (plotted in red and orange, B). 
Experiment 2: RTs (C) were significantly influenced by reward in the pre and at 
condition, error rates (D) were only influenced by reward in the pre condition. * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In two experiments we demonstrated that control can be rapidly enhanced 
in response to reward. The use of three timing conditions also provides novel 
insights into the nature and time course of cognitive control implementation. 
When a reward-predictive cue was presented 200 ms before target onset, it 
improved processing efficiency. The effect of reward diminished as less time was 
available for cue processing, with smaller effects for simultaneous cue and target 
presentation, and no effect for cues presented after target onset.  
One might argue that difficulty was unmatched across timing conditions: 
the less time there was to process the cue, the more difficult the task might have 
become. Since reward and difficulty cues are weighted in the decision to increase 
control, increased difficulty might eliminate a reward effect. However, RTs were 
faster and fewer errors were made in the post condition than in the simultaneous 
condition, indicating that, if anything, the task was more difficult in the 
simultaneous condition, where we did find a reward effect.  
A broad research effort is uncovering the fast and far-reaching influences 
of reward on cognition. Visual attention research has extensively shown that 
rewarded stimuli capture attention automatically, even when this is 
counterproductive (Hickey & van Zoest, 2012; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most, & 
Le Pelley, 2015). Interestingly this might imply that the currently reported reward 
effects are an underestimation of enhanced control. Reward cues automatically 
attracted attention away from the actual discrimination task stimulus, which 
would cause a slowing of responses rather than the observed speeding.  
Our findings challenge models that conceptualize cognitive control as a 
slow process (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004; Braver, 2012; Posner & Presti, 1987; 
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Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Such models have been challenged before in 
congruency tasks. There, the magnitude of the congruency effect depends on the 
proportion of incongruent trials in the task. This proportion congruency effect 
(PCE) is typically ascribed to a slow process that tonically enhances control in 
the context of high proportions of incongruency (Braver, 2012). In contrast, 
Crump et al. (2006) showed that the PCE also occurs if the proportion congruency 
only becomes apparent at stimulus onset, suggesting a fast, stimulus-driven 
control enhancement. Our research shows that also task-irrelevant reward cues 
(i.e., which are uninformative for the task) can induce such rapid adjustments.  
The current research supports more recent accounts that conceptualize 
cognitive control from an associative learning viewpoint (Egner, 2014; Verguts 
& Notebaert, 2008, 2009) and adds to these models by specifying the time 
constraints of cognitive control. We emphasized that we were careful to exclude 
stimulus-response learning; however, what then is learned in the associative 
learning point of view? We argue that subjects learn associations between 
perceptual (in this case, reward cue) and control (rather than motor) 
representations, which are automatically activated with the next cue appearance 
(e.g., in event files: Hommel, 1998; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2004) and 
quickly trigger appropriate levels of control. Future research is needed to 
determine whether such cueing requires training at all (instruction-based control 
implementation) and whether its timing changes with extensive training.  
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CHAPTER 3 
OCCIPITAL ALPHA POWER REVEALS FAST ATTENTIONAL 
INHIBITION OF INCONGRUENT DISTRACTORS 1 
Recent associative models of cognitive control hypothesize that cognitive 
control can be learned (optimized) for task-specific settings, via associations 
between perceptual, motor, and control representations; and once learned, can be 
implemented rapidly. Mid-frontal brain areas signal the need for control, and 
control is subsequently implemented by biasing sensory representations, boosting 
or suppressing activity in brain areas processing task-relevant or task-irrelevant 
information. To assess the timescale of these processes, we employed EEG. In 
order to achieve the spatial specificity needed to pinpoint control implementation 
in specific sensory areas, we used a flanker task with incongruent flankers in only 
one hemifield (congruent flankers in the other hemifield). Event-related potentials 
(ERPs) revealed modulations specifically in visual processing areas contralateral 
to the incongruent flankers. To test whether these modulations reflect increased or 
decreased processing of incongruent flankers, we investigated alpha power, a 
marker for attentional inhibition. Importantly, we show increased alpha power 
over visual areas processing incongruent flankers from 300 to 500 ms post-
stimulus onset. This suggests fast cognitive control by attentional inhibition for 
                                                     
1 Janssens, C., De Loof, E., Boehler, C. N., Pourtois, G., & Verguts, T. (submitted). 
Occipital alpha power reveals fast attentional inhibition of incongruent distractors. 
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information disrupting goal-oriented actions. Additionally, we show that mid-
frontal theta earlier in the trial is also modulated by incongruency, and that theta 
power predicts subsequent control implementation. This supports the hypothesis 
that mid-frontal conflict detection leads to control implementation, and reveals that 
these mechanisms take place on a fast, within-trial timescale. Notably, we show 
conflict detection and attentional inhibition for both stimulus-incongruent (SI) and 
response-incongruent (RI) trials, showing that response conflict is not a 
prerequisite for control implementation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Routine activities, such as driving a car, are often performed automatically, 
without consciously deciding which actions to perform. However, when a cyclist 
suddenly crosses the street, the flow of automatic functioning is broken and we are 
forced to focus attention on relevant stimuli in the environment to guide deliberate 
actions. Such goal-directed behavior relies on cognitive control, a set of top-down 
mechanisms employed to regulate more basic processes (Botvinick, Cohen, & 
Carter, 2004). Since cognitive control is vital for everyday functioning, it has been 
extensively studied in psychology, often with congruency tasks (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974; Hazeltine, Poldrack, & Gabrieli, 2000; MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 
1935). In such tasks a response conflict is induced between a target stimulus and 
distracting stimuli in order to manipulate cognitive control. 
Classical theoretical models assume cognitive control to be a rather slow 
process (Posner & Presti, 1987; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Consistently, 
computational models (e.g., conflict monitoring theory, Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001) have typically implemented relatively slow (trial-to-trial) 
cognitive control. In contrast, recent associative models of control do predict that 
control adaptation can occur rapidly, within trials. Such models state that control 
is implemented via associations between perceptual, motor, and control 
representations (Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016; Egner, 2014; 
Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). Perceptual or motor input quickly activates 
associated control representations, which in turn influence perceptual or motor 
processes. Also reward representations are known to trigger or enhance control 
(Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, & Sommer, 2011). In a behavioral study, Janssens, De 
Loof, Pourtois, & Verguts (2016) already show the fast associative nature of this 
by showing rapid control implementation in response to a reward cue. 
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On the neural level, conflict is thought to trigger control representations in 
mid-frontal brain areas (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)). These 
representations in turn activate sensory cortical areas responsible for stimulus 
processing (Botvinick et al., 2001). This purported pathway has gained some 
support from fMRI, where congruency boosts activity in task-relevant sensory 
areas (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Weissman, Warner, & Woldorff, 2004) or suppresses 
activity in irrelevant sensory areas (Polk, Drake, Jonides, Smith, & Smith, 2008). 
However, due to the slow resolution of the BOLD signal, these studies cannot 
reveal the timescale of these sensory adaptations and thus cannot directly show the 
fast associative nature of these modulations. EEG is a temporally much more 
precise technique and has been used to investigate fast control processes. 
Scherbaum, Fischer, Dshemuchadse, & Goschke (2011) applied EEG with 
frequency tagging and showed that attention focused on the target stimulus 
increased during stimulus processing, whereas attention to distractors decreased. 
Importantly these changes occurred continuously throughout the trial, 
demonstrating the fast dynamics of the control system.  
To localize sensory control processes in both time and specific sensory 
regions, Appelbaum, Smith, Boehler, Chen and Woldorff (2011) used ERPs to 
study distractor processing in sensory brain areas during a trial. They administered 
a lateralized Eriksen flanker task, in which incongruent flanker letters appeared in 
only one visual hemifield (congruent flankers always appeared in the other 
hemifield). When comparing occipital activation for left vs. right hemifield 
incongruent flanker trials, they obtained a lateralized incongruency difference 
(LID), showing differential ERP activity to incongruent versus congruent flankers. 
However, it remains to be tested whether the LID is caused by the visual 
discrepancy between target and flankers, or by the response conflict. In other 
words, it is unclear whether this processing reflects bottom-up attentional capture 
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by visually distinct flankers or instead an active control process downregulating 
attention for response-conflicting flankers. Since this study only included 
congruent (CON) and response incongruent (RI) trials, differences cannot be 
unambiguously attributed to the response incongruency. Moreover, it remains 
unclear how to interpret the sign of an ERP voltage difference. 
To address these issues, we introduced stimulus incongruent (SI) stimuli, in 
which there is a visual discrepancy between target and flanker, but no response 
incongruency. This allows an unambiguous attribution of the effects of differences 
between flankers and targets. More broadly, the importance of the distinction 
between RI and SI is illustrated by fMRI and EEG research demonstrating ACC 
activation for RI but not for SI trials (Van Veen & Carter, 2002; Van Veen, Cohen, 
Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001, but see Wendt, Heldmann, Münte, & Kluwe, 
2007).  
A second important feature of our study is a time-frequency decomposition 
of the EEG data. Time-frequency analysis of EEG data allows to study changes in 
power over time in separate frequency bands. Unlike the polarity of an ERP 
component, which cannot be linked in a straightforward manner to increases or 
decreases in neural activity, changes in power in specific frequency bands allow 
for relatively clear interpretations of the underlying cognitive process. In particular, 
power in the alpha range (approximately 8 to 12 Hz) is increased in sensory areas 
processing distracting stimuli in sustained attention tasks (Kelly, Lalor, Reilly, & 
Foxe, 2006; Thut, Nietzel, Brandt, & Pascual-Leone, 2006; Worden, Foxe, Wang, 
& Simpson, 2000). It is thought that such alpha power enhancements are used for 
active inhibition of cortical areas (Jensen, Bonnefond, & VanRullen, 2012; Jensen 
& Mazaheri, 2010). Furthermore, alpha power is negatively correlated with brain 
activity (Haegens, Nacher, Luna, Romo, & Jensen, 2011; Laufs et al., 2003; Ritter, 
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Moosmann, & Villringer, 2009). In general, changes in alpha power are a well-
established empirical index of attentional modulation and thus offer a powerful tool 
to investigate fast sensory-specific cognitive control. In addition, power in the theta 
band (approximately 4 to 8 Hz) has been coupled with conflict and error detection 
processes, since frontal theta power is increased in a wide variety of cognitive 
control tasks (Cavanagh, Zambrano-Vazquez, & Allen, 2012; Cohen, van Gaal, 
Ridderinkhof, & Lamme, 2009). We therefore also investigated the time course of 
mid-frontal theta power. 
The current study combined lateralized incongruency (both SI and RI) with 
time-frequency analysis to investigate the time course of control in visual sensory 
areas. The LID ERP (Appelbaum et al., 2011) shows that incongruent flankers are 
rapidly processed. If flankers visually distinct from the target draw attention, we 
predicted less alpha power (more attention) in areas processing these flankers than 
in areas processing flankers identical to the target. Also, we predicted that this 
modulation of alpha would be observed both in SI and RI conditions. On the other 
hand, if cognitive control operates by inhibiting attention for response-conflicting 
flankers, we predicted the opposite, namely more alpha power (less attention) in 
areas processing incongruent flankers. Moreover, we predicted that this active 
control process would be triggered by response conflict, and thus would only 
appear in the RI condition, but not in the SI condition. In this study, alpha power 
was compared across CON, SI, and RI conditions to pit these predictions against 
one another. Finally, we also investigated the relation of sensory modulations with 
activity in frontal conflict detection areas by linking alpha power to frontal theta 
power, a likely neural marker for ACC conflict processing.  
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METHODS 
Experimental design 
Twenty paid subjects participated to this experiment. Participants performed 
a flanker task similar to the one used by Appelbaum et al. (2011). An overview of 
the paradigm and stimuli is presented in Figure 1. A total of 384 trials were 
presented in 16 blocks of 24 trials, interspersed by self-paced breaks. Stimuli 
consisting of five letters were presented for 800 ms, mixed with jittered 
interstimulus intervals sampled from a uniform distribution (1600-2000 ms). The 
presented stimulus consisted of one central target letter and four flanker letters, two 
to the left and two to the right of the central target (see Figure 1A). Stimulus letters 
came from a set of four letters. There were two possible sets of letters (set 1 = 
ABCD, set 2 = WXYZ). Sets were counterbalanced across participants, so each 
participant only received letters from one set. Participants were instructed to 
respond to the identity of the central target letter with a button press as soon as 
possible. Two letters mapped onto one response (see Figure 1B). Since the 
experiment took place following another similar experiment (same experiment for 
each participant; outside the scope of this paper) with the same response mapping, 
this mapping was well-learned by the beginning of the experiment. Stimuli were 
congruent (50%), stimulus incongruent (SI, 25%), or response incongruent (RI, 
25%). For both types of incongruent stimuli, incongruent flankers were presented 
on both sides of the central target (33%) or on only one side of the central target 
(33% only left and 33% only right). If incongruent flankers were presented on one 
side of the target, congruent flankers were presented on the opposite side (see 
Figure 1C). 
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Figure 1. Overview of the flanker paradigm. (A) A stimulus was presented (800 ms) 
consisting of one central target letter and two flanker letters on each side of the target. 
Stimuli were interspersed with a jittered interval (1600-2000 ms). (B) There were four 
possible targets, linked to only two responses. (C) There were congruent (CON, 50 %), 
stimulus-incongruent (SI, 25%) and response-incongruent (RI, 25%) trials in the 
experiment. SI and RI trials could have bilaterally incongruent flankers (33%) or 
unilaterally incongruent flankers (left or right hemifield, both 33%). 
 
EEG data acquisition, processing and analysis 
Continuous EEG activity was acquired at 512 Hz using a 64-channel (pin-
type) Biosemi Active Two system (http://www.biosemi.com) referenced to the 
CMS-DRL ground and positioned according to the extended 10/20 international 
EEG system. Six additional electrodes were attached to the head: left and right 
mastoids, two electrodes for vertical and horizontal electro-oculogram. 
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EEG data were analyzed using EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and 
ERPLAB (http://erpinfo.org/erplab) software, running on MATLAB. The data 
were re-referenced offline to linked mastoids. Independent component analysis 
(ICA) was performed on continuous data to identify and remove components 
associated with eye blink and horizontal eye movement artifacts. Epochs of -200 
to +1000 ms locked to stimulus onset were selected. Semi-automatic artifact 
rejection was applied to the data using a 200 μV threshold for initial artifact 
marking and visual inspection for final artifact removal.  
For ERP analysis the epochs were baseline corrected to the pre-stimulus 
period. Next, the epochs were averaged per condition per participant and a grand 
average across participants was created resulting in one average ERP per condition. 
To enhance spatial resolution, these averages were transformed using the CSD 
toolbox for Laplacian transformation (Kayser & Tenke, 2006; 
http://psychophysiology.cpmc.columbia. edu/software/CSDtoolbox). Current 
source densities (CSDs) were calculated according to the spherical spline algorithm 
of Perrin, Pernier, Bertrand, & Echallier (1989), using a 10 cm head radius and a 
smoothing constant of 1−5.  
Previous research by Appelbaum et al. (2011) used the LID to show activity 
specific to incongruent flankers. The LID was computed by subtracting the signal 
for trials with incongruent flankers in the right hemifield (e.g., AAA**; here, * can 
be any SI or RI flanker in the stimulus set, e.g., AAABB or AAACC) from the 
signal for trials with incongruent flankers in the left hemifield (**AAA). Note that 
the LID shown by Appelbaum et al. (2011) in Figure 3C is defined as contra – 
ipsilateral flanker presentation, resulting in a symmetrical difference by definition, 
whereas the LID here is defined as left – right flanker presentation, resulting in a 
typically non-symmetrical difference. The LID was quantified at electrodes PO7 
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(left hemisphere) and PO8 (right hemisphere) for further analysis. These electrode 
sites were selected based on Appelbaum et al. (2011) and on previous literature 
showing that these electrode locations index lateralized visual attention processes 
(Eimer, 1996; Hickey, Di Lollo, & McDonald, 2009). To investigate the LID, the 
interaction of electrode site (left vs. right hemisphere) and side of the incongruent 
flankers (left vs. right visual hemifield) was tested. To determine differences in 
LID for SI vs. RI conditions, congruency type was also added to the analysis, 
resulting in a repeated-measures ANOVA performed for ERP amplitudes with 
three factors: (1) congruency (RI vs SI), (2) electrode site (left hemisphere vs right 
hemisphere) and (3) incongruent flanker side (left hemifield vs right hemifield). 
This analysis was done for a number of different time windows, ranging from 100 
to 600 ms post stimulus onset in steps of 50 ms (selected times based on 
Appelbaum et al., 2011). 
For the time-frequency analysis, Fast-Fourier Transform (FFT) was applied 
to the selected epochs in a moving window (width: 250 time points/488 ms, with 
Hann tapering), resulting in power estimates ranging from -100 ms to 600 ms (step 
10 ms) locked to stimulus onset. Single trial event-related spectral perturbation 
(ERSP; i.e., power) estimates were acquired using the newtimef function from 
EEGLAB. Estimates were obtained for 15 uniformly distributed frequencies 
ranging from 2 to 30 Hz. Obtained output of the function was baseline corrected to 
the pre-stimulus period (baseline per subject, frequency, electrode and condition), 
and then converted to decibel. Note that due to decibel conversion, the sum of the 
baseline is not necessarily zero and there may appear to be differences between 
conditions at stimulus onset (approach based on Cohen, 2014). 
We defined our time-frequency ROIs (TF-ROIs) based on the grand-average 
time-frequency analysis (as in Cavanagh et al., 2012, see Figure 2), and hence 
OCCIPITAL ALPHA POWER REVEALS  
FAST ATTENTIONAL INHIBITION OF INCONGRUENT FLANKERS     75 
independent of the specific research question. This revealed a power increase in 
the theta band (4-8 Hz) followed by a power decrease in the alpha band (8-14 Hz). 
For the purpose of the research question, we selected occipital regions: PO7 for the 
left hemisphere, PO8 for the right hemisphere. These same electrodes were used to 
determine the LID and are commonly used when investigating occipital alpha (e.g. 
Kelly et al., 2006). For frontal regions electrode Fz was selected. This electrode 
has a location similar to that used by Appelbaum et al. (2011). 
Both occipital alpha and frontal theta power were analyzed. Based on the 
TF-ROIs (see Figure 2) occipital alpha power was defined as mean power at 12 Hz 
in the interval 300-500 ms post stimulus onset, representing the observed alpha 
power decrease. Frontal theta was defined as the peak amplitude of the initial theta 
power increase (power at 6 Hz at 160 ms post stimulus onset). Power estimates 
were standardized per subject, and outliers were removed (more than four standard 
deviations from mean) prior to statistical analyses. 
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Figure 2. ERSP (power) locked to stimulus presentation (at time 0) at frontal (Fz, panel A) 
and occipital (average of PO7 and PO8, panel B) sites. A power increase in the theta band 
(3 – 8 Hz) peaking around 160 ms was followed by a power decrease in the alpha band (8 
– 14 Hz) peaking between 300 and 500 ms. TF-ROIs were based on this pattern of power 
changes. 
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RESULTS 
Behavioral results  
For RT analysis (see Figure 3), error trials and post-error trials were 
removed. First, a linear mixed effects (LME) model was fitted for RTs with 
congruency (CON vs. SI vs. RI) as a fixed factor and a random intercept per 
subject. Results show a main effect of congruency, F(1, 6573) = 26.8, p < 0.001. 
Follow-up contrasts revealed that RTs on CON trials (in grey) were significantly 
faster than on SI trials (in blue), t(6573) = 4.16, p < 0.001, and faster than on RI 
trials (in orange), t(6573) = 7.06, p < 0.001. Also RTs on SI trials were faster than 
on RI trials, t(6573) = 2.52, p = 0.01.  
Second, to investigate the effect of laterality of the incongruent flankers, 
congruent trials were excluded from the analysis, since laterality is not defined for 
congruent trials. A LME model was fitted for RTs with congruency (SI vs. RI) and 
laterality of the incongruent flankers (unilateral vs. bilateral) as fixed factors and a 
random intercept per subject. This revealed a main effect of congruency, F(1, 3265) 
= 5.95, p = 0.01, with again faster RTs for SI than for RI trials, and a main effect 
of laterality, F(1, 3265) = 5.29, p = 0.02, with faster RTs for unilateral compared 
to bilateral incongruent flankers. There was no significant interaction of 
congruency and laterality, F(1,3265) = 0.02, p > 0.05, indicating an SI vs. RI 
difference both with unilateral and bilateral incongruent flankers. 
Mean accuracy was 92.5%. First, a generalized LME model for binary 
responses was fitted for accuracy with congruency (congruent vs. SI vs. RI) as a 
fixed factor and a random intercept per subject. There was no effect of congruency, 
χ2(2, N = 20) = 0.42, p > 0.05. Second, to investigate the effect of laterality of the 
incongruent flankers, congruent trials were excluded from the analysis, since for 
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congruent trials laterality is not defined. A model was fitted with congruency (SI 
vs. RI) and laterality of the incongruent flankers (unilateral vs. bilateral) as fixed 
factors and a random intercept per subject. This revealed no effect of congruency 
χ2(1, N = 20) = 0.97, p > 0.05, no main effect of laterality, χ2(1, N = 20) = 0.91, p > 
0.05, and also no interaction, χ2(1, N = 20) = 1.34, p > 0.05. 
 
 
Figure 3. Behavioral results for reaction times (RTs). Error bars reflect standard errors. 
There was a significant effect of congruency on RTs with fastest RTs for congruent, slowest 
for RI and intermediate for SI trials. This congruency effect did not interact with laterality 
of the incongruent flankers (uni- or bilateral).  
 
EEG results  
Lateralized incongruency difference 
To investigate the LID and the effect of congruency type, a repeated 
measures ANOVA for mean amplitudes was performed with three factors: (1) 
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congruency (RI vs SI), (2) electrode site (left hemisphere vs right hemisphere) and 
(3) incongruent flanker side (left hemifield vs right hemifield). The LID 
(interaction of electrode site and flanker side) was significant in all 50 ms windows 
from 250 to 450 ms (p < 0.05, indicated in Figure 4 by black rectangle) and was 
marginally significant in windows from 450 to 550 ms (p < 0.07, indicated in 
Figure 4 by grey dashed square). In all other time windows it was not significant 
(p > 0.10). The LID did not differ for SI vs. RI conditions in any of the tested time 
windows, as was shown by a non-significant three-way interaction of electrode site, 
flanker side and congruency type (p > 0.10). 
 
 
Figure 4. Lateralized incongruency difference (LID): ERP topographical plots for the 
difference between left hemifield incongruent-flanker trials (**AAA) and right hemifield 
incongruent-flanker trials (AAA**) are shown. Mean amplitude in a 50 ms time window is 
plotted ranging from 100 to 600 ms post stimulus onset. A lateralized pattern of activation 
(negative difference in the left hemisphere, positive in the right hemisphere) shows that 
incongruent flankers are processed differently from congruent flankers. This is the case for 
both SI and RI conditions.  
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Occipital alpha power is increased for irrelevant flankers 
The effect of incongruent flankers on alpha power in lateral occipital 
electrodes was tested. Lateralized alpha power, the difference in alpha power for 
left vs. right hemisphere (power at PO7 minus power at PO8), was determined on 
every trial. A LME model was fitted for this hemispheric difference in alpha power 
with presentation side of the incongruent flankers (left vs. right hemifield) as a 
fixed factor and a random intercept per subject. Importantly, this revealed a 
significant effect of incongruent flanker side on alpha power lateralization, χ2(1, N 
= 20) = 6.47, p = 0.01. Figure 5 shows lateralized alpha power in the interval 300-
500 ms post stimulus onset, with negative values indicating more alpha in right 
hemisphere (so more attention for the left visual hemifield) and positive values 
indicating more alpha power in the left hemisphere (so more attention for the right 
visual hemifield). Trials with left incongruent distractors (**AAA) elicited more 
alpha power in the right hemisphere than in the left hemisphere (negative value in 
Figure 5), suggesting more attention directed to the right hemifield, away from the 
distractors. Trials with right incongruent distractors (AAA**) reversely elicited 
more alpha power in the left hemisphere than in the right hemisphere (positive 
value in Figure 5), suggesting more attention directed to the left hemifield, again 
away from the distractors. This pattern of results is similar for SI and RI trials; the 
interaction of distractor hemifield and congruency type (SI vs. RI) was not 
significant, χ2(1, N = 20) = 0.78, p = 0.38. There was also no main effect of 
congruency type χ2(1, N = 20) = 1.15, p = 0.28.  
Figure 6 shows the time course of alpha power in more detail. It again shows 
more alpha power in the hemisphere contralateral to incongruent flankers, and 
shows that this difference in alpha power occurs between 300 and 500 ms post 
stimulus onset.  
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To test if the observed alpha power modulations predict behavior, an LME 
model was fitted for RTs with alpha lateralization (alpha contralateral minus alpha 
ipsilateral to incongruent flankers) as a predictor and a random intercept per 
subject. Lateralized alpha power was not significantly predictive of RTs, χ2(1, N = 
20) = 0.01, p = 0.97.  
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Figure 5. Lateralized alpha power (alpha power at PO7 – alpha power at PO8) in the 
interval 300-500 ms post stimulus onset. Positive values indicate more alpha power in the 
left hemisphere (so less attention for the right visual hemifield). Negative values indicate 
more alpha power in the right hemisphere (so less attention for the left visual hemifield). 
Trials with left incongruent distractors (**AAA) elicit more alpha power in the right 
hemisphere (negative difference). Trials with right incongruent distractors (AAA**) elicit 
more alpha power in the left hemisphere (positive values). This indicates that processing of 
incongruent flankers is inhibited by attenuating attention. This pattern of results is similar 
for SI (blue) and RI (orange) trials.  
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Figure 6. Alpha power (12 Hz) over time, measured at left and right hemisphere electrodes 
for left and right incongruent flankers. Trials with left incongruent distractors (**AAA, 
panels A and B) elicit more alpha power (and hence more attentional inhibition) in the right 
(contralateral) hemisphere. Trials with right incongruent distractors (AAA**, panels C and 
D) elicit more alpha power in the left (contralateral) hemisphere. Hence, both for AAA** 
and **AAA conditions, more alpha in the hemisphere contralateral to incongruent flankers 
is observed, indicating that attention for incongruent flankers is inhibited. This pattern of 
results is similar for SI (panels A and C in blue) and RI (panels B and D in orange) trials. 
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Frontal theta power is modulated by stimulus incongruency 
To examine frontal control mechanisms that might influence these sensory 
processes, the effect of congruency on frontal theta power was examined (see 
Figure 7). An LME model was fitted for theta power at the peak of the theta 
increase (160 ms) with congruency (CON vs. SI vs. RI) as a fixed factor, and a 
random intercept per subject. Results show a main effect of congruency, χ2(2, N = 
20) = 10.9, p = 0.004. Follow-up contrasts revealed a significant difference 
between CON and RI trials, t(4533) = 3.23, p < 0.001, a marginally significant 
difference between CON and SI trials, t(4533) = 1.75, p = 0.08 and no significant 
difference between SI and RI trials, t(4533) = 1.28, p = 0.20. To test if theta power 
predicts behavior, an LME model was fitted for RTs with theta power as a predictor 
and a random intercept per subject. Theta power was not significantly predictive of 
RTs, χ2(1, N = 20) = 0.33, p = 0.56. 
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Figure 7. Frontal theta power (6 Hz) in electrode Fz, time locked to stimulus presentation. 
Following stimulus presentation, theta power increases (peaks around 160 ms). Theta 
power is significantly influenced by congruency, with no significant difference in theta 
between RI and SI trials, significantly more theta power for RI trials compared CON trials 
and marginally significantly more power for SI trials compared to CON trials (peak 
amplitude). 
 
Theta power predicts alpha power on single trial level 
To test our hypothesis of frontal theta leading control through alpha power 
modulations, we also fitted an LME model for alpha lateralization (alpha power 
contralateral minus alpha power ipsilateral to incongruent flanker presentation) 
with theta power as a predictor and a random intercept per subject. We found 
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evidence for a direct influence of theta power on alpha power modulations, χ2(1, N 
= 20) = 4.33, p = 0.04, with higher theta power predicting more pronounced 
lateralized alpha modulations. 
DISCUSSION 
We capitalized on the high temporal resolution of EEG to investigate within-
trial modulations of cognitive control, specifically in sensory processing areas. To 
ensure sufficient spatial precision to localize activity in sensory areas, we applied 
a lateralized flanker paradigm. The LID showed early processing differences for 
congruent versus incongruent (both SI and RI) flankers. We used alpha power to 
determine whether this LID signifies increased or decreased attention for 
distracting information. We hypothesized that if visually distinct flankers capture 
attention, there should be less alpha power in areas processing incongruent 
flankers. These modulations should then be present in both SI and RI conditions, 
since the visual discrepancy appears in both. If on the other hand, incongruent 
flankers elicit cognitive control, there should be more alpha power in areas 
processing these incongruent flankers, reflecting active inhibition of attention. This 
effect should be present only in the RI condition, where a response conflict occurs, 
since response conflict is generally believed to drive cognitive control. We 
observed higher alpha power in areas processing incongruent flankers, which 
strongly supports the cognitive control hypothesis. However, this alpha modulation 
did not differ for SI and RI trials, suggesting that control was triggered by the 
stimulus incongruency rather than response conflict. Similarly, frontal theta power 
earlier in the trial, marking conflict detection, was also modulated by stimulus 
incongruency rather than response conflict. Moreover, theta power was predictive 
of alpha modulations, suggesting that stimulus incongruency was detected in 
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frontal regions and subsequently, control was implemented in specific sensory 
areas processing irrelevant information. Crucially, we show that these control 
mechanisms operate on a fast, within-trial timescale. 
An important argument of the current study was that incongruent flankers 
might in principle decrease alpha power (indexing increased attention). Indeed, 
visual search literature shows that stimuli that differ from their surroundings ‘pop 
out’ and draw attention (Treisman, 1985). This phenomenon is known as 
attentional capture (Posner, 1980) and is strongly stimulus-driven (Jonides & 
Yantis, 1988; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994). In a static array of visual stimuli a 
discontinuity involuntarily captures attention (Burnham & Neely, 2008; Burnham, 
Neely, Naginsky, & Thomas, 2010). Consistently, when stimuli are presented 
serially, neural responses gradually decrease for repeating visual stimuli, a 
phenomenon called repetition suppression (Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, 
Mesulam, & Egner, 2008). Similarly, alpha power decreases across repetitions 
(Engell & Mccarthy, 2014). Taken together, studies with both simultaneous and 
serial stimulus presentation predict decreased attention for repeated stimuli but 
increased attention for discrepant stimuli. In the current study, we use a static array 
of visual stimuli where the target is repeated in one visual hemifield and a visual 
break between target and incongruent flankers is created in the other visual 
hemifield. Based on the attention literature above, we hypothesized that such a 
discontinuity might capture attention. However, we find exactly the opposite, 
namely less alpha power for repeating (congruent) flankers and more alpha power 
for discrepant (incongruent) flankers. This points to an active top-down control 
mechanism inhibiting the incongruent flankers rather than stimulus-driven 
attentional capture. 
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Our interpretation of increased alpha for incongruent flankers as a marker 
for increased cognitive control depends on the notion that alpha oscillations have 
an active inhibitory function. Initially alpha oscillations were thought to reflect 
cortical inactivity (Pfurtscheller, Stancák, & Neuper, 1996), but strong evidence 
currently supports the hypothesis that alpha oscillations mark active inhibition of 
irrelevant information, to promote the processing of relevant information (gating 
by inhibition, for a review see Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010). For instance, a number 
of studies show that alpha power decreases in brain regions that are actively 
involved in task performance, and that alpha modulations predict task performance 
(Kelly et al., 2006; Thut et al., 2006; Worden et al., 2000). Decreased alpha power 
has also been clearly linked to increased BOLD activity measured by fMRI (Laufs 
et al., 2003; Ritter et al., 2009). Finally, intracranial recordings in monkey during 
task performance demonstrate that neural firing is locked to the troughs of alpha 
oscillations in the local field potentials (Haegens et al., 2011). This strongly links 
alpha power modulations to the engagement and inhibition of certain brain areas 
and supports our interpretation of increased alpha as reflecting increased cognitive 
control. 
Both classical (Botvinick et al., 2001) and more recent associative 
(Abrahamse et al., 2016; Egner, 2014; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009) accounts 
of cognitive control predict that control is guided by frontal regions that are 
activated when a challenging event, such as an incongruency or an error, occurs. 
This initial detection of conflict is reflected in a mid-frontal theta power increase 
for incongruent or error trials (Cavanagh et al., 2012; Nigbur, Cohen, 
Ridderinkhof, & Stürmer, 2012). Earlier work observed an increased synchrony 
between frontal theta and occipital alpha on post-error trials, supporting the 
connection between error detection and control implementation (Cohen et al., 
2009). Another study reported a correlation between frontal theta increases and 
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occipital alpha decreases following errors (Mazaheri, Nieuwenhuis, van Dijk, & 
Jensen, 2009). Consistently, we observed that theta power at 160 ms post-stimulus 
onset predicts alpha power modulations later in the trial, from 300 to 500 ms. 
Higher theta power was linked to a more pronounced inhibition of attention for 
irrelevant information. The timing of these events and their correlation strongly 
suggest that initial incongruency detection reflected in theta power leads control 
implementation in sensory areas later during the trial. Importantly, this happens on 
a very fast (within-trial) timescale, before the response is given. Such a fast 
timescale is predicted by associative models for control, but not by classical 
theories, that typically predict slower, trial-by-trial control modulations.  
Theta and alpha power responded similarly to SI and RI conditions, 
suggesting that not response conflict but the visual stimulus incongruency initiates 
control implementation in this task. This aspect of the findings is in line with 
previous work (Nigbur et al., 2012) and can be interpreted from an associative 
control model perspective. Here, control is gradually learned while solving a task, 
depending on current task demands, and can occur at different levels. Subjects in 
an experiment search for and learn strategies that are useful for the particular task 
that is given to them, taking into account the stimuli and stimulus contingencies at 
hand (for a similar argument, see Brown, 2009; Pansky & Algom, 2002; Schmidt 
& De Houwer, 2012). In classical cognitive control tasks (where only CON and RI 
conditions are presented), ‘response conflict’ is the most relevant and obvious 
feature that predicts task performance and is picked up by participants. In the 
current context, we propose that subjects learn a different aspect of the task that 
predicts task performance. They learn that information in one or both hemifields 
can hinder performance. They consequently develop task-specific and location-
specific (left and right hemifield) representations that detect whether target and 
flankers are different. When these representations are activated by an experimental 
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stimulus, they trigger control mechanisms and inhibit processing of incongruent 
flankers. These representations are formed based on visual discrepancy, so they are 
triggered by both SI and RI trials, inhibiting incongruent flankers in both SI and RI 
conditions. Although currently speculative, the account can lead to testable 
predictions. For example, future studies with more power to detect changes across 
trials can investigate the evolution of alpha during the experiment. 
In conclusion, the current study shows that task-specific control (here 
triggered by stimulus incongruency) is implemented by inhibiting sensory 
processing of irrelevant stimuli, in sensory areas specific to these stimuli. This 
control process is guided by mid-frontal brain areas detecting the need for control, 
which is also task-specific. Crucially this occurs on a fast, within-trial timescale. 
The current study thus supports associative models for control that predict such fast 
and task-specific control mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PREPARING FOR HARD TIMES: 
SCALP AND INTRACRANIAL PHYSIOLOGICAL 
SIGNATURES OF PROACTIVE ATTENTIONAL CONTROL
1 
Based on reward and/or difficulty information people can strategically 
adjust proactive attentional control. fMRI research shows that motivated 
proactive control is implemented through fronto-parietal attentional control 
networks that are triggered by both reward and difficulty cues. In the current 
study we investigated electrophysiological signatures of proactive control, 
triggered by task difficulty. Previously, the contingent negative variation 
(CNV) in the event-related potentials and oscillatory power in the alpha band 
(8-14 Hz) have been suggested as signatures of control implementation. 
However, experimental designs did not allow to separate control 
implementation from motor preparation. Critically, we used a mental 
calculation task and studied the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN), 
carefully removing motor preparation, allowing us to interpret effects on the 
SPN and alpha power in a straightforward manner as proactive control 
implementation. We found a more negative SPN amplitude and decreased 
                                                     
1Janssens, C., Vassena, E., De Loof, E., De Taeye, L., Meurs, A., Van Roost, D., 
Boon, P., Raedt, R., & Verguts, T. (in preparation). Preparing for hard times: scalp 
and intracranial physiological signatures of proactive attentional control.  
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alpha power for hard versus easy calculations in the period leading up to task 
onset, showing increased proactive control implementation when a difficult 
task was expected. In addition to scalp EEG recordings, we also collected 
intracranial local field potential recordings in an epilepsy patient. We 
observed a slow component in the posterior parietal cortex, that was more 
pronounced for hard trials, similar to the scalp SPN observed for healthy 
participants. This is in line with previously reported involvement of the fronto-
parietal attentional network in motivated recruitment of proactive control for 
a difficult task. Also, we found a slow-drift activation pattern in the striatum 
(presumably putamen) and hippocampus, possibly reflecting task-specific 
preparation for difficult mental calculations. The current study thus shows 
that difficulty information triggers proactive control and demonstrates some 
of its neurophysiological signatures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When faced with a difficult or important task, humans can shift to a 
higher gear to perform the best they can. When warned about an upcoming 
task, top-down proactive cognitive control is used to regulate more basic 
cognitive processes (Braver, 2012). Control sharpens task performance, but 
also carries a cost (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010). This cost has 
to be weighed alongside possible benefits in the decision to enhance control 
(Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Whether 
or not cognitive control should be implemented is decided based on 
information about task difficulty and potential reward: control is expedient 
when a task is difficult and reward is likely. It has been shown in numerous 
studies that reward improves task performance (Aarts et al., 2014; Bijleveld, 
Custers, & Aarts, 2010; Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Janssens, De Loof, 
Pourtois, & Verguts, 2016; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010, 2011; Seitz, Kim, & 
Watanabe, 2009), and it is also well established that the experience (Gratton, 
Coles, & Donchin, 1992) or expectation (Aarts & Roelofs, 2011) of response 
conflict, a specific instance of task difficulty, enhances control. This influence 
of reward and difficulty information on control was also formalized in 
computational reinforcement learning models (Verguts, Vassena, & Silvetti, 
2015).  
This view on control is supported by fMRI studies showing that the 
anticipation of both reward and difficulty activate an overlapping brain 
network, consisting of several cortical and subcortical regions (Boehler et al., 
2011; Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song, & Woldorff, 2012; Padmala & Pessoa, 
2011; Vassena et al., 2014). This network closely matches the fronto-parietal 
attentional control network, including also subcortical areas such as the dorsal 
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striatum (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dosenbach et al., 2007; Gitelman et al., 
1999; Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000; 
Padmala & Pessoa, 2011). The subcortical areas involved in cognitive control 
are closely connected to cortical frontal and parietal control areas and make 
up some of the main targets of midbrain dopaminergic projections. Dopamine 
is a key component in motivational processes, activating and thus facilitating 
cognitive and behavioral processes (Wise, 2004). fMRI studies therefore 
concluded that both reward and difficulty information can act as motivational 
cues that influence strategic control through activation of dopaminergic 
pathways and the fronto-parietal control network. 
Many studies have looked for electrophysiological signatures of 
proactive control. One possible signature reported in the literature is the 
contingent negative variation (CNV), a slow negative deflection in the ERP, 
observed in the interval between a cue and an imperative stimulus requiring a 
speeded response (Brunia & van Boxtel, 2001; Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, 
McCallum, & Winter, 1964). Several studies show that reward information 
influences the CNV: the amplitude of the CNV is more pronounced when a 
rewarding task is expected (Schevernels, Krebs, Santens, Woldorff, & 
Boehler, 2014; van den Berg, Krebs, Lorist, & Woldorff, 2014). The influence 
of task difficulty on the CNV has also been investigated (Tecce, 1972). Just 
like a reward cue, a difficulty cue increases the CNV amplitude (Schevernels 
et al., 2014; Vanlessen, De Raedt, Mueller, Rossi, & Pourtois, 2015). 
Interestingly, the CNV amplitude correlates with activation in the fronto-
parietal network (Grent-‘t-Jong & Woldorff, 2007). However, the CNV 
studies discussed above do not provide a clear electrophysiological signature 
of proactive attentional control implementation. Indeed, the CNV is believed 
to reflect not only cognitive control but also motor preparation for an 
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upcoming task (Brunia & van Boxtel, 2001) making it difficult to assign 
variations in CNV amplitude to changes specifically in activation of brain 
areas involved in proactive control. Some studies have separated motor and 
non-motor parts of the CNV, either by timing and topography or by applying 
experimental paradigms postponing the motor response. However, these were 
mostly simple discrimination studies that did not have the research focus on 
proactive cognitive control of the current study (Frost, Neill, & Fenelon, 1988; 
Rohrbaugh, Syndulko, & Lindsley, 1976; Ruchkin, Sutton, Mahaffey, & 
Glaser, 1986).  
In the electrophysiological literature, attentional anticipation in absence 
of any motor component has been investigated extensively by studying the 
stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN; for reviews see Brunia & van Boxtel, 
2001; van Boxtel & Böcker, 2004). The SPN is very closely related to the 
CNV. It is also a slow negative deflection in the ERP marking preparatory 
attentional processes. Critically, the SPN is not locked to a stimulus requiring 
a speeded response; it is typically defined as a preparatory component seen 
before a stimulus providing information on performance, such as a feedback 
or reward stimulus, and not before task onset. To make strong claims about 
cognitive proactive control (without the confound of motor preparation) in the 
current study, we studied the SPN; however, in contrast to most earlier studies, 
we did not study it locked to feedback, but instead to a cue relevant for active 
task preparation. In particular, we used a cognitive task that separates 
attentional from motor preparation. The task was taken from earlier fMRI 
research; here, difficulty information activated the anticipatory fronto-parietal 
network, in absence of motor preparation (Vassena et al., 2014). Like the 
CNV, the SPN has a more pronounced amplitude when a rewarding event is 
expected (Brunia, Hackley, van Boxtel, Kotani, & Ohgami, 2011; Fuentemilla 
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et al., 2013). The effect of difficulty information on the SPN has not been 
investigated often, since the SPN is usually studied before a feedback stimulus 
(i.e., after the task), rather than before a task onset cue. A few studies did 
investigate the effect of cued difficulty on the SPN in simple visual 
discrimination tasks and report little or no effect (Hillman, Apparies, & 
Hatfield, 2000; Kotani & Aihara, 1999). In contrast, based on computational 
models and fMRI research, we expected that similar to reward anticipation, 
also difficulty anticipation would influence the SPN. 
The SPN (and the ERP approach in general) provides only one 
electrophysiological signature of control, namely phase-locked effects in the 
EEG (Kappenman & Luck, 2011). To provide a more complete picture of 
cognitive processes, including phase-locked and non-phase-locked events in 
the EEG signal, time-frequency decomposition of the signal can be used 
(Cohen, 2014). To study attentional control, power in the alpha band (8-14 
Hz) is particularly interesting since a decrease in (occipital) alpha power has 
been observed when attention is increased in a visual attention paradigm 
(Kelly, Lalor, Reilly, & Foxe, 2006; Worden, Foxe, Wang, & Simpson, 2000). 
Also, increased parietal alpha power has been linked to suppression of external 
stimuli, whereas decreased parietal alpha power has been linked to increased 
attention for such external stimuli (Benedek, Schickel, Jauk, Fink, & 
Neubauer, 2014). In a cued speeded response task, the influence of reward 
expectation on control implementation is also reflected in alpha power, with 
less occipital and centro-parietal alpha power (so more attention) when a 
reward was expected (van den Berg et al., 2014). Unfortunately, just like in 
the CNV studies discusses above, alpha power measured in this study does 
not reflect pure cognitive preparation but is likely also influenced by motor 
preparation. Crucially, the effect of difficulty information on alpha power in 
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a cognitive task (unconfounded by motor preparation) has, to our knowledge, 
not been investigated thus far. 
The first aim of the current study was to reveal a detailed 
electrophysiological signature of proactive control implementation in 
response to cued task difficulty. By studying both the SPN amplitude 
and alpha power changes we captured all aspects of attentional 
preparation in the EEG, both phase-locked and non-phase-locked. To 
provide an unambiguous and interpretable signal we carefully 
eliminated the motor response from the task. Participants performed a 
(purely cognitive) calculation task, that required no motor response 
until the calculation was finished, several seconds after SPN 
calculation. Hence any effects of difficulty information on pre-task 
activity can be assigned to changes in cognitive preparation. Based on 
theoretical models of proactive attentional control (Braver, 2012; 
Verguts et al., 2015) and previous fMRI research (Aarts & Roelofs, 
2011; Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014) we hypothesized that 
difficulty information would influence control via activation of the 
fronto-parietal control network and subcortical areas, typically involved 
in top-down attentional control. We further hypothesized that this 
would be reflected in both decreased alpha power and increased SPN 
amplitude for hard trials compared to easy trials in the period leading 
up to the task. 
The second aim of the current study was to directly link the 
observations at the scalp level to their putative source, the fronto-
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parietal control network. Through dipole fitting (Böcker, Brunia, & van 
den Berg-Lenssen, 1994) and PET (Brunia, de Jong, van den Berg-
Lenssen, & Paans, 2000), several areas have been proposed as 
contributing sources to the SPN, including the lateral prefrontal cortex, 
insula and posterior parietal cortex. For the CNV, fMRI-seeded source 
modeling revealed again frontal and parietal areas contributing to the 
signal measured at the scalp, as well as visual-sensory occipital areas 
(Grent-‘t-Jong & Woldorff, 2007). These studies thus already suggest 
involvement of fronto-parietal network in generating these slow-wave 
attentional components. In the current study we used a more direct 
measure of electrical brain activity, namely intracranial local field 
potential recordings in a patient diagnosed with epilepsy. EEG source 
modeling techniques such as dipole fitting and sLORETA are not suited 
to investigate deep sources due to volume conduction, so intracranial 
recordings provide an excellent opportunity to investigate deep 
subcortical sources more reliably. In this study the resulting high spatial 
resolution measurements in the parietal cortex, dorsal striatum 
(putamen), insula and hippocampus were investigated and compared to 
the scalp measures of the control subjects, linking the scalp SPN to 
activity in these areas and the attentional control network in general. 
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METHOD 
Experimental design 
Nineteen paid subjects participated in this experiment. Participants 
performed 256 trials of a cued serial mental calculation task. Self-paced breaks 
occurred every 16 trials. Participants performed mental calculations that could 
be easy or difficult (both 50 % of trials). For an overview of trial events see 
Figure 1. On each trial, a cue was presented for 3000 ms, informing 
participants of the difficulty of the upcoming calculation (‘E’ for easy or ‘D’ 
for difficult). The cue was followed by a blank screen (200 ms) and an initial 
number (1000 ms), marking task onset. Two operations to perform on this 
initial number were presented serially (1000 ms each, interspersed by blank 
screens for 500 ms). Subjects were instructed to mentally perform each 
operation when presented, and they were finally asked to choose between two 
possible outcomes (presented for 2000 ms, which was also the response time 
limitation). The correct and an incorrect outcome were presented left and right 
on the screen (location of the correct outcome was random) and an outcome 
could be selected by pressing a left or right button, corresponding to the 
location on the screen. Following the response, feedback was presented 
(correct or incorrect, presented for 1000 ms). For correct responses 
participants received 100 points which was also shown in the feedback (+100 
points, +0 points for incorrect responses). Trials were interspersed by a 200 
ms blank screen.  
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Figure 1. Overview of a trial in the mental calculation task. At cue onset, a cue (letter 
E for easy or D for difficult) was presented, reliably predicting task difficulty. At task 
onset, a number was presented. This was followed by two operations to be performed 
on this number (presented sequentially). The SPN amplitude and power in the alpha 
frequency band were studied in the interval between the cue onset and task onset.  
 
Before the start of the experiment participants completed the need for 
cognition questionnaire (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984). They also 
performed a training block of 16 trials. In this block they rated each calculation 
on how difficult and how enjoyable it was on a 7 point Likert scale. No EEG 
was recorded during this training block. 
 PREPARING FOR HARD TIMES     107 
 
To assess effects of the difficulty manipulation on performance, a linear 
mixed effects model (LME) for reaction times (RTs) and an LME for binary 
responses for accuracy were fitted, with difficulty as a fixed factor and a 
random intercept per subject. Effects in the fitted models were tested by 
ANOVA type III. For RTs, F-statistics were calculated with Kenward-Roger 
adjustment of the degrees of freedom (Kenward & Roger, 1997). For accuracy 
no F-statistics could be calculated and therefore χ2 statistics are reported. 
EEG data acquisition, processing and analysis 
Continuous EEG activity was acquired at 512 Hz using a 64-channel 
(pin-type) Biosemi Active Two system (http://www.biosemi.com) referenced 
to the CMS-DRL ground and positioned according to the extended 10/20 
international EEG system. Six additional electrodes were attached to the head: 
left and right mastoids, two electrodes for vertical and horizontal electro-
oculogram. Data for two participants had to be removed due to excessive noise 
and technical difficulties. 
EEG data were analyzed with EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) 
and ERPLAB (http://erpinfo.org/erplab) software, running on MATLAB. The 
data were re-referenced offline to linked mastoids. Independent component 
analysis (ICA) was applied to continuous data to identify and remove 
components associated with eye blinks. Epochs of -1000 to +3000 ms locked 
to cue onset were selected. Epochs were visually inspected and epochs 
containing artifacts were removed.  
For ERP analysis the selected epochs were baseline corrected to the pre-
cue period. Next, the epochs were averaged per condition per participant and 
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a grand average across participants was created resulting in one average ERP 
per condition. The SPN component was quantified in a centro-parietal ROI 
(electrodes CP1, CP2 and CPz) for further analysis. This ROI was selected 
because the SPN is maximal over centro-parietal sites (Brunia & van Boxtel, 
2001) To determine differences in SPN for easy vs. hard conditions, a repeated 
measures 3x2 ANOVA was performed for average ERP amplitudes in the 
interval between 800 and 3000 ms post cue onset, with electrode site and 
difficulty as factors.  
For the time-frequency analysis, Fast-Fourier Transform (FFT) was 
applied to the selected epochs in a moving window (width: 250 time 
points/488 ms, with Hann tapering), resulting in power estimates ranging from 
-500 ms to 2750 ms (step 10 ms) locked to cue onset. Average and baseline-
corrected event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP; i.e., power) estimates 
were acquired using the newtimef function from EEGLAB. Estimates were 
obtained for 15 uniformly distributed frequencies ranging from 2 to 30 Hz. 
We defined time-frequency ROIs (TF-ROIs) based on the grand-average time-
frequency analysis (as in Cavanagh, Zambrano-Vazquez, & Allen, 2012), 
hence independent of the specific research question, thus avoiding double 
dipping (Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009). TF-ROI 1 was 
defined as the initial power decrease in the alpha frequency band (14 Hz), 200 
to 500 ms post cue-onset. This decrease was followed by TF-ROI 2, a more 
sustained alpha power decrease later in the trial, from 1000 to 2750 ms post 
cue onset (see Figure 4).  
Power in these TF-ROIs was statistically analyzed. Alpha power in TF-
ROI 1 was defined as mean power at 14 Hz in the interval 200-500 ms post 
cue onset, representing the observed alpha power decrease. Alpha power in 
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TF-ROI 2 was tested in 250 ms intervals, ranging from 1000 ms to 2750 ms 
post cue onset. In every interval alpha power was defined as mean power at 
14 Hz. For each TF-ROI a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA (per interval) 
was performed with difficulty (easy vs. difficult) and electrode (CP1 vs. CP2) 
as factors. 
We also collected intracranial recordings from a patient suffering from 
epilepsy. Patient NB was a left-handed woman (age 29) with normal IQ. For 
these recordings the same experimental design was used as for the control 
EEG subjects, but with a cue – task interval of 4000 ms. Also, due to time 
constraints, only 128 trials were performed. Data were collected at 1024 Hz 
and downsampled offline to 256 Hz. Electrodes were implanted on several 
sites, including a right subdural temporo-parietal grid (5 x 8 contacts), depth 
electrodes in parahippocampal areas, hippocampus and fusiform cortex (10 
contact points) and depth electrodes in insula, dorsal striatum (putative 
putamen) and pulvinar (10 contact points). The exact locations of these 
electrodes (MNI coordinates) were determined by two independent 
researchers based on a structural MRI scan taken after implantation (see 
Figure 2); the absolute mean deviation between their estimated coordinates 
was 0.4 mm.  
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Figure 2. MRI images displaying implantation of intracranial electrodes in patient 
NB. Three electrodes of interest are marked. Two independent researchers determined 
reliable MNI coordinates for these sites based on visual inspection of the MRI images. 
Locations and coordinates for sites in posterior parietal cortex (panel A), putamen 
(panel B) and hippocampus (panel C) are shown. 
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Epochs of -1000 to 4000 ms locked to cue onset were selected. Epochs 
were visually inspected and epochs containing epileptic activity or other 
artifacts were removed. The selected epochs were baseline corrected to the 
pre-cue period and were averaged per condition. To isolate locally specific 
patterns of activation, activation was inspected for every electrode referenced 
to the average of neighboring electrodes. Using Cartool software 
(http://brainmapping.unige.ch/Cartool.php), we tested for significant 
differences between easy and hard trials on every electrode. This was done by 
nonparametric analyses on the basis of randomization tests (for a similar 
approach see Pourtois, Spinelli, Seeck, & Vuilleumier, 2010). The observed 
data is compared to random shuffling of the same values over 1000 
permutations to estimate the probability (p < .05) that the data might be 
observed by chance.  
RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
As expected, LME analysis revealed a significant effect of difficulty on 
both error rates, χ2(1, N = 19) = 73.97, p < 0.01 and reaction times F(1, 4678) 
= 140.89, p < 0.01, with more errors and slower responses for hard than for 
easy trials (error rate: 1%, RT: 425 ms for easy vs. error rate: 6%, RT: 492 ms 
for difficult). These results show that the difficulty manipulation was effective 
and performance was worse for hard trials. 
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SPN  
The repeated measures ANOVA for SPN amplitude revealed a 
significant main effect of difficulty, with a more pronounced SPN component 
(more negative amplitude) leading up to task onset for hard trials than for easy 
trials, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.78, F(1, 16) = 4.52, p = 0.049 (see Figure 3). This 
effect of difficulty did not interact with electrode, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.82, F(2 
,15) = 1.60, p = 0.23. 
 
 
Figure 3. SPN for a centro-parietal ROI (electrodes CP1, CPz and CP2). The SPN 
component leading up to task onset is significantly more negative for hard trials 
compared to easy trials, from 800 to 3000 ms post cue-onset (indicated in gray). This 
reflects increased proactive control for hard trials. 
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Time-frequency 
See Figure 4 for an overview of TF results. For TF-ROI 1, the initial 
alpha power decrease from 200 to 500 ms post cue onset, there was a 
significant difference between hard and easy trials, Wilks’ Lambda = 0.71, 
F(1, 16) = 6.62, p = 0.020, indicating a more pronounced alpha decrease for 
hard trials. For TF-ROI 2, the sustained alpha power decrease later in the cue 
period, we tested for differences between easy and hard trials in intervals of 
200 ms. We observed significant differences in alpha power from 1600 to 
2200 ms post cue onset (p < 0.05), showing that the sustained alpha power 
decrease was more pronounced for hard than for easy trials. In all other 200 
ms intervals tested, we observed no statistically significant differences (p > 0. 
05).  
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Figure 4. Panels A and B show changes in power over time (relative to baseline, 0 marks cue 
onset) for different frequencies ranging from 2 to 30 Hz. Significant differences between easy 
(panel A) and hard (panel B) trials in alpha power are indicated with black boxes. Dotted line 
boxes represent TF-ROIs. Panel C shows the time course of alpha power (14 Hz) for hard (in 
red) and easy (in blue) trials in more detail. Significant differences between easy and hard trials 
are marked by grey areas. For TF-ROI 1 (200-500 ms), the initial alpha power decrease was 
more pronounced for hard than for easy trials. For TF-ROI 2 (1000-2750 ms), the sustained 
alpha power decrease was also larger for hard than for easy trials (significant difference from 
1500 to 2250 ms). 
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Intracranial recordings 
Inspection of intracranial electrodes revealed a negative-going slow 
deflection of the field potential during the cue period, specific to three 
electrodes, one in the posterior parietal cortex (Figure 5A), one in the putative 
putamen (Figure 5B) and one in the hippocampus (Figure 5C). This pattern of 
activation was comparable to the SPN scalp ERP component observed in our 
healthy participants. Moreover, the slow SPN-like deflection observed in 
these areas was more pronounced for hard than for easy trials, again mirroring 
the effect in healthy participants. The difference was statistically assessed at 
every time point by non-parametric randomization tests (see Methods) and 
was significant on a number of time points throughout the cue period leading 
up to task onset (see Figure 5A-C, grey areas mark statistically significant time 
points, p < 0.05). Notably, no such slow deflection was observed for the 
electrodes in the insular, pulvinar, parahippocampal or fusiform sites. To 
illustrate the local specificity of these findings, for each area a neighboring 
electrode is shown, showing that no slow-drift activation pattern or effect of 
the difficulty manipulation could be found there (see Figure 5D-F). 
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Figure 5. Cue-locked intracranial local field potential recordings at posterior parietal 
cortex (panel A), posterior putamen (panel B) and hippocampus (panel C). Following 
cue onset there was an SPN-like, slow drifting deflection in these areas, which was 
more pronounced for hard than for easy trials (statistically significant differences are 
colored in grey). Neighboring electrodes (panel D-F) show the local specificity of the 
observed signal in the electrodes of interest.  
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DISCUSSION 
In this study we provide a detailed and reliable electrophysiological 
signature of proactive attentional control in a cognitive task. Following a 
difficulty cue, we showed a more pronounced SPN (see Figure 3) and more 
alpha power suppression (see Figure 4) for hard vs. easy trials, reflecting 
increased cognitive control. These electrophysiological markers show that 
pre-cued task difficulty motivates proactive control in a motor-free task. The 
SPN and alpha power modulations likely reflect stronger activation in the 
fronto-parietal attentional control network. This is further supported by 
intracranial recordings from the posterior parietal cortex. Here, a slow 
deflection in the local field potential, mirroring the scalp SPN in healthy 
subjects, was observed (see Figure 5). This slow component was also more 
pronounced for hard than for easy trials. Taken together, the scalp and 
intracranial recordings in the current study support the notion that difficulty 
information influences proactive control through activation of cortical fronto-
parietal brain areas. This is in line with predictions by computational 
reinforcement learning models (Verguts et al., 2015) and fMRI research 
(Boehler et al., 2011; Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014). 
To allow straightforward attribution of the ERP slow-wave amplitude 
and alpha power modulations solely to attentional preparation, we used a task 
that carefully excluded motor preparation from the period leading up to task 
performance. Our mental calculation task did not require a motor response 
until after the complete calculation was finished and two outcome options 
were presented (based on Vassena et al., 2014). It is therefore very unlikely 
that motor preparation occurred during the cue-task interval. We showed that 
task onsets in hardtrials were preceded by a more pronounced SPN and 
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stronger alpha power suppression. Whereas previous studies failed to show an 
effect of difficulty on the SPN amplitude (Hillman et al., 2000; Kotani & 
Aihara, 1999), our study did provide evidence that difficulty information 
influences the CNV. This is in line with previous studies reporting effects of 
difficulty on the CNV (Schevernels et al., 2014; Vanlessen et al., 2015). In the 
current study, we show very clear effects of cued difficulty on the SPN and 
we thus confirm that difficulty information, in the absence of motor 
preparation, is an important cue motivating proactive attentional control.  
The slow-drift component measured at the scalp is the result of summed 
postsynaptic potentials in pyramidal neurons from cortical areas involved in 
the upcoming task (Birbaumer, Roberts, Lutzenberger, Rockstroh, & Elbert, 
1992; Elbert, 1993). The SPN and other negative slow components may derive 
from increased neural excitability of underlying source neurons. This may 
lower the threshold for firing in task-relevant areas, thus leading to fast 
engagement of these neurons at task onset (Elbert, 1993; McAdam, 1969). The 
SPN is therefore an excellent marker of cortical priming (Walter et al., 1964). 
Source localization studies have specified the origin of the SPN and report the 
fronto-parietal network as one of its main sources (Böcker et al., 1994; Brunia 
et al., 2000; Kotani et al., 2015; Tsukamoto et al., 2006). Also for the related 
CNV component, the fronto-parietal network together with motor areas have 
been proposed as the main sources (Gómez, Flores, & Ledesma, 2007; Grent-
‘t-Jong & Woldorff, 2007). 
As a second neural marker of control, we also observed decreased alpha 
power during the cue-target period. This decrease in alpha power was again 
larger for hard trials than for easy trials, between 1600 and 2200 ms following 
the difficulty cue (TF-ROI 2). This alpha power decrease very likely reflects 
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increased attention for upcoming stimuli, since alpha oscillations are a well-
established mechanism for attentional suppression (Jensen, Bonnefond, & 
VanRullen, 2012; Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010). The gating by inhibition 
framework (for a review see Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010) states that alpha 
oscillations reflect inhibition of irrelevant input and can be strategically 
adjusted to admit relevant information into processing. Also, alpha power is 
negatively correlated with BOLD activity measured by fMRI (Laufs et al., 
2003; Ritter, Moosmann, & Villringer, 2009) and neural firing in monkeys is 
locked to the troughs of alpha oscillations (Haegens, Nacher, Luna, Romo, & 
Jensen, 2011). Based on this, we hypothesized that alpha oscillations would 
play a role in proactive attentional control. In visual attention tasks, decreases 
in alpha power have been shown in occipital regions that are actively involved 
in task performance (Kelly et al., 2006; Thut, Nietzel, Brandt, & Pascual-
Leone, 2006; Worden et al., 2000). Similar proactive alpha power modulations 
in somatosensory areas also show that alpha mechanisms are not limited to 
visual areas, but act in different areas depending on the task (Haegens, Händel, 
& Jensen, 2011). Alpha oscillations are also actively used to shield working 
memory from irrelevant distracting input (Bonnefond & Jensen, 2012, 2013). 
For cognitive tasks, alpha power before task onset predicts performance and 
can be strategically adjusted, e.g. following errors, to increase cognitive 
control (Mazaheri, Nieuwenhuis, Van Dijk, & Jensen, 2009). Our findings are 
in line with the findings above and show that alpha suppression can be 
triggered by a difficulty cue and marks proactive attentional control.  
In addition to scalp measures we also recorded local field potentials 
from intracranial electrodes in an epilepsy patient. These recordings, 
especially those in posterior parietal cortex, provided an insight into the 
putative source of the SPN and supported the idea that proactive control relies 
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on the fronto-parietal attentional control network. In the posterior parietal 
cortex an SPN-like slow component was observed, which was more 
pronounced for hard than for easy trials, mirroring the scalp SPN for healthy 
subjects. This pattern of activation was locally specific, showing that it 
originates in the posterior parietal cortex and is not the reflection of a deeper 
or distant source. The posterior parietal cortex is an important part of the 
fronto-parietal attentional control network (Gitelman et al., 1999; Hopfinger 
et al., 2000) and many fMRI studies have shown activation of this area during 
proactive cognitive control (Engelmann, Damaraju, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009; 
Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010; 
Rosell-Negre et al., 2014; Wu, Weissman, Roberts, & Woldorff, 2007). In the 
current study we observed more activation in this area following cue-onset for 
hardtrials, supporting the idea that more proactive control is implemented for 
these cues through activation of the fronto-parietal control network. Note that 
the posterior parietal cortex is also involved in mental arithmetics (Rickard et 
al., 2000; Zago et al., 2001). Parietal intracranial activation measured in the 
current study might therefore also reflect task-specific parietal engagement. 
The pattern of activation on posterior parietal intracranial sites was very 
similar to the scalp SPN recorded for control subjects, suggesting that this area 
might contribute to the SPN. This is in line with source localization studies 
naming the fronto-parietal network as one of the main sources for CNV 
(Gómez et al., 2007; Grent-‘t-Jong & Woldorff, 2007) and SPN (Böcker et al., 
1994; Brunia et al., 2000; Kotani et al., 2015; Tsukamoto et al., 2006). 
Additionally, source modelling also revealed the (anterior) insula as an 
important source region contributing to the scalp SPN (Böcker et al., 1994). 
In the current study we did not find an SPN-like component or an effect of the 
difficulty manipulation in the insula. In the current study, the SPN was studied 
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before task onset rather than before reward feedback, as in the source 
modelling studies. The insula might be specifically involved in the expectation 
of an affective-motivational feedback stimulus, consistent with the role of the 
insula in saliency processing (Menon & Uddin, 2010). This may be why it was 
not activated in the current study.  
We observed the SPN-like slow pattern of activation also in the dorsal 
striatum (likely posterior putamen, see Figure 2B and Figure 5B). This 
suggests the putamen as part of the subcortical network underlying motivated 
control. Subcortical areas, including the putamen, are often coactivated with 
the cortical fronto-parietal network (Gitelman et al., 1999; Hopfinger et al., 
2000). Decision-making control models propose task difficulty, together with 
reward as a key motivator for control (Shenhav et al., 2013; Verguts et al., 
2015). The putamen, and more generally the dorsal striatum, is activated 
alongside other subcortical areas and the fronto-parietal network in motivated 
control, during anticipation of an effortful task (Krebs et al., 2012; Kurniawan, 
Guitart-Masip, Dayan, & Dolan, 2013; Vassena et al., 2014) as well as during 
reward anticipation (Engelmann et al., 2009; Knutson, Adams, Fong, & 
Hommer, 2001; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011). Consistently, single unit 
recordings in monkeys show that caudate nucleus neurons fire during 
motivated proactive control, and this activation is correlated with improved 
task performance (Lauwereyns, Watanabe, Coe, & Hikosaka, 2002). The 
dorsal striatum and other dopaminergic subcortical areas might significantly 
influence the SPN. Activation in dopaminergic subcortical areas is indirectly 
linked to slow preparatory components as evidenced by genetic (Foti & 
Hajcak, 2012) and psychopharmacological (Tecce, 1991) dopamine effects on 
the CNV and SPN. Also, the CNV and SPN are reduced in dopamine-related 
clinical conditions, such as schizophrenia (Wynn, Horan, Kring, Simons, & 
 122     CHAPTER 4 
Green, 2010) and Parkinson’s disease (Mattox, Valle-Inclán, & Hackley, 
2006; Verleger et al., 1999). 
Another possible explanation for putamen activation, is that the cue 
triggers the putamen because it is a task-specific area involved in mental 
calculations. The putamen, especially the posterior portion, is well known for 
its involvement in automatized processing (Ashby, Turner, & Horvitz, 2010; 
Lehéricy et al., 2005). In this study the putamen was more involved in 
preparing for hard calculations. The hard calculations in this study rely more 
heavily on using well-learned arithmetic facts (e.g., 8+5=13), whereas easy 
calculations can be solved simply by counting, since they consisted only of 
“+1” operations. It is possible to conceptualize the arithmetic mental 
operations used on difficult trials as covert actions, that are trained and 
automatized when children learn arithmetics (Rivera, Reiss, Eckert, & Menon, 
2005). These automatic “actions” might involve the putamen, meaning that 
preparatory activation of the putamen reflects proactive control 
implementation in this task-specific area. This interpretation requires further 
research before it can be accepted.  
The current study provides further evidence for proactive control being 
implemented in task-specific areas, namely in the hippocampus. Intracranial 
recordings in the hippocampus also showed a slow-drift component following 
cue-onset. Activation here was very specific to the hippocampus, since 
neighboring electrodes located in parahippocampal areas were not sensitive to 
the cue (see Figure 5, panel C and F). Activation in the hippocampus leading 
up to task onset likely reflects task-specific preparation rather than general 
attentional control. Mental calculation makes use of extensive brain networks, 
and some research has implicated the hippocampus in these networks. It has 
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been shown that the hippocampus is activated more strongly in addition 
operations with carrying, as in the hard condition in the current experiment, 
compared to additions without carrying, as in the easy condition in the current 
experiment (Kong et al., 2005). Also, the hippocampus is involved when a 
retrieval strategy is used but not when a counting strategy is used (Cho, Ryali, 
Geary, & Menon, 2011). In children, the hippocampus plays a role specifically 
in addition problems (compared to subtractions) and is activated for problems 
where a retrieval strategy is being used (De Smedt, Holloway, & Ansari, 
2011). In the current study, easy mental calculations consisted solely of “+1” 
operations, strongly promoting a counting strategy, whereas hard calculations 
likely promoted different strategies, such as retrieval. These studies thus 
support the idea that the hippocampus plays a role specifically in the currently 
used mental calculation task, especially in the hard condition. 
Taken together, effects of the cue on the SPN and alpha power 
recordings and on intracranial recordings in parietal cortex, putamen and 
hippocampus, show that preparation for a difficult task relies on general 
attentional networks as well as task-specific areas. This is in line with control 
models and fMRI research that predict control to be implemented by the 
fronto-parietal network in specific (sensory) areas involved in task execution 
(Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Grent-‘t-Jong & Woldorff, 2007; Hopfinger et al., 
2000; Weissman, Warner, & Woldorff, 2004). It also corresponds to the idea 
that slow preparatory scalp components reflect activation in general 
attentional areas as well as task-specific areas (Birbaumer et al., 1992). 
Computational models predict that both difficulty and reward 
information can motivate proactive control. In this study, cues indicating 
difficult trials were followed by an increased SPN and decreased alpha power. 
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Similarly, van den Berg et al. (2014) showed an increased CNV amplitude and 
decreased alpha power following reward cues. Although the paradigms used 
in the two studies differ substantially, these similar CNV/SPN and alpha 
modulations suggest comparable effects of reward and difficulty on 
motivating proactive control. Additionally, models predict that reward and 
difficulty could have interacting effects on control implementation: difficulty 
might influence task preparation only when reward is likely (Shenhav et al., 
2013; Verguts et al., 2015). In a study by Schevernels et al. (2014), difficulty 
and reward information were combined in a cue leading up to a speeded 
response task. Here reward information influenced the early CNV. Later in 
the trial, also difficulty information influenced the CNV, but only for 
rewarded trials, showing an interaction of reward and difficulty information. 
This interaction in the context of non-motor, mental preparation remains to be 
studied in future research.  
Computational models further predict that proactive control 
implementation will drop due to lack of motivation when the task becomes so 
difficult that reward becomes very unlikely, even when control is 
implemented (Verguts et al., 2015). The difficulty of calculations used in the 
current study was very low, with excellent performance also for hard trials 
(mean error rate 6% for hard trials, 1% for easy trials). Consequently, more 
control was implemented for hard trials, reflected in a larger SPN amplitude. 
Contrary to the current study, Silvetti, Nuñez Castellar, Roger, & Verguts 
(2014) showed a smaller CNV amplitude for hard compared to easy trials. In 
their study, a very difficult task was used, leading to a 60% error rate for hard 
trials and a 20% error rate for easy trials. This suggests that indeed control 
implementation fails when task difficulty becomes too high. Future research 
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should systematically manipulate task difficulty in order to investigate its 
hypothesized inverted-U relation with control implementation.  
In conclusion, the current study provides a comprehensive 
electrophysiological signature of proactive control, unconfounded by motor 
preparation. We showed that proactive control is triggered by difficulty 
information, and this is reflected both in the SPN and alpha power. Also, we 
linked this scalp activity to underlying brain areas by intracranial recordings. 
Activity in the posterior parietal cortex showed an activation pattern similar 
to the SPN, suggesting the involvement of the fronto-parietal attentional 
network in proactive control. Also task-specific preparation in the dorsal 
striatum and hippocampus was observed. The neural signatures of control 
demonstrated in the current experiment provide an excellent tool for future 
research in cognitive control.   
 126     CHAPTER 4 
REFERENCES 
Aarts, E., & Roelofs, A. (2011). Attentional control in anterior cingulate 
cortex based on probabilistic cueing. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
23(3), 716–727. http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2010.21435 
Aarts, E., Wallace, D. L., Dang, L. C., Jagust, W. J., Cools, R., & D’Esposito, 
M. (2014). Dopamine and the cognitive downside of a promised bonus. 
Psychological Science, 25(4), 1003–1009. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613517240 
Ashby, F. G., Turner, B. O., & Horvitz, J. C. (2010). Cortical and basal ganglia 
contributions to habit learning and automaticity. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 14(5), 208–215. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2010.02.001 
Benedek, M., Schickel, R. J., Jauk, E., Fink, A., & Neubauer, A. C. (2014). 
Alpha power increases in right parietal cortex reflects focused internal 
attention. Neuropsychologia, 56, 393–400. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.02.010 
Bijleveld, E., Custers, R., & Aarts, H. (2010). Unconscious reward cues 
increase invested effort, but do not change speed-accuracy tradeoffs. 
Cognition, 115(2), 330–335. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.12.012 
Birbaumer, N., Roberts, L. E., Lutzenberger, W., Rockstroh, B., & Elbert, T. 
(1992). Area-specific self-regulation of slow cortical potentials on the 
sagittal midline and its effects on behavior. Electroencephalography and 
Clinical Neurophysiology/Evoked Potentials Section, 84(4), 353–361. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0168-5597(92)90088-S 
Böcker, K. B. E., Brunia, C. H. M., & van den Berg-Lenssen, M. M. C. (1994). 
A spatiotemporal dipole model of the stimulus preceding negativity (spn) 
prior to feedback stimuli. Brain Topography, 7(1), 71–88. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01184839 
Boehler, C. N., Hopf, J.-M., Krebs, R. M., Stoppel, C. M., Schoenfeld, M. A., 
Heinze, H.-J., & Noesselt, T. (2011). Task-load-dependent activation of 
dopaminergic midbrain areas in the absence of reward. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 31(13), 4955–4961. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4845-10.2011 
 PREPARING FOR HARD TIMES     127 
Botvinick, M., & Braver, T. (2015). Motivation and cognitive control: from 
behavior to neural mechanism. Annual Review of Psychology, 66(1), 83–
113. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015044 
Braver, T. S. (2012). The variable nature of cognitive control: a dual 
mechanisms framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(2), 106–113. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.12.010 
Brunia, C. H. ., & van Boxtel, G. J. . (2001). Wait and see. International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 43(1), 59–75. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-
8760(01)00179-9 
Brunia, C. H., de Jong, B. M., van den Berg-Lenssen, M. M., & Paans, A. M. 
(2000). Visual feedback about time estimation is related to a right 
hemisphere activation measured by PET. Experimental Brain Research, 
130(3), 328–337. http://doi.org/10.1007/s002219900293 
Brunia, C. H. M., Hackley, S. A., van Boxtel, G. J. M., Kotani, Y., & Ohgami, 
Y. (2011). Waiting to perceive: reward or punishment? Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 122(5), 858–868. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.clinph.2010.12.039 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Feng Kao, C. (1984). The efficient assessment 
of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48(3), 306–307. 
http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13 
Cavanagh, J. F., Zambrano-Vazquez, L., & Allen, J. J. B. (2012). Theta lingua 
franca: A common mid-frontal substrate for action monitoring processes. 
Psychophysiology, 49(2), 220–238. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2011.01293.x 
Cho, S., Ryali, S., Geary, D. C., & Menon, V. (2011). How does a child solve 
7 + 8? Decoding brain activity patterns associated with counting and 
retrieval strategies. Developmental Science, 14(5), 989–1001. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01055.x 
Cohen, M. X. (2014). Analyzing neural time series data: theory and practice. 
MIT Press. http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Corbetta, M., & Shulman, G. L. (2002). Control of goal-directed and stimulus-
driven attention in the brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3(3), 201–215. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/nrn755 
De Smedt, B., Holloway, I. D., & Ansari, D. (2011). Effects of problem size 
and arithmetic operation on brain activation during calculation in children 
 128     CHAPTER 4 
with varying levels of arithmetical fluency. NeuroImage, 57(3), 771–781. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.12.037 
Delorme, A., & Makeig, S. (2004). EEGLAB: an open source toolbox for 
analysis of single-trial EEG dynamics including independent component 
analysis. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 134(1), 9–21. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jneumeth.2003.10.009 
Dosenbach, N. U. F., Fair, D. A., Miezin, F. M., Cohen, A. L., Wenger, K. K., 
Dosenbach, R. A. T., … Petersen, S. E. (2007). Distinct brain networks for 
adaptive and stable task control in humans. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 104(26), 11073–11078. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0704320104 
Egner, T., & Hirsch, J. (2005). Cognitive control mechanisms resolve conflict 
through cortical amplification of task-relevant information. Nature 
Neuroscience, 8(12), 1784–1790. http://doi.org/10.1038/nn1594 
Elbert, T. (1993). Slow cortical potentials reflect the regulation of cortical 
excitability. In Slow Potential Changes in the Human Brain (pp. 235–251). 
Boston, MA: Springer US. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-1597-9_15 
Engelmann, J. B., Damaraju, E., Padmala, S., & Pessoa, L. (2009). Combined 
effects of attention and motivation on visual task performance: transient 
and sustained motivational effects. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 3, 
4. http://doi.org/10.3389/neuro.09.004.2009 
Foti, D., & Hajcak, G. (2012). Genetic variation in dopamine moderates neural 
response during reward anticipation and delivery: Evidence from event-
related potentials. Psychophysiology, 49(5), 617–626. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2011.01343.x 
Frost, B. G., Neill, R. A., & Fenelon, B. (1988). The determinants of the non-
motoric CNV in a complex, variable foreperiod, information processing 
paradigm. Biological Psychology, 27(1), 1–21. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0301-0511(88)90002-6 
Fuentemilla, L., Cucurell, D., Marco-Pallarés, J., Guitart-Masip, M., Morís, 
J., & Rodríguez-Fornells, A. (2013). Electrophysiological correlates of 
anticipating improbable but desired events. NeuroImage, 78, 135–144. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.03.062 
Gitelman, D. R., Nobre, A. C., Parrish, T. B., LaBar, K. S., Kim, Y. H., Meyer, 
J. R., & Mesulam, M. (1999). A large-scale distributed network for covert 
spatial attention: further anatomical delineation based on stringent 
 PREPARING FOR HARD TIMES     129 
behavioural and cognitive controls. Brain, 122(6), 1093–1106. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/brain/122.6.1093 
Gómez, C. M., Flores, A., & Ledesma, A. (2007). Fronto-parietal networks 
activation during the contingent negative variation period. Brain Research 
Bulletin, 73(1), 40–47. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainresbull.2007.01.015 
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G. H., & Donchin, E. (1992). Optimizing the use of 
information: Strategic control of activation of responses. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 121(4), 480–506. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.121.4.480 
Grent-‘t-Jong, T., & Woldorff, M. G. (2007). Timing and sequence of brain 
activity in top-down control of visual-spatial attention. PLoS Biology, 5(1), 
e12. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.0050012 
Haegens, S., Nacher, V., Luna, R., Romo, R., & Jensen, O. (2011). Alpha-
oscillations in the monkey sensorimotor network influence discrimination 
performance by rhythmical inhibition of neuronal spiking. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 108(48), 19377–19382. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1117190108 
Hillman, C. H., Apparies, R. J., & Hatfield, B. D. (2000). Motor and nonmotor 
event-related potentials during a complex processing task. 
Psychophysiology, 37(6), 731–736. http://doi.org/10.1111/1469-
8986.3760731 
Hopfinger, J. B., Buonocore, M. H., & Mangun, G. R. (2000). The neural 
mechanisms of top-down attentional control. Nature Neuroscience, 3(3), 
284–291. http://doi.org/10.1038/72999 
Janssens, C., De Loof, E., Pourtois, G., & Verguts, T. (2016). The time course 
of cognitive control implementation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1–
7. http://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0992-3 
Jensen, O., Bonnefond, M., & VanRullen, R. (2012). An oscillatory 
mechanism for prioritizing salient unattended stimuli. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 16(4), 200–205. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.03.002 
Jensen, O., & Mazaheri, A. (2010). Shaping functional architecture by 
oscillatory alpha activity: gating by inhibition. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 4, 186. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2010.00186 
 130     CHAPTER 4 
Kappenman, E. S., & Luck, S. J. (2011). The Oxford Handbook of Event-
Related Potential Components. Oxford University Press. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195374148.001.0001 
Kastner, S., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2000). Mechanisms of visual attention in 
the human cortex. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23, 315–341. Retrieved 
from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10845067 
Kelly, S. P., Lalor, E. C., Reilly, R. B., & Foxe, J. J. (2006). Increases in alpha 
oscillatory power reflect an active retinotopic mechanism for distracter 
suppression during sustained visuospatial attention. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 95(6), 3844–3851. 
http://doi.org/10.1152/jn.01234.2005 
Kenward, M. G., & Roger, J. H. (1997). Small sample inference for fixed 
effects from restricted maximum likelihood. Biometrics, 53(3), 983. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/2533558 
Knutson, B., Adams, C. M., Fong, G. W., & Hommer, D. (2001). Anticipation 
of increasing monetary reward selectively recruits nucleus accumbens. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 21(16), RC159. http://doi.org/20015472 [pii] 
Knutson, B., Westdorp, A., Kaiser, E., & Hommer, D. (2000). FMRI 
visualization of brain activity during a monetary incentive delay task. 
NeuroImage, 12(1), 20–27. http://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2000.0593 
Kong, J., Wang, C., Kwong, K., Vangel, M., Chua, E., & Gollub, R. (2005). 
The neural substrate of arithmetic operations and procedure complexity. 
Cognitive Brain Research, 22(3), 397–405. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2004.09.011 
Kool, W., McGuire, J. T., Rosen, Z. B., & Botvinick, M. M. (2010). Decision 
making and the avoidance of cognitive demand. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 139(4), 665–682. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0020198 
Kotani, Y., & Aihara, Y. (1999). The effect of stimulus discriminability on 
stimulus-preceding negativities prior to instructive and feedback stimuli. 
Biological Psychology, 50(1), 1–18. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0301-
0511(98)00047-7 
Kotani, Y., Ohgami, Y., Ishiwata, T., Arai, J., Kiryu, S., & Inoue, Y. (2015). 
Source analysis of stimulus-preceding negativity constrained by functional 
magnetic resonance imaging. Biological Psychology, 111, 53–64. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.08.005 
 PREPARING FOR HARD TIMES     131 
Krebs, R. M., Boehler, C. N., Roberts, K. C., Song, A. W., & Woldorff, M. G. 
(2012). The involvement of the dopaminergic midbrain and cortico-
striatal-thalamic circuits in the integration of reward prospect and 
attentional task demands. Cerebral Cortex, 22(3), 607–615. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhr134 
Kriegeskorte, N., Simmons, W. K., Bellgowan, P. S. F., & Baker, C. I. (2009). 
Circular analysis in systems neuroscience: the dangers of double dipping. 
Nature Neuroscience, 12(5), 535–540. http://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2303 
Kurniawan, I. T., Guitart-Masip, M., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2013). Effort 
and valuation in the brain: the effects of anticipation and execution. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 33(14), 6160–6169. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4777-12.2013 
Laufs, H., Kleinschmidt, A., Beyerle, A., Eger, E., Salek-Haddadi, A., 
Preibisch, C., & Krakow, K. (2003). EEG-correlated fMRI of human alpha 
activity. NeuroImage, 19(4), 1463–1476. http://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-
8119(03)00286-6 
Lauwereyns, J., Watanabe, K., Coe, B., & Hikosaka, O. (2002). A neural 
correlate of response bias in monkey caudate nucleus. Nature, 418(6896), 
413–417. http://doi.org/10.1038/nature00892 
Lehericy, S., Benali, H., Van de Moortele, P.-F., Pelegrini-Issac, M., 
Waechter, T., Ugurbil, K., & Doyon, J. (2005). Distinct basal ganglia 
territories are engaged in early and advanced motor sequence learning. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102(35), 12566–12571. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0502762102 
Mattox, S. T., Valle-Inclán, F., & Hackley, S. A. (2006). Psychophysiological 
evidence for impaired reward anticipation in Parkinson’s disease. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 117(10), 2144–2153. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.clinph.2006.05.026 
Mazaheri, A., Nieuwenhuis, I. L. C., Van Dijk, H., & Jensen, O. (2009). 
Prestimulus alpha and mu activity predicts failure to inhibit motor 
responses. Human Brain Mapping, 30(6), 1791–1800. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20763 
McAdam, D. W. (1969). Increases in CNS excitability during negative cortical 
slow potentials in man. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 26(2), 216–219. http://doi.org/10.1016/0013-
4694(69)90213-2 
 132     CHAPTER 4 
Menon, V., & Uddin, L. Q. (2010). Saliency, switching, attention and control: 
a network model of insula function. Brain Structure and Function, 214(5–
6), 655–667. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-010-0262-0 
Padmala, S., & Pessoa, L. (2010). Interactions between cognition and 
motivation during response inhibition. Neuropsychologia, 48(2), 558–565. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.10.017 
Padmala, S., & Pessoa, L. (2011). Reward reduces conflict by enhancing 
attentional control and biasing visual cortical processing. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(11), 3419–3432. 
http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00011 
Pourtois, G., Spinelli, L., Seeck, M., & Vuilleumier, P. (2010). Modulation of 
face processing by emotional expression and gaze direction during 
intracranial recordings in right fusiform cortex. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 22(9), 2086–2107. http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2009.21404 
Rickard, T. ., Romero, S. ., Basso, G., Wharton, C., Flitman, S., & Grafman, 
J. (2000). The calculating brain: an fMRI study. Neuropsychologia, 38(3), 
325–335. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0028-3932(99)00068-8 
Ritter, P., Moosmann, M., & Villringer, A. (2009). Rolandic alpha and beta 
EEG rhythms’ strengths are inversely related to fMRI-BOLD signal in 
primary somatosensory and motor cortex. Human Brain Mapping, 30(4), 
1168–1187. http://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20585 
Rivera, S. M., Reiss, A. L., Eckert, M. A., & Menon, V. (2005). 
Developmental changes in mental arithmetic: evidence for increased 
functional specialization in the left inferior parietal cortex. Cerebral 
Cortex, 15(11), 1779–1790. http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhi055 
Rohrbaugh, J., Syndulko, K., & Lindsley, D. (1976). Brain wave components 
of the contingent negative variation in humans. Science, 191(4231), 1055–
1057. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1251217 
Rosell-Negre, P., Bustamante, J. C., Fuentes-Claramonte, P., Costumero, V., 
Benabarre, S., & Barros-Loscertales, A. (2014). Reward anticipation 
enhances brain activation during response inhibition. Cognitive, Affective 
& Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(2), 621–634. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-014-0292-9 
Ruchkin, D. ., Sutton, S., Mahaffey, D., & Glaser, J. (1986). Terminal CNV 
in the absence of motor response. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
 PREPARING FOR HARD TIMES     133 
Neurophysiology, 63(5), 445–463. http://doi.org/10.1016/0013-
4694(86)90127-6 
Schevernels, H., Krebs, R. M., Santens, P., Woldorff, M. G., & Boehler, C. N. 
(2014). Task preparation processes related to reward prediction precede 
those related to task-difficulty expectation. NeuroImage, 84, 639–647. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.09.039 
Seitz, A. R., Kim, D., & Watanabe, T. (2009). Rewards Evoke Learning of 
Unconsciously Processed Visual Stimuli in Adult Humans. Neuron, 61(5), 
700–707. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2009.01.016 
Shenhav, A., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2013). The expected value of 
control: an integrative theory of anterior cingulate cortex function. Neuron, 
79(2), 217–240. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.07.007 
Silvetti, M., Nuñez Castellar, E., Roger, C., & Verguts, T. (2014). Reward 
expectation and prediction error in human medial frontal cortex: an EEG 
study. NeuroImage, 84, 376–382. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.08.058 
Tecce, J. J. (1972). Contingent negative variation (CNV) and psychological 
processes in man. Psychological Bulletin, 77(2), 73–108. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0032177 
Tecce, J. J. (1991). Dopamine and CNV: studies of drugs, disease and 
nutrition. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology. 
Supplement, 42, 153–164.  
Thut, G., Nietzel, A., Brandt, S. A., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2006). Alpha-band 
electroencephalographic activity over occipital cortex indexes visuospatial 
attention bias and predicts visual target detection. Journal of Neuroscience, 
26(37), 9494–9502. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0875-06.2006 
Tsukamoto, T., Kotani, Y., Ohgami, Y., Omura, K., Inoue, Y., & Aihara, Y. 
(2006). Activation of insular cortex and subcortical regions related to 
feedback stimuli in a time estimation task: An fMRI study. Neuroscience 
Letters, 399, 39–44. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neulet.2006.01.061 
van Boxtel, G. J. M., & Böcker, K. B. E. (2004). Cortical measures of 
anticipation. Journal of Psychophysiology, 18(2/3), 61–76. 
http://doi.org/10.1027/0269-8803.18.23.61 
van den Berg, B., Krebs, R. M., Lorist, M. M., & Woldorff, M. G. (2014). 
Utilization of reward-prospect enhances preparatory attention and reduces 
 134     CHAPTER 4 
stimulus conflict. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(2), 
561–577. http://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-014-0281-z 
Vanlessen, N., De Raedt, R., Mueller, S. C., Rossi, V., & Pourtois, G. (2015). 
Happy and less inhibited? Effects of positive mood on inhibitory control 
during an antisaccade task revealed using topographic evoked potential 
mapping. Biological Psychology, 110, 190–200. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.07.004 
Vassena, E., Silvetti, M., Boehler, C. N., Achten, E., Fias, W., & Verguts, T. 
(2014). Overlapping neural systems represent cognitive effort and reward 
anticipation. PLoS One, 9(3), e91008. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0091008 
Verguts, T., Vassena, E., & Silvetti, M. (2015). Adaptive effort investment in 
cognitive and physical tasks: a neurocomputational model. Frontiers in 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, 57. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00057 
Verleger, R., Wascher, E., Arolt, V., Daase, C., Strohm, A., & Kömpf, D. 
(1999). Slow EEG potentials (contingent negative variation and post-
imperative negative variation) in schizophrenia: their association to the 
present state and to Parkinsonian medication effects. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 110(7), 1175–1192. http://doi.org/10.1016/S1388-
2457(99)00023-1 
Walter, W. G., Cooper, R., Aldridge, V. J., McCallum, W. C., & Winter, A. 
A. L. (1964). Contingent negative variation: An electrical sign of 
sensorimotor association and expectancy in the human brain. Nature, 
(203), 380–384. 
Weissman, D. H., Warner, L. M., & Woldorff, M. G. (2004). The neural 
mechanisms for minimizing cross-modal distraction. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 24(48), 10941–10949. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3669-04.2004 
Westbrook, A., & Braver, T. S. (2015). Cognitive effort: a neuroeconomic 
approach. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 15(2), 395–
415. http://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-015-0334-y 
Wise, R. A. (2004). Dopamine, learning and motivation. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 5(6), 483–494. http://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1406 
Worden, M. S., Foxe, J. J., Wang, N., & Simpson, G. V. (2000). Anticipatory 
biasing of visuospatial attention indexed by retinotopically specific alpha-
 PREPARING FOR HARD TIMES     135 
band electroencephalography increases over occipital cortex. The Journal 
of Neuroscience, 20(6), RC63.  
Wu, C.-T., Weissman, D. H., Roberts, K. C., & Woldorff, M. G. (2007). The 
neural circuitry underlying the executive control of auditory spatial 
attention. Brain Research, 1134(1), 187–198. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2006.11.088 
Wynn, J. K., Horan, W. P., Kring, A. M., Simons, R. F., & Green, M. F. 
(2010). Impaired anticipatory event-related potentials in schizophrenia. 
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 77(2), 141–149. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2010.05.009 
Zago, L., Pesenti, M., Mellet, E., Crivello, F., Mazoyer, B., & Tzourio-
Mazoyer, N. (2001). Neural correlates of simple and complex mental 
calculation. NeuroImage, 13(2), 314–327. 
http://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2000.0697 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The first aim of this PhD was to assess the role of difficulty and reward 
information in motivating proactive and reactive control. Theories on 
cognitive control have stated that control carries a cost, and is only 
implemented when properly motivated (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013; 
Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Two motivational factors drive the decision to 
adapt cognitive control in a task, namely difficulty and reward information 
(Verguts, Vassena, & Silvetti, 2015). Control is implemented when it can 
improve task performance and when performing well is properly rewarded. 
Model simulations predict that these types of information are crucial for both 
proactive and reactive control implementation (Verguts et al., 2015), two 
important mechanisms for goal-directed behavior (Braver, 2012). The 
experiments presented in this dissertation, provide empirical support for this 
hypothesis. In Chapter 2, RT measures showed the rapid beneficial influence 
of reward on reactive cognitive control. In Chapter 3 and 4, the experience or 
expectancy of difficulty triggered reactive or proactive control processes. 
Moreover, we determined its electrophysiological signature using EEG. 
The second aim of this PhD was to specify the time course of cognitive 
control processes. Classical control models conceptualize control as rather 
slow, typically operating between trials of a psychological experiment 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Posner & Presti, 1987; 
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Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). In contrast, more recent associative models 
predict that control can also be implemented on a fast timescale, within the 
trial (Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016; Egner, 2014; Verguts 
& Notebaert, 2008, 2009). In this view, stimulus and/or motor representations 
become associated with control representations and over time will trigger 
these control representations automatically, making fast control not only 
possible but likely. In this dissertation it was revealed that indeed, fast, within-
trial control can occur, both in response to reward and difficulty information. 
This provides support for associative models of control. In Chapter 2, 
motivational effects of reward on control were observed when reward 
information was presented 200 ms before or even simultaneous to the task 
onset, indicating that reward affects reactive control very rapidly, within the 
trial. In Chapter 3, EEG measures revealed that the experience of stimulus and 
response conflict rapidly led to increased reactive control, as soon as 400 ms 
after stimulus onset.  
Finally, not just the theoretical construct of cognitive control, but also 
the neural mechanisms that underlie cognitive control were a principal focus 
of this PhD. Previous fMRI research has shown the importance of the mid-
frontal cortex in conflict detection and of a fronto-parietal control network in 
controlled attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dosenbach et al., 2007; 
MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Nobre et al., 1997). 
Additionally, control is believed to be implemented in task-specific sensory 
areas (Egner & Hirsch, 2005a; Polk, Drake, Jonides, Smith, & Smith, 2008; 
Weissman, Warner, & Woldorff, 2004). Finally, neural oscillations in these 
areas, such as theta and alpha oscillations, have proven to be important in 
control implementation (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Cavanagh, Zambrano-
Vazquez, & Allen, 2012; Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011). Synchronization of these 
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oscillations is a likely mechanism for long range communication between 
distinct control regions (Cohen & Van Gaal, 2013; Cohen, van Gaal, 
Ridderinkhof, & Lamme, 2009; Nigbur, Cohen, Ridderinkhof, & Stürmer, 
2012; Womelsdorf, Ardid, Everling, & Valiante, 2014). This dissertation 
shows how various control brain regions and neural mechanisms are 
implicated specifically in reactive and proactive control, and describes how 
they are activated by reward and difficulty information. In Chapter 3, a theta 
power increase was observed for incongruent trials, reflecting the detection of 
conflict. This theta increase was predictive of ensuing alpha power 
modulations in specific visual areas processing incongruent flankers. Here, 
alpha power was increased for incongruent flankers during the trial, reflecting 
control implementation. In Chapter 4 the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN) 
and parietal alpha power were shown to reflect increased proactive control 
following a difficulty cue. Also, intracranial local field potential differences 
between easy and hardtrials in parietal regions, as well as in the dorsal striatum 
(putamen) and the hippocampus, show the involvement of the fronto-parietal 
network and of task-specific areas.  
In the three empirical chapters of this dissertation, I used behavioral, 
scalp EEG and intracranial EEG measures to study the time course of both 
reactive and proactive cognitive control, triggered by reward or difficulty 
information. In what follows, I will review the results of these studies in more 
detail and I will discuss their implications for cognitive control theories. I will 
also discuss how future research might further advance our knowledge of 
cognitive control and its neural mechanisms. There were three main aims in 
this PhD. In the three sections of this discussion I will explain how the results 
of the empirical chapters serve these three main aims and how they answer the 
research questions I laid out in the introduction. I will first discuss what my 
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research has taught us about the influence of reward and difficulty information 
on cognitive control. I will then explain how my results support the 
hypothesized fast timescale of control. Finally, I will discuss the neural 
networks underlying control and their time course. 
REWARD AND DIFFICULTY INFORMATION MOTIVATE CONTROL 
The first aim of this PhD was to investigate if and how reward and 
difficulty information each influence control adaptation. Their influence on 
control is predicted by computational reinforcement learning models and 
neuro-economic decision making control theories (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; 
Shenhav et al., 2013; Verguts et al., 2015; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). From 
this neuro-economic perspective, control is conceptualized as the decision to 
invest cognitive effort and upregulate control, taking into account both the 
benefits and costs of control. The EVC model defines how these costs and 
benefits are taken into account (Shenhav et al., 2013). Similarly, the adaptive 
effort investment model describes how control (or in their terminology: mental 
effort) can be adaptively learned taking into account benefits and costs 
(Verguts et al., 2015). According to reinforcement learning principles applied 
in these models, actions are selected to maximize a value function (Sutton & 
Barto, 1998). Although cognitive control is not an overt action, it has 
consequences in the outside world, and can therefore be subject to 
reinforcement learning principles. Control is thus adapted to maximize the 
value function. What the optimal level of control is to obtain maximal value, 
depends on task difficulty and expected reward. Due to the reinforcement 
learning basis of these models, it is additionally expected that control can be 
adaptively learned for a specific task, during task execution. This learning of 
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control results over time in automatic activation of the optimal control 
representation when certain task stimuli are presented (Verguts et al., 2015). 
In this dissertation, to test predictions put forward by these models and to 
assess the influence of reward and difficulty information on proactive and 
reactive control, four research questions in a two by two structure were 
postulated in Chapter 1. The effect of reward on proactive control is well-
studied in the literature (Aarts, Roelofs, & van Turennout, 2008; Bijleveld, 
Custers, & Aarts, 2010; Brian Knutson, 2005; Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song, 
& Woldorff, 2012; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011), and therefore not recapitulated 
in this dissertation. Chapter 2 describes the influence of reward on reactive 
control. Chapter 3 tackles difficulty influences on reactive control. Finally, 
Chapter 4 shows the effect of difficulty on proactive control. 
Reward motivates cognitive control 
The motivational role of reward prospect on cognitive control has been 
assessed numerous times in psychology. When performance-contingent 
rewards are introduced in a task, these improve task performance, which can 
be attributed to enhanced control (for a review see Botvinick & Braver, 2015). 
Research has mostly focused on slow adjustments of proactive control. In 
blocks where rewards are provided, performance improves (Leotti & Wager, 
2010; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010). Also a cue informing participants about 
reward has been shown to improve proactive control in various tasks, ranging 
from Stroop-like tasks (Aarts et al., 2014; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011), to visual 
discrimination tasks (Krebs et al., 2012; Schevernels, Krebs, Santens, 
Woldorff, & Boehler, 2014), and simple detection tasks (Brian Knutson, 
2005) but also to more complicated mental arithmetic tasks (Bijleveld et al., 
2010; Vassena et al., 2014) or working memory tasks (Taylor et al., 2004). 
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Since the effects of reward on proactive control have been extensively studied 
in the past, this research question was not addressed further in this dissertation.  
Studies describing the impact of reward on reactive control on the other 
hand, are relatively scarce. There is some prior evidence that reward 
intensifies trial-by-trial control adaptations following conflict or errors 
(Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012; Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, 
& Sommer, 2011). Also some studies suggested previously that reward might 
trigger fast reactive control processes. In a Stroop task, Krebs, Boehler, & 
Woldorff (2010) systematically rewarded stimuli with certain colors and show 
improved performance for these rewarded stimuli. Similarly, improved 
performance for rewarded stimuli was observed in a stop-signal task (Boehler, 
Hopf, Stoppel, & Krebs, 2012). However, in these studies rewarded stimulus-
response (S-R) associations rather than increased control could account for the 
beneficial effects of reward. In Chapter 2 we used a visual discrimination task, 
and crucially we made the reward manipulation orthogonal to the S-R 
mapping. This allows reward effects to be attributed indisputably to increased 
control. This study provides new and robust evidence that reward indeed 
boosts reactive cognitive control on a fast within-trial timescale. 
Task difficulty calls for cognitive control investment 
In Chapter 3, EEG revealed within-trial control adaptations following 
both stimulus and response incongruency. According to the conflict 
monitoring theory (CMT) response conflict is a necessary prerequisite to 
trigger control (Botvinick et al., 2001). However, in our study theta and alpha 
power reflecting control processes responded similarly to SI and RI 
conditions. This points to visual stimulus incongruency as the main driver for 
control implementation in this task. The finding that response conflict is not 
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necessary to evoke control, but that also stimulus incongruency can act as a 
control signal is not new (see e.g. Nigbur, Cohen, Ridderinkhof, & Stürmer, 
2012) and can easily be explained from an associative decision-making 
perspective such as the EVC or adaptive effort model (Shenhav et al., 2013; 
Verguts et al., 2015). Stimulus incongruency impedes performance in the task, 
and is therefore a marker for task difficulty. Since control adaptation following 
such a difficulty cue results in the optimization of the value function 
(successful task performance), this type of “control behavior” is learned 
gradually during the task. Implementing control following stimulus 
incongruency proves to be a useful strategy for this particular task, and is 
therefore adopted. Which strategies are useful depends on the stimuli and 
stimulus contingencies at hand (for a similar argument, see Brown, 2009; 
Pansky & Algom, 2002; Schmidt & De Houwer, 2012). In classical 
congruency tasks, response conflict is often the most relevant and obvious 
marker for task difficulty, predicting task performance. Response conflict is 
consequently the usual, but as it turns out, not the necessary driver of control. 
In conclusion, in Chapter 3 stimulus incongruency serving as a difficulty cue 
was shown to boost reactive cognitive control. 
Chapters 4 describes how difficulty expectation motivates proactive 
control. We manipulated the difficulty of operations in a mental calculation 
task, warning participants about upcoming task difficulty a few seconds before 
task onset. Here, any motor preparation was carefully removed from the cue-
task interval, by evoking only a mental response to the task. In the CMT motor 
processes play a special role in control, since conflict between competing 
motor responses is believed to trigger activation in the conflict monitoring unit 
and ensuing control. However, in decision making models task difficulty 
motivating control is not necessarily related to response conflict and motor 
 144     CHAPTER 5 
processes. Previous research has often confounded motor and attentional 
preparation, by investigating the contingent negative variation (CNV) to study 
task preparation (Schevernels et al., 2014; Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, 
McCallum, & Winter, 1964). Alternatively, pure attentional expectation has 
been studied via the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN). However, the SPN 
has been used almost exclusively to study expectation of feedback or other 
stimuli not requiring any (mental) task performance (Brunia & van Boxtel, 
2001; van Boxtel & Böcker, 2004). So SPN studies normally do not 
investigate proactive cognitive control. In Chapter 4 we used the SPN to 
capture the ERP signature of proactive control, free of any motor signal. 
Additionally, also parietal alpha oscillations were studied. Both the amplitude 
of the SPN and alpha power modulations were larger for hardcompared to 
easy trials. The neurophysiological signatures in this study thus clearly show 
that control is boosted when a difficult task is expected.  
The interaction of reward and difficulty 
Decision-making control models based on reinforcement learning 
principles predict that reward and difficulty information will interact, with 
control only being implemented when both are sufficiently high (Shenhav et 
al., 2013; Verguts et al., 2015). Control will be invested only when this could 
be beneficial for performance (for a difficult task) and when reward is likely. 
In this dissertation, we focused on the separate effects of reward and difficulty 
rather than on their interaction. Nevertheless, Chapter 2 does allow some 
evaluation of the interaction. In the experiments of Chapter 2 not only reward 
but also task difficulty was manipulated. We expected an interaction of reward 
and difficulty, however we found no evidence for this. We speculate that the 
timing of the difficulty information, by definition at task onset, occurred too 
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late in time to interact with reward information. Reward information presented 
simultaneous to task onset only had an effect in very simple task conditions, 
when only two possible reward cues were used, but not in more complicated 
task conditions, when three possible cues were used. When reward 
information was presented later, after task onset, it no longer had an effect. 
These results show that any effects we do find, are on the timing limits of 
control possibilities. Processing and integrating both the reward and difficulty 
information to make a decision about control possibly took too much time to 
influence behavior. For proactive control, Schevernels et al., (2014) used EEG 
to show that reward influences control earlier in time than difficulty 
information. Consistently, they show an interaction of reward and difficulty 
only after considerable time (1100 ms post cue onset). To test whether reward 
and difficulty information also interactively influence reactive control, the 
paradigm of Chapter 2 could be used but with an added difficulty cue 
presented a short interval before task onset. Manipulating the timing of 
difficulty information could reveal just how much time is vital for the two 
types of information to be integrated and influence reactive control.  
When reward is just not worth it anymore 
Decision-making control models predict that control will not be 
implemented if a task becomes too difficult (Shenhav et al., 2013; Verguts et 
al., 2015). In this case, upregulating control does not optimize the value 
function since it does not improve task performance and hence does not 
increase the likelihood of obtaining a reward. Indeed, decision-making studies 
have shown that incentives do not motivate cognitive effort when task 
requirements exceed a person’s skill set (Awasthi & Pratt, 1990) or processing 
capacity (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). Also, task difficulty is directly linked to 
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the cost of cognitive control i.e. the mental effort required to succeed in the 
task (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010). When task difficulty 
increases significantly, the cost of control might outweigh the benefits. In 
decision making literature, the phenomenon effort discounting describes how 
a positive outcome or reward is discounted by physical or mental effort 
(Botvinick, Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009; Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, 
Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009; Salamone & Correa, 2012). In the present 
dissertation, task performance was very good, even for difficult trials. In all 
three chapters, error rates never exceeded 10%, indicating that the task 
requirements were well within subject’s processing capacity. The 
experimental setup of the experiments in this dissertation therefore does not 
allow us to study (the absence) of control implementation in very challenging 
conditions. Using a very difficult task,  Silvetti, Nuñez Castellar, Roger, & 
Verguts (2014) showed a lower CNV amplitude for hard compared to easy 
trials, reflecting less control for hard than for easy trials. In this study the error 
rate for hard trials was 60% (vs. 20% error rate for easy trials). This suggests 
that indeed control implementation fails when task difficulty becomes too 
high. Future research should explore the boundaries for control, searching for 
the tipping point where increased difficulty does no longer promote control 
but discourages it. This tipping point might be individually different, 
depending on dopaminergic limbic loop functioning. Dopamine depletion in 
rats results in a refusal to invest effort to obtain rewards (Salamone, Cousins, 
& Bucher, 1994), and in humans, patients suffering from depression are often 
effort averse and refrain from investing effort to obtain rewards (Cohen, 1982; 
Treadway & Zald, 2011). Detailed insight into the complex equilibrium of 
reward and task difficulty in the investment of cognitive control is necessary 
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for our understanding of goal-directed behavior and is crucial to understand 
and treat related disorders. 
CONTROL CAN ACT ON A FAST, WITHIN-TRIAL TIMESCALE 
The second aim of this PhD was the specification of the time course of 
cognitive control. In contrast to classical control models, associative models 
predict that reactive control can be rapidly recruited on a within-trial timescale 
(Abrahamse et al., 2016; Egner, 2014; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). This 
hypothesis was tested in Chapter 2 and 3. 
Reactive control can be recruited within 400 ms 
In Chapter 2 we specified the time course of control by assessing the 
influence of reward timing on RTs and error rates in a visual discrimination 
task. When a reward-predictive cue was presented 200 ms before target onset, 
it improved processing efficiency. This reward effect was smaller for 
simultaneous cue and target presentation, and was absent when cues were 
presented after target onset. Average response times were around 450 ms, in 
reference to the task onset. In the cue-pre-target condition, reward based 
control processes thus had approximately 650 ms to unfold and influence the 
response. In the simultaneous conditions this dropped to 450 ms, and in the 
cue-post-target condition this was further reduced to 250 ms. Since the reward 
cue had no effect when it was presented after task onset, we can infer that 
control implementation had not progressed enough to influence the response 
after 250 ms. It had however sufficiently advanced to influence behavior after 
450 ms (as evident from the reward effect in the simultaneous cue-target 
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condition). This reveals that the time needed for influential control processes 
is between 250 ms and 450 ms for this task.  
In Chapter 3, we exploited the high temporal resolution of EEG to 
shown that control was modulated within-trial, as soon as 400 ms after 
stimulus onset. A lateralized flanker task was used, where incongruent 
flankers were presented in only one hemifield. Incongruent stimuli led to a 
power increase in the theta frequency band, peaking around 160 ms. This 
increase likely reflects the early detection of incongruency (Cavanagh et al., 
2012). Further, we captured activity specific to the processing of incongruent 
flankers by computing the lateralized incongruency difference (LID). The 
signal for trials with incongruent flankers in the right visual hemifield was 
subtracted from the signal for trials with incongruent flankers in the left visual 
hemifield. Consistent with previous research using this paradigm 
(Appelbaum, Smith, Boehler, Chen, & Woldorff, 2011), the LID revealed that 
processing differs for congruent versus incongruent flankers, and this 
difference first occurs around 250 ms post stimulus onset. To determine 
whether this processing difference reflected distraction (decreased attention) 
or control (increased attention) we investigated alpha power. We hypothesized 
that incongruent flankers would elicit cognitive control, and this would be 
reflected in more alpha power in areas processing these incongruent flankers 
marking active inhibition of attention (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Worden, 
Foxe, Wang, & Simpson, 2000). Indeed, we observed more alpha power for 
incongruent flankers, and this active inhibition process peaked around 400 ms.  
It is important to note that this time-frequency result does not have the 
same millisecond precision as ERP results. Power was calculated by 
performing a Fast Fourier Transform on data in a 488 ms (moving) time 
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window. Consequently, power estimations cannot capture power precisely on 
one moment, but reflect average power during a larger time interval. This loss 
in timing precision is inevitable when performing time-frequency analysis, 
since power estimation of a certain frequency requires data containing at least 
one cycle (and preferably more) of this frequency (Cohen, 2014). Our 
estimation of control timing is therefore not millisecond precise. Nevertheless, 
we can reliably claim that control processes occurred rapidly, within the trial. 
The timing of control in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 was comparable. In 
Chapter 2 control could influence task performance somewhere between 250 
to 450 ms post task onset. In Chapter 3, the LID onset occurred at 250 ms and 
alpha modulations reflecting control peaked around 400 ms after stimulus 
onset. Taken together these findings suggest that reactive control (at least in 
these tasks) can be recruited within 400 ms. This is in line with previous 
findings reporting fast within-trial control. In an EEG experiment using 
frequency tagging, Scherbaum, Fischer, Dshemuchadse, & Goschke (2011) 
showed that attention was modulated continuously throughout an incongruent 
trial, with attention being directed towards relevant information and away 
from irrelevant information. Also following errors, fast control processes have 
been shown (Cohen et al., 2009). The experiments presented in Chapter 2 and 
3 add to these findings by further specifying the rapid time course of control, 
both triggered by reward and difficulty information. 
Fast control supports associative models of control 
The findings presented in Chapter 2 and 3 support associative models 
of control (Egner, 2014; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009) over more classical 
control models, that conceptualize cognitive control as a slow process 
typically operating between trials (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004; Braver, 2012; 
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Posner & Presti, 1987; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Associative models 
implicitly predict fast control is possible and even likely, but they do not 
explicitly define control timing. The current findings add to these models by 
explicitly specifying the timing constraints of cognitive control. They thus 
provide an empirical basis for future and more advanced models, that can 
explicitly model and predict fast control processes. In the current studies, 
control processes seem to take 400 ms to influence behavior. The timing of 
these effects is similar to that of other associative processes, e.g. associative 
priming (Perea & Gotor, 1997; Perea & Rosa, 2002; Sailor, Brooks, Bruening, 
Seiger-Gardner, & Guterman, 2009). 
Another prediction of associative models is that subjects may learn 
associations between perceptual and control representations during the task. 
Consequently, these models predict that cued control might require training. 
This implicates that the timing of control processes might change after 
extensive training. To test this, future research is needed that monitors control 
processes throughout the course of training for a task. 
THE NEURAL TIME COURSE OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
The third aim of this PhD was to gain insight into the neural 
mechanisms of cognitive control and their timing. fMRI research has 
previously shown the involvement of the medial frontal cortex, the fronto-
parietal control network and task-specific sensory processing areas (Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002; Egner & Hirsch, 2005a; MacDonald et al., 2000; Polk et 
al., 2008; Weissman et al., 2004). However, since these studies rely mostly on 
fMRI, they are unable to reveal the time course of control processes. 
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Alpha oscillations reveal fast attentional modulations 
In Chapter 3 we used EEG to capture the time course of control. We 
specifically wanted to assess how fast control is implemented in specific 
sensory processing areas. To allow us to isolate processing of incongruent 
irrelevant stimuli, we applied a lateralized flanker task. In this task, a central 
target stimulus is flanked by incongruent flankers in only one visual hemifield 
(congruent flankers are presented in the opposite hemifield), confining 
sensory processing of these flankers to the occipital cortex of the contralateral 
hemisphere. By comparing the EEG for left vs. right hemisphere electrodes 
we revealed processing specific to incongruent flankers. This approach was 
used previously by Appelbaum et al. (2011), who calculated the lateralized 
incongruency difference (LID) and observed that incongruent flankers are 
processed differently from congruent ones. However, they could not attribute 
this processing difference to either increased attention (i.e. control 
implementation) or increased distraction by incongruent flankers drawing 
attention. Indeed, previous research supports the idea that visually distinct 
stimuli in a stream of static stimuli capture attention (Burnham & Neely, 2008; 
Burnham, Neely, Naginsky, & Thomas, 2010). This attentional capture 
process might explain the LID. To determine whether the LID reflects control 
processes, we investigated alpha oscillations.  
In the current study, alpha oscillations revealed that the LID indeed 
reflects increased control by suppressing processing of incongruent flankers, 
and that it does not reflect increased distraction. We observed more alpha 
power on occipital sites over the hemisphere processing incongruent flankers 
than on occipital sites over the opposite hemisphere, processing congruent 
flankers. Alpha oscillations are a well-known mechanism for neural 
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suppression and can be actively used to suppress processing of irrelevant 
information (Jensen, Bonnefond, & VanRullen, 2012; Jensen & Mazaheri, 
2010). They have often been reported in the context of proactive control or 
cued spatial attention, where they mark attention for relevant stimuli and 
where they significantly predict task performance (Kelly, Lalor, Reilly, & 
Foxe, 2006; Thut, Nietzel, Brandt, & Pascual-Leone, 2006; Worden et al., 
2000). In the current study, we observed alpha modulations within the trial 
(peaking around 400 ms post-stimulus onset), following stimulus or response 
conflict. We thus show that alpha oscillations in visual areas also underlie 
control on a fast timescale, providing insight into the neural processes 
supporting reactive control. 
In Chapter 4, we again investigated alpha oscillations. In this study we 
observed a sustained decreased alpha power in the period between a difficulty 
cue and task onset. This alpha power decrease was maximal at parietal 
electrodes and reflects increased attention for the upcoming task stimuli. 
Parietal alpha power has been linked to increased attention for external stimuli 
(Benedek, Schickel, Jauk, Fink, & Neubauer, 2014). We further hypothesize 
that this parietal alpha power modulation reflects increased activation in the 
fronto-parietal attentional control network, since alpha power has been shown 
to correlate negatively with BOLD activity (Laufs et al., 2003; Ritter, 
Moosmann, & Villringer, 2009). In our study, alpha power was decreased 
more strongly for hard than for easy trials, indicating increased control. A 
sustained suppression of alpha oscillations similar to that in the current study 
was observed previously by van den Berg, Krebs, Lorist, & Woldorff, (2014). 
In their study, alpha power in the cue-target interval was modulated by reward 
information, with less alpha (and thus more attention) for rewarded vs. non-
rewarded trials. The similarity of these alpha characteristics, in terms of 
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topographical maximum, timing and modulation, suggest that reward and 
difficulty influence attentional control through similar mechanisms, relying 
on oscillations in the alpha frequency band. 
Control is implemented through the fronto-parietal network and in task-
specific areas 
Based on control models and previous fMRI research, we hypothesized 
that control would be implemented through a fronto-parietal attentional 
control network (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dosenbach et al., 2007; 
Gitelman et al., 1999; Nobre et al., 1997) but would also be implemented 
locally, in brain areas specific to the task at hand (Egner & Hirsch, 2005a; 
Polk et al., 2008; Verguts & Notebaert, 2009; Weissman et al., 2004). The 
results from Chapter 3 and 4 confirm this hypothesis. Crucially, our findings 
add to previous fMRI research by also revealing the time course of these 
control processes. 
In Chapter 4 we made use of scalp and intracranial recordings to show 
the involvement of the fronto-parietal attentional network and task-specific 
areas in proactive control. We observed a larger SPN in the period between a 
difficulty cue and task onset. The SPN is believed to reflect postsynaptic 
potentials of pyramidal neurons in cortical areas involved in the upcoming 
task (Birbaumer, Roberts, Lutzenberger, Rockstroh, & Elbert, 1992; Elbert, 
1993). The SPN and other slow negative components likely reflect increased 
neural excitability of underlying source neurons. In these neurons, the 
threshold for generating an action potential in lowered, to prime these neurons 
to fire at task onset (Elbert, 1993; McAdam, 1969). Source localization studies 
have revealed the cortical areas that drive the SPN. The main sources of the 
SPN are believed to be the fronto-parietal network, and the anterior insula 
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(Böcker et al., 1994; Brunia et al., 2000; Kotani et al., 2015; Tsukamoto et al., 
2006). The fronto-parietal network is believed to underlie attentional 
processes, whereas the anterior insula likely responds to the emotional valence 
of the expected stimulus (Menon & Uddin, 2010). For the related negative 
slow CVN component, the fronto-parietal network has also been proposed as 
the main source, together with motor areas involved in motor preparation 
(Gómez, Flores, & Ledesma, 2007; Grent-‘t-Jong & Woldorff, 2007). The 
slow component measured in the current study thus very likely reflects the 
involvement of the fronto-parietal network in proactive control. Moreover, the 
high temporal resolution of EEG shows that this involvement continuously 
increases throughout the cue period, peaking before task onset.  
Intracranial recordings in the posterior parietal cortex further 
supported the hypothesized involvement of the fronto-parietal network in 
proactive control. Intracranial local field potential recordings provided us with 
an excellent opportunity to study the brain areas involved in control. In 
contrast to scalp EEG measures, these recordings do not only provide 
excellent temporal resolution, but are also very locally precise. The posterior 
parietal cortex is an important part of the fronto-parietal network (Gitelman et 
al., 1999; Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000) and many fMRI studies 
have supported its role in proactive cognitive control (Engelmann, Damaraju, 
Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009; Brian Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 
2000; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010; Rosell-Negre et al., 2014; Wu, Weissman, 
Roberts, & Woldorff, 2007). In Chapter 4, a slow negative deflection, similar 
to the scalp SPN in our healthy subjects, was observed in the posterior parietal 
cortex. This slow wave was much more pronounced for hard than for easy 
trials. This difference increased throughout the trial until task onset, showing 
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again how attention is continuously increased during the cue period through 
activation of the fronto-parietal control network.  
The intracranial recordings in Chapter 4 also revealed control related 
activation in the dorsal striatum (likely putamen). Scalp EEG measures mostly 
capture superficial brain activation and deep sources typically do not show up 
in the EEG (Elbert, 1993; Kappenman & Luck, 2011). Intracranial recordings 
thus present a great opportunity to study also the neurophysiology of deeper, 
subcortical areas. Using fMRI, these areas have been shown to play an 
important role in (motivated) control (Boehler et al., 2011; Krebs et al., 2012; 
Vassena et al., 2014). Subcortical areas are often co-activated with the cortical 
fronto-parietal network (Gitelman et al., 1999; Hopfinger et al., 2000). Also, 
the dorsal striatum is reliably activated during motivated control, both during 
anticipation of an effortful task (Krebs et al., 2012; Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, 
Dayan, & Dolan, 2013; Vassena et al., 2014) and during reward anticipation 
(Engelmann et al., 2009; Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Padmala 
& Pessoa, 2011). On a more physiological level, caudate nucleus neurons have 
been shown to fire during motivated proactive control, and this activation is 
correlated with improved task performance (Lauwereyns, Watanabe, Coe, & 
Hikosaka, 2002). Many subcortical areas play an important role in 
dopaminergic processes, which are vital for motivated control (Salamone & 
Correa, 2012; Wise, 2004). Dopamine depletion in animals is related with 
reduced willingness to invest effort, whereas dopaminergic stimulation 
increases effort (Bardgett, Depenbrock, Downs, Points, & Green, 2009). Also 
in humans, dopamine has been shown crucial for cognitive effort (Westbrook 
& Braver, 2016). In sum, these findings indicate an important role for 
subcortical areas in control. Based on this, activation of these areas during 
proactive control, as part of the extended general attentional control network, 
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can be expected.  In line with this, we indeed observed increased dorsal 
striatum (likely posterior putamen) involvement during anticipation of hard 
trials (compared to easy). 
Control is not only implemented through the fronto-parietal network, 
but also acts locally, in task-specific brain areas. In Chapter 3, we showed 
control implementation in areas specific to processing task-irrelevant flankers. 
Attention for these incongruent flankers was suppressed during the trial, as 
evidenced by increased alpha power in areas processing these flankers. By 
using a lateralized flanker paradigm, we could spatially separate relevant from 
irrelevant stimulus processing. This allowed us to study control in task-
specific areas. In this study, we showed that control is indeed implemented in 
these areas. This is in line with fMRI studies showing that control can be 
implemented by suppressing processing for irrelevant stimuli (Polk et al., 
2008). Since relevant stimuli were presented centrally in this study, we cannot 
asses how processing of these stimuli was adapted during the trial. Based on 
previous fMRI research, we could hypothesize that processing in these 
relevant areas would be increased (Egner & Hirsch, 2005a; Weissman et al., 
2004). Crucially, we revealed the time course of control in task-specific areas. 
We showed that attention for irrelevant information was rapidly suppressed, 
within the trial. To our knowledge, no prior research has revealed the timing 
of such fast control processes in task-specific areas, since previous studies 
relied on fMRI. 
The idea that control can be implemented in task-specific areas is also 
supported by intracranial recordings in Chapter 4. In the cue-target interval 
we found increased activation in the hippocampus for hard vs. easy trials. The 
task used in Chapter 4 was a mental calculation task. The hippocampus has 
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been implicated in neural networks underlying mental calculations. More 
specifically, the hippocampus is activated when a retrieval strategy is used to 
solve a calculation (Cho, Ryali, Geary, & Menon, 2011; De Smedt, Holloway, 
& Ansari, 2011). Also, the hippocampus is more involved for difficult 
calculations requiring carrying, than for easy calculations not requiring 
carrying (Kong et al., 2005). These studies support the idea that the 
hippocampus is a task-specific area involved in mental calculations. Activity 
in the hippocampus during the cue period in our task, can thus be interpreted 
as a marker for increased control implementation in a task-specific area. 
The activation in the posterior parietal cortex and putamen interpreted 
above as activation of the (extended) fronto-parietal control network, could 
also be explained in terms of task-specific control. The posterior parietal 
cortex is not only involved in the fronto-parietal network, but also plays an 
important part in mental arithmetic processes (Rickard et al., 2000). The 
putamen is typically involved in automatized processing (Ashby, Turner, & 
Horvitz, 2010; Lehéricy et al., 2005). It might be activated in anticipation of 
hard calculations in our mental calculation task, because these hard 
calculations rely on using well-learned arithmetic facts (e.g., 7+4=11). In 
contrast, counting can be used to solve easy calculations, since they consisted 
only of “+1” operations. Arithmetic mental operations used to solve hardtrials 
can be conceptualized as covert actions, that have previously been learned and 
automatized (Rivera, Reiss, Eckert, & Menon, 2005). Activation of these 
automatic “actions” might involve the putamen. In this view, preparatory 
activation in the posterior parietal cortex and in the putamen reflect proactive 
control implementation in task-specific areas. Further research, applying 
various tasks, is needed to clearly separate the roles of the fronto-parietal 
attentional network and specific areas in control. 
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Based on the research of Chapter 3 and 4, we can conclude that both the 
fronto-parietal control network and task-specific areas are critical in control 
implementation. This is in line with associative control models. These models 
predict that general control networks are used to implement control in sensory 
areas. When a cue for control is perceived, perceptual and/or motor input 
activates associated control representations. These representations in turn 
generate an arousal boost leading to increased binding between cortical areas 
that are active at that moment, i.e. task-relevant cortical areas (Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2009). It is also consistent with fMRI studies showing interacting 
roles for the fronto-parietal network and task-specific areas for control (Egner 
& Hirsch, 2005b; Slagter et al., 2007; Weissman et al., 2004). 
Detection of difficulty in the MFC can drive reactive control 
implementation  
Chapter 3 provides evidence for the idea that a detection signal in the 
medial frontal cortex (MFC) triggers reactive control processes. In this 
experiment we observed a frontal theta power increase, which was correlated 
with control implementation later in the trial. The theta increase peaked 
around 160 ms post stimulus onset and very likely reflects the detection of 
stimulus and response conflict by the MFC (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; 
Cavanagh et al., 2012). This theta detection signal was correlated with the 
alpha modulations reflecting control implementation later in the trial: more 
theta power was related to more attentional suppression for irrelevant 
information. Since these alpha power modulations occurred later in the trial, 
peaking around 400 ms post-stimulus onset, we hypothesize that theta might 
drive alpha modulations. This is consistent with the idea that the MFC triggers 
control implementation in sensory specific areas. Previous oscillation studies 
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have already shown how the MFC and occipital areas interact during control 
implementation. Synchrony between frontal theta and occipital alpha is 
increased on post-error trials (Cohen et al., 2009) and frontal theta increases 
have been correlated with occipital alpha decreases following errors 
(Mazaheri, Nieuwenhuis, Van Dijk, & Jensen, 2009). Here we show that 
similar mechanisms operate to implement control within the trial, following 
stimulus presentation.  
This proposed dynamic between MFC and sensory areas is compatible 
with the CMT, proposing a conflict detection unit located in the MFC 
(Botvinick et al., 2001). It also supports associative control models that claim 
control is implemented locally, in sensory areas involved in the task (Verguts 
& Notebaert, 2009). fMRI studies show that activation in the ACC triggers the 
involvement of the DLPFC (MacDonald et al., 2000), which in turn influences 
activity in sensory specific areas (Egner & Hirsch, 2005a; Polk et al., 2008; 
Weissman et al., 2004). However, because of the slow nature of the BOLD 
response, these studies could not reveal the time course of the MFC – sensory 
areas dynamic. In Chapter 3 we show that the MFC can rapidly recruit sensory 
areas to adapt control. 
CONCLUSION 
The experiments presented in this dissertation, provide empirical 
support for the hypothesis that both reward and difficulty information drive 
motivated cognitive control, as predicted by decision-making control theories 
and computational models of control (Shenhav et al., 2013; Verguts et al., 
2015; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). I systematically tested and confirmed this 
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hypothesis for both reactive and proactive control, two important mechanisms 
of control (Braver, 2012). One of the cardinal aims of this PhD was to gain 
insight into the time course of control. By using stimulus timing manipulations 
or by exploiting the excellent temporal resolution of EEG, I showed that 
control can occur rapidly, within a trial. In our tasks, control was implemented 
as fast as within 400 ms post stimulus onset. This provides support for 
associative control models, that imply that stimulus representations can 
rapidly activate associated control representations (Abrahamse et al., 2016; 
Egner, 2014; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). Moreover, my results provide 
an important empirical basis for the advancement of future models, that can 
explicitly model fast control processes. Finally, in this dissertation I also 
provide further evidence for the fronto-parietal network and task-specific 
areas as important neural substrates for control. Moreover, I also demonstrated 
the fast nature of the neural processes underlying control, adding crucial new 
information to observations from fMRI research (e.g. Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Gitelman et al., 1999; Polk et al., 2008). The 
medial frontal cortex was shown to trigger reactive control, that was 
implemented later in the trial in sensory areas processing task-specific 
information. By demonstrating alpha power increases in areas processing 
incongruent stimuli I revealed that control is implemented there through 
attentional suppression reliant on alpha oscillations. This is in line with the 
gating by inhibition view, assuming an active inhibitory role for alpha 
oscillations (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010) and shows that these oscillations can 
be rapidly adapted to serve goal-directed action. Also for proactive control, 
scalp and intracranial measures revealed the involvement of task-specific 
areas, as well as the fronto-parietal network and subcortical areas. My findings 
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suggest that in all these areas, control is gradually increased during task 
preparation. 
The current findings provide crucial empirical validation of hypotheses 
put forward by various cognitive control models. Importantly, they reveal the 
time course of control implementation and of neural processes underlying it. 
Timing is an aspect that is often overlooked, because fMRI is used or because 
paradigms are not well adapted to look for fast control implementation. The 
timing of these processes is however crucial information, if we want to truly 
understand and define cognitive control. Control is often needed on short 
notice, so more insight into its timing is necessary to specify control processes 
in detail. The research performed during my PhD provides a step in that 
direction, and might inspire future control models and theories to take fast 
control processes into account. However, many open questions for future 
research remain. How do reward and difficulty interact in motivating fast 
control processes? What network dynamics link various brain areas involved 
in control? How do task requirements influence control timing? How can 
training change control associations and thus possibly the time course of 
control? These and many other questions will require further systematic 
empirical research in years to come. 
  
 162     CHAPTER 5 
REFERENCES 
Aarts, E., Roelofs, A., & van Turennout, M. (2008). Anticipatory Activity in 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex Can Be Independent of Conflict and Error 
Likelihood. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(18), 4671–4678. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4400-07.2008 
Aarts, E., Wallace, D. L., Dang, L. C., Jagust, W. J., Cools, R., & D’Esposito, 
M. (2014). Dopamine and the Cognitive Downside of a Promised Bonus. 
Psychological Science, 25(4), 1003–1009. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613517240 
Abrahamse, E., Braem, S., Notebaert, W., & Verguts, T. (2016). Grounding 
cognitive control in associative learning. Psychological Bulletin, 142(7), 
693–728. http://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000047 
Appelbaum, L. G., Smith, D. V, Boehler, C. N., Chen, W. D., & Woldorff, M. 
G. (2011). Rapid modulation of sensory processing induced by stimulus 
conflict. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(9), 2620–2628. 
http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn.2010.21575 
Ashby, F. G., Turner, B. O., & Horvitz, J. C. (2010). Cortical and basal ganglia 
contributions to habit learning and automaticity. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 14(5), 208–215. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2010.02.001 
Awasthi, V., & Pratt, J. (1990). The Effects of Monetary Incentives on Effort 
and Decision Performance: The Role of Cognitive Characteristics. 
Accounting Review, 65(4), 797–811. Retrieved from 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=96032
74126&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
Bardgett, M. E., Depenbrock, M., Downs, N., Points, M., & Green, L. (2009). 
Dopamine modulates effort-based decision making in rats. Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 123(2), 242–251. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0014625 
Benedek, M., Schickel, R. J., Jauk, E., Fink, A., & Neubauer, A. C. (2014). 
Alpha power increases in right parietal cortex reflects focused internal 
attention. Neuropsychologia, 56, 393–400. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.02.010 
Bijleveld, E., Custers, R., & Aarts, H. (2010). Unconscious reward cues 
increase invested effort, but do not change speed-accuracy tradeoffs. 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION     163 
Cognition, 115(2), 330–335. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.12.012 
Birbaumer, N., Roberts, L. E., Lutzenberger, W., Rockstroh, B., & Elbert, T. 
(1992). Area-specific self-regulation of slow cortical potentials on the 
sagittal midline and its effects on behavior. Electroencephalography and 
Clinical Neurophysiology/Evoked Potentials Section, 84(4), 353–361. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0168-5597(92)90088-S 
Böcker, K. B. E., Brunia, C. H. M., & van den Berg-Lenssen, M. M. C. (1994). 
A spatiotemporal dipole model of the stimulus preceding negativity (spn) 
prior to feedback stimuli. Brain Topography, 7(1), 71–88. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/BF01184839 
Boehler, C. N., Hopf, J.-M., Krebs, R. M., Stoppel, C. M., Schoenfeld, M. A., 
Heinze, H.-J., & Noesselt, T. (2011). Task-Load-Dependent Activation of 
Dopaminergic Midbrain Areas in the Absence of Reward. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 31(13), 4955–4961. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4845-10.2011 
Boehler, C. N., Hopf, J.-M., Stoppel, C. M., & Krebs, R. M. (2012). 
Motivating inhibition - reward prospect speeds up response cancellation. 
Cognition, 125(3), 498–503. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.07.018 
Bonner, S., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2002). The effects of monetary incentives on 
effort and task performance: theories, evidence, and a framework for 
research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27, 303–345. Retrieved 
from http://www.jstor.org/stable/247651 
Botvinick, M., & Braver, T. (2015). Motivation and Cognitive Control: From 
Behavior to Neural Mechanism. Annual Review of Psychology, 66(1), 83–
113. http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015044 
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. 
(2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Review, 
108(3), 624–652. http://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.108.3.624 
Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict monitoring 
and anterior cingulate cortex: an update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
8(12), 539–546. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003 
Botvinick, M. M., Huffstetler, S., & McGuire, J. T. (2009). Effort discounting 
in human nucleus accumbens. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 9(1), 16–27. http://doi.org/10.3758/CABN.9.1.16 
 164     CHAPTER 5 
Braem, S., Verguts, T., Roggeman, C., & Notebaert, W. (2012). Reward 
modulates adaptations to conflict. Cognition, 125(2), 324–332. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.07.015 
Braver, T. S. (2012). The variable nature of cognitive control: a dual 
mechanisms framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(2), 106–113. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.12.010 
Brown, J. W. (2009). Conflict effects without conflict in anterior cingulate 
cortex: Multiple response effects and context specific representations. 
NeuroImage, 47(1), 334–341. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.04.034 
Brunia, C. H. ., & van Boxtel, G. J. . (2001). Wait and see. International 
Journal of Psychophysiology, 43(1), 59–75. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-
8760(01)00179-9 
Brunia, C. H., de Jong, B. M., van den Berg-Lenssen, M. M., & Paans, A. M. 
(2000). Visual feedback about time estimation is related to a right 
hemisphere activation measured by PET. Experimental Brain Research, 
130(3), 328–337. http://doi.org/10.1007/s002219900293 
Burnham, B. R., & Neely, J. H. (2008). A static color discontinuity can capture 
spatial attention when the target is an abrupt-onset singleton. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 34(4), 
831–841. http://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.34.4.831 
Burnham, B. R., Neely, J. H., Naginsky, Y., & Thomas, M. (2010). Stimulus-
driven attentional capture by a static discontinuity between perceptual 
groups. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and 
Performance, 36(2), 317–329. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0015871 
Cavanagh, J. F., & Frank, M. J. (2014). Frontal theta as a mechanism for 
cognitive control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(8), 414–421. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.04.012 
Cavanagh, J. F., Zambrano-Vazquez, L., & Allen, J. J. B. (2012). Theta lingua 
franca: A common mid-frontal substrate for action monitoring processes. 
Psychophysiology, 49(2), 220–238. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2011.01293.x 
Cho, S., Ryali, S., Geary, D. C., & Menon, V. (2011). How does a child solve 
7 + 8? Decoding brain activity patterns associated with counting and 
retrieval strategies. Developmental Science, 14(5), 989–1001. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2011.01055.x 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION     165 
Cohen, M. X. (2014). Analyzing Neural Time Series Data: Theory and 
Practice. MIT Press, 600. http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Cohen, M. X., & Cavanagh, J. F. (2011). Single-trial regression elucidates the 
role of prefrontal theta oscillations in response conflict. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 2, 30. http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00030 
Cohen, M. X., & Van Gaal, S. (2013). Dynamic interactions between large-
scale brain networks predict behavioral adaptation after perceptual errors. 
Cerebral Cortex, 23(5), 1061–1072. http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhs069 
Cohen, M. X., van Gaal, S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., & Lamme, V. a F. (2009). 
Unconscious errors enhance prefrontal-occipital oscillatory synchrony. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 3, 54. 
http://doi.org/10.3389/neuro.09.054.2009 
Cohen, R. M. (1982). Effort and Cognition in Depression. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 39(5), 593. 
http://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.1982.04290050061012 
Corbetta, M., & Shulman, G. L. (2002). Control of goal-directed and stimulus-
driven attention in the brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3(3), 201–215. 
http://doi.org/10.1038/nrn755 
Croxson, P. L., Walton, M. E., O’Reilly, J. X., Behrens, T. E. J., & Rushworth, 
M. F. S. (2009). Effort-Based Cost-Benefit Valuation and the Human 
Brain. Journal of Neuroscience, 29(14), 4531–4541. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4515-08.2009 
De Smedt, B., Holloway, I. D., & Ansari, D. (2011). Effects of problem size 
and arithmetic operation on brain activation during calculation in children 
with varying levels of arithmetical fluency. NeuroImage, 57(3), 771–781. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.12.037 
Dosenbach, N. U. F., Fair, D. A., Miezin, F. M., Cohen, A. L., Wenger, K. K., 
Dosenbach, R. A. T., … Petersen, S. E. (2007). Distinct brain networks for 
adaptive and stable task control in humans. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 104(26), 11073–11078. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0704320104 
Egner, T. (2014). Creatures of habit (and control): a multi-level learning 
perspective on the modulation of congruency effects. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5, 1247. http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01247 
 166     CHAPTER 5 
Egner, T., & Hirsch, J. (2005a). Cognitive control mechanisms resolve 
conflict through cortical amplification of task-relevant information. Nature 
Neuroscience, 8(12), 1784–1790. http://doi.org/10.1038/nn1594 
Egner, T., & Hirsch, J. (2005b). The neural correlates and functional 
integration of cognitive control in a Stroop task. NeuroImage, 24(2), 539–
547. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.09.007 
Elbert, T. (1993). Slow Cortical Potentials Reflect the Regulation of Cortical 
Excitability. In Slow Potential Changes in the Human Brain (pp. 235–
251). Boston, MA: Springer US. http://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-1597-
9_15 
Engelmann, J. B., Damaraju, E., Padmala, S., & Pessoa, L. (2009). Combined 
effects of attention and motivation on visual task performance: transient 
and sustained motivational effects. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 3, 
4. http://doi.org/10.3389/neuro.09.004.2009 
Gitelman, D. R., Nobre, A. C., Parrish, T. B., LaBar, K. S., Kim, Y. H., Meyer, 
J. R., & Mesulam, M. (1999). A large-scale distributed network for covert 
spatial attention: further anatomical delineation based on stringent 
behavioural and cognitive controls. Brain, 122(6), 1093–1106. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/brain/122.6.1093 
Gómez, C. M., Flores, A., & Ledesma, A. (2007). Fronto-parietal networks 
activation during the contingent negative variation period. Brain Research 
Bulletin, 73(1), 40–47. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainresbull.2007.01.015 
Grent-‘t-Jong, T., & Woldorff, M. G. (2007). Timing and Sequence of Brain 
Activity in Top-Down Control of Visual-Spatial Attention. PLoS Biology, 
5(1), e12. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.0050012 
Hopfinger, J. B., Buonocore, M. H., & Mangun, G. R. (2000). The neural 
mechanisms of top-down attentional control. Nature Neuroscience, 3(3), 
284–291. http://doi.org/10.1038/72999 
Jensen, O., Bonnefond, M., & VanRullen, R. (2012). An oscillatory 
mechanism for prioritizing salient unattended stimuli. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 16(4), 200–205. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.03.002 
Jensen, O., & Mazaheri, A. (2010). Shaping functional architecture by 
oscillatory alpha activity: gating by inhibition. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 4, 186. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2010.00186 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION     167 
Kappenman, E. S., & Luck, S. J. (2011). The Oxford Handbook of Event-
Related Potential Components. New York: Oxford University Press. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195374148.001.0001 
Kelly, S. P., Lalor, E. C., Reilly, R. B., & Foxe, J. J. (2006). Increases in alpha 
oscillatory power reflect an active retinotopic mechanism for distracter 
suppression during sustained visuospatial attention. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 95(6), 3844–3851. 
http://doi.org/10.1152/jn.01234.2005 
Knutson, B. (2005). Distributed Neural Representation of Expected Value. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 25(19), 4806–4812. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0642-05.2005 
Knutson, B., Adams, C. M., Fong, G. W., & Hommer, D. (2001). Anticipation 
of increasing monetary reward selectively recruits nucleus accumbens. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 21(16), RC159. http://doi.org/20015472 [pii] 
Knutson, B., Westdorp, A., Kaiser, E., & Hommer, D. (2000). FMRI 
visualization of brain activity during a monetary incentive delay task. 
NeuroImage, 12(1), 20–27. http://doi.org/10.1006/nimg.2000.0593 
Kong, J., Wang, C., Kwong, K., Vangel, M., Chua, E., & Gollub, R. (2005). 
The neural substrate of arithmetic operations and procedure complexity. 
Cognitive Brain Research, 22(3), 397–405. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2004.09.011 
Kool, W., McGuire, J. T., Rosen, Z. B., & Botvinick, M. M. (2010). Decision 
making and the avoidance of cognitive demand. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 139(4), 665–682. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0020198 
Kotani, Y., Ohgami, Y., Ishiwata, T., Arai, J., Kiryu, S., & Inoue, Y. (2015). 
Source analysis of stimulus-preceding negativity constrained by functional 
magnetic resonance imaging. Biological Psychology, 111, 53–64. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.08.005 
Krebs, R. M., Boehler, C. N., Roberts, K. C., Song, A. W., & Woldorff, M. G. 
(2012). The involvement of the dopaminergic midbrain and cortico-
striatal-thalamic circuits in the integration of reward prospect and 
attentional task demands. Cerebral Cortex, 22(3), 607–615. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhr134 
Krebs, R. M., Boehler, C. N., & Woldorff, M. G. (2010). The influence of 
reward associations on conflict processing in the Stroop task. Cognition, 
117(3), 341–347. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2010.08.018 
 168     CHAPTER 5 
Kurniawan, I. T., Guitart-Masip, M., Dayan, P., & Dolan, R. J. (2013). Effort 
and Valuation in the Brain: The Effects of Anticipation and Execution. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 33(14), 6160–6169. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4777-12.2013 
Laufs, H., Kleinschmidt, A., Beyerle, A., Eger, E., Salek-Haddadi, A., 
Preibisch, C., & Krakow, K. (2003). EEG-correlated fMRI of human alpha 
activity. NeuroImage, 19(4), 1463–1476. http://doi.org/10.1016/S1053-
8119(03)00286-6 
Lauwereyns, J., Watanabe, K., Coe, B., & Hikosaka, O. (2002). A neural 
correlate of response bias in monkey caudate nucleus. Nature, 418(6896), 
413–417. http://doi.org/10.1038/nature00892 
Lehéricy, S., Benali, H., Van de Moortele, P.-F., Pélégrini-Issac, M., 
Waechter, T., Ugurbil, K., & Doyon, J. (2005). Distinct basal ganglia 
territories are engaged in early and advanced motor sequence learning. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102(35), 12566–71. 
http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0502762102 
Leotti, L. A., & Wager, T. D. (2010). Motivational influences on response 
inhibition measures. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 36(2), 430–447. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0016802 
MacDonald, A. W., Cohen, J. D., Stenger, V. A., & Carter, C. S. (2000). 
Dissociating the Role of the Dorsolateral Prefrontal and Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex in Cognitive Control. Science, 288(5472), 1835–1838. 
http://doi.org/10.1126/science.288.5472.1835 
Mazaheri, A., Nieuwenhuis, I. L. C., Van Dijk, H., & Jensen, O. (2009). 
Prestimulus alpha and mu activity predicts failure to inhibit motor 
responses. Human Brain Mapping, 30(6), 1791–1800. 
http://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20763 
McAdam, D. W. (1969). Increases in CNS excitability during negative 
cortical slow potentials in man. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology (Vol. 26). 
Menon, V., & Uddin, L. Q. (2010). Saliency, switching, attention and control: 
a network model of insula function. Brain Structure and Function, 214(5–
6), 655–667. http://doi.org/10.1007/s00429-010-0262-0 
Nigbur, R., Cohen, M. X., Ridderinkhof, K. R., & Stürmer, B. (2012). Theta 
Dynamics Reveal Domain-specific Control over Stimulus and Response 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION     169 
Conflict. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(5), 1264–1274. 
http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00128 
Nobre, A. C., Sebestyen, G. N., Gitelman, D. R., Meusulam, M. M., 
Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Frith, C. D. (1997). Functional localization of the 
system for visuospatial attention using positron emission tomography. 
Brain, 120, 515–533. 
Padmala, S., & Pessoa, L. (2010). Interactions between cognition and 
motivation during response inhibition. Neuropsychologia, 48(2), 558–565. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.10.017 
Padmala, S., & Pessoa, L. (2011). Reward Reduces Conflict by Enhancing 
Attentional Control and Biasing Visual Cortical Processing. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(11), 3419–3432. 
http://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00011 
Pansky, A., & Algom, D. (2002). Comparative judgment of numerosity and 
numerical magnitude: Attention preempts automaticity. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 28(2), 259–
274. http://doi.org/10.1037//0278-7393.28.2.259 
Perea, M., & Gotor, A. (1997). Associative and semantic priming effects occur 
at very short stimulus-onset asynchronies in lexical decision and naming. 
Cognition, 62(2), 223–240. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(96)00782-
2 
Perea, M., & Rosa, E. (2002). The effects of associative and semantic priming 
in the lexical decision task. Psychological Research, 66(3), 180–194. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-002-0086-5 
Polk, T. A., Drake, R. M., Jonides, J. J., Smith, M. R., & Smith, E. E. (2008). 
Attention Enhances the Neural Processing of Relevant Features and 
Suppresses the Processing of Irrelevant Features in Humans: A Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study of the Stroop Task. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 28(51), 13786–13792. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1026-08.2008 
Posner, M. I., & Presti, D. E. (1987). Selective attention and cognitive control. 
Trends in Neurosciences, 10(1), 13–17. http://doi.org/10.1016/0166-
2236(87)90116-0 
Rickard, T. ., Romero, S. ., Basso, G., Wharton, C., Flitman, S., & Grafman, 
J. (2000). The calculating brain: an fMRI study. Neuropsychologia, 38(3), 
325–335. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0028-3932(99)00068-8 
 170     CHAPTER 5 
Ritter, P., Moosmann, M., & Villringer, A. (2009). Rolandic alpha and beta 
EEG rhythms’ strengths are inversely related to fMRI-BOLD signal in 
primary somatosensory and motor cortex. Human Brain Mapping, 30(4), 
1168–1187. http://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.20585 
Rivera, S. M., Reiss, A. L., Eckert, M. A., & Menon, V. (2005). 
Developmental changes in mental arithmetic: evidence for increased 
functional specialization in the left inferior parietal cortex. Cerebral 
Cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991), 15(11), 1779–90. 
http://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhi055 
Rosell-Negre, P., Bustamante, J. C., Fuentes-Claramonte, P., Costumero, V., 
Benabarre, S., & Barros-Loscertales, A. (2014). Reward anticipation 
enhances brain activation during response inhibition. Cognitive, Affective 
& Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(2), 621–634. 
http://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-014-0292-9 
Sailor, K., Brooks, P. J., Bruening, P. R., Seiger-Gardner, L., & Guterman, M. 
(2009). Exploring the time course of semantic interference and associative 
priming in the picture–word interference task. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 62(4), 789–801. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17470210802254383 
Salamone, J. D., & Correa, M. (2012). The mysterious motivational functions 
of mesolimbic dopamine. Neuron, 76(3), 470–485. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.021 
Salamone, J. D., Cousins, M. S., & Bucher, S. (1994). Anhedonia or anergia? 
Effects of haloperidol and nucleus accumbens dopamine depletion on 
instrumental response selection in a T-maze cost/benefit procedure. 
Behavioural Brain Research, 65(2), 221–229. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0166-4328(94)90108-2 
Scherbaum, S., Fischer, R., Dshemuchadse, M., & Goschke, T. (2011). The 
dynamics of cognitive control: evidence for within-trial conflict adaptation 
from frequency-tagged EEG. Psychophysiology, 48(5), 591–600. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2010.01137.x 
Schevernels, H., Krebs, R. M., Santens, P., Woldorff, M. G., & Boehler, C. N. 
(2014). Task preparation processes related to reward prediction precede 
those related to task-difficulty expectation. NeuroImage, 84, 639–647. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.09.039 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION     171 
Schmidt, J. R., & De Houwer, J. (2012). Contingency learning with evaluative 
stimuli: Testing the generality of contingency learning in a performance 
paradigm. Experimental Psychology, 59(4), 175–182. 
http://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000141 
Shenhav, A., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2013). The Expected Value 
of Control: An Integrative Theory of Anterior Cingulate Cortex Function. 
Neuron, 79(2), 217–240. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.07.007 
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human 
information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending and a 
general theory. Psychological Review, 84(2), 127–190. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.84.2.127 
Silvetti, M., Nuñez Castellar, E., Roger, C., & Verguts, T. (2014). Reward 
expectation and prediction error in human medial frontal cortex: an EEG 
study. NeuroImage, 84, 376–382. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.08.058 
Slagter, H. A., Giesbrecht, B., Kok, A., Weissman, D. H., Kenemans, J. L., 
Woldorff, M. G., & Mangun, G. R. (2007). fMRI evidence for both 
generalized and specialized components of attentional control. Brain 
Research, 1177(1), 90–102. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2007.07.097 
Stürmer, B., Nigbur, R., Schacht, A., & Sommer, W. (2011). Reward and 
punishment effects on error processing and conflict control. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 2(NOV), 335. http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00335 
Sutton, R. S., & Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An 
Introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/TNN.1998.712192 
Taylor, S. F., Welsh, R. C., Wager, T. D., Luan Phan, K., Fitzgerald, K. D., & 
Gehring, W. J. (2004). A functional neuroimaging study of motivation and 
executive function. NeuroImage, 21(3), 1045–1054. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.10.032 
Thut, G., Nietzel, A., Brandt, S. A., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2006). Alpha-band 
electroencephalographic activity over occipital cortex indexes visuospatial 
attention bias and predicts visual target detection. Journal of Neuroscience, 
26(37), 9494–9502. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0875-06.2006 
Treadway, M. T., & Zald, D. H. (2011). Reconsidering anhedonia in 
depression: Lessons from translational neuroscience. Neuroscience & 
 172     CHAPTER 5 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 35(3), 537–555. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.06.006 
Tsukamoto, T., Kotani, Y., Ohgami, Y., Omura, K., Inoue, Y., & Aihara, Y. 
(2006). Activation of insular cortex and subcortical regions related to 
feedback stimuli in a time estimation task: An fMRI study. Neuroscience 
Letters (Vol. 399). 
van Boxtel, G. J. M., & Böcker, K. B. E. (2004). Cortical Measures of 
Anticipation. Journal of Psychophysiology, 18(2/3), 61–76. 
http://doi.org/10.1027/0269-8803.18.23.61 
van den Berg, B., Krebs, R. M., Lorist, M. M., & Woldorff, M. G. (2014). 
Utilization of reward-prospect enhances preparatory attention and reduces 
stimulus conflict. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14(2), 
561–577. http://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-014-0281-z 
Vassena, E., Silvetti, M., Boehler, C. N., Achten, E., Fias, W., & Verguts, T. 
(2014). Overlapping neural systems represent cognitive effort and reward 
anticipation. PLoS One, 9(3), e91008. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0091008 
Verguts, T., & Notebaert, W. (2008). Hebbian learning of cognitive control: 
dealing with specific and nonspecific adaptation. Psychological Review, 
115(2), 518–525. http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.115.2.518 
Verguts, T., & Notebaert, W. (2009). Adaptation by binding: a learning 
account of cognitive control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(6), 252–
257. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.02.007 
Verguts, T., Vassena, E., & Silvetti, M. (2015). Adaptive effort investment in 
cognitive and physical tasks: a neurocomputational model. Frontiers in 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, 57. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00057 
Walter, W. G., Cooper, R., Aldridge, V. J., McCallum, W. C., & Winter, A. 
A. L. (1964). Contingent negative variation: An electrical sign of 
sensorimotor association and expectancy in the human brain. Nature, 
(203), 380–384. 
Weissman, D. H., Warner, L. M., & Woldorff, M. G. (2004). The Neural 
Mechanisms for Minimizing Cross-Modal Distraction. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 24(48), 10941–10949. 
http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3669-04.2004 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION     173 
Westbrook, A., & Braver, T. S. (2015). Cognitive effort: A neuroeconomic 
approach. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 15(2), 395–
415. http://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-015-0334-y 
Westbrook, A., & Braver, T. S. (2016). Dopamine Does Double Duty in 
Motivating Cognitive Effort. Neuron, 89(4), 695–710. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.12.029 
Wise, R. A. (2004). Dopamine, learning and motivation. Nature Reviews. 
Neuroscience, 5(6), 483–494. http://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1406 
Womelsdorf, T., Ardid, S., Everling, S., & Valiante, T. A. (2014). Burst Firing 
Synchronizes Prefrontal and Anterior Cingulate Cortex during Attentional 
Control. Current Biology, 24(22), 2613–2621. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.09.046 
Worden, M. S., Foxe, J. J., Wang, N., & Simpson, G. V. (2000). Anticipatory 
biasing of visuospatial attention indexed by retinotopically specific alpha-
band electroencephalography increases over occipital cortex. The Journal 
of Neuroscience, 20(6), RC63. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10704517 
Wu, C.-T., Weissman, D. H., Roberts, K. C., & Woldorff, M. G. (2007). The 
neural circuitry underlying the executive control of auditory spatial 
attention. Brain Research, 1134(1), 187–198. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2006.11.088 
 
  
CHAPTER 6 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
Mensen zijn in staat om hun gedrag te sturen op basis van de doelen die 
ze willen bereiken. Ze kunnen aandacht focussen op taakrelevante stimuli en 
de verwerking van irrelevante stimuli onderdrukken. Om taakgericht te 
handelen vertrouwen mensen op cognitieve controle, een set van top-down 
processen die meer eenvoudige processen coördineren. Controle is meestal 
bevorderend voor de prestaties in een cognitieve taak. Anderzijds houdt 
controle ook een kost in, aangezien het een mentale inspanning vraagt (Kool, 
McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010). De voor- en nadelen van het inzetten 
van controle worden door ons cognitief systeem tegen elkaar afgewogen 
(Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013; Verguts, Vassena, & Silvetti, 2015; 
Westbrook & Braver, 2015). De eerste onderzoeksvraag in dit 
doctoraatsproefschrift was welke factoren mensen kunnen motiveren om 
controle uit te oefenen, ondanks de kost. Een tweede belangrijke 
onderzoeksvraag was op welke tijdsschaal cognitieve controleprocessen 
kunnen verlopen. Ten derde had dit proefschrift ook als bedoeling de neurale 
processes onderliggend aan controle te onderzoeken. Meer specifiek werd 
onderzocht op welke tijdsschaal verschillende hersengebieden en 
mechanismen actief zijn tijdens het uitoefenen van controle en hoe deze 
processen samenhangen.   
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INFORMATIE OVER BELONING EN TAAKMOEILIJKHEID 
MOTIVEERT COGNITIEVE CONTROLE 
Cognitieve controle helpt ons om efficiënt en taakgericht te 
functioneren. Maar controle vraagt ook een mentale inspanning, en houdt dus 
eent in (Kool et al., 2010). Neuro-economische beslissingsmodellen hebben 
de factoren omschreven die een rol spelen bij het al dan niet verhogen van 
controle (Shenhav et al., 2013; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). De voor- en 
nadelen van controle worden tegen elkaar afgewogen. Er zijn twee factoren 
die bepalen of het verhogen van controle waardevol is, gegeven de situatie 
(Verguts et al., 2015). Het eerste aspect is taakmoeilijkheid. Controle kan de 
prestaties enkel verhogen als de taak moeilijk genoeg is en dus het cognitief 
systeem uitdaagt. Het tweede aspect is beloning. Verhoogde controle is enkel 
waardevol als goede prestaties ook beloond worden. Deze modellen 
voorspellen dus dat zowel informatie over taakmoeilijkheid als over beloning 
cognitieve controle kan motiveren. De empirische hoofdstukken in dit 
proefschrift onderzoeken het effect van moeilijkheid en beloning op controle. 
Daarbovenop wordt in controle het onderscheid gemaakt tussen reactieve en 
proactieve controle (Braver, 2012). Reactieve controle treedt op wanneer zich 
een conflict of andere moeilijkheid voordoet. Proactieve controle daarentegen 
wordt ingezet tijdens de voorbereiding van een taak, bijvoorbeeld na een cue 
die de taak aankondigt. Wanneer we het effect van beloning en 
taakmoeilijkheid, op zowel reactieve als proactieve controle willen 
beschrijven bekomen we vier onderzoeksvragen. Drie van deze vragen 
vormen de centrale onderzoeksvragen in de drie empirische hoofdstukken van 
dit proefschrift. In Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 werd onderzocht hoe reactieve controle 
wordt beïnvloed door beloning en moeilijkheid. In Hoofdstuk 4 werd 
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onderzocht hoe het vooruitzicht op een moeilijke taak proactieve control 
beïnvloedt. De overblijvende vraag, namelijk hoe beloning verhoogde 
proactieve controle uitlokt, is al uitvoerig onderzocht in het verleden (Aarts et 
al., 2014; Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2010; Brian Knutson, 2005; Krebs, 
Boehler, Roberts, Song, & Woldorff, 2012; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; 
Schevernels, Krebs, Santens, Woldorff, & Boehler, 2014) en wordt dus niet 
verder behandeld in dit doctoraatsproefschrift. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 werd op elke trial een cue gepresenteerd die aanduidde 
of de trial beloond kon worden of niet. De effecten van deze cue op reactieve 
cognitieve controle werden onderzocht. Beloningscues leidden tot snellere en 
accuratere responsen, en hadden dus een positieve invloed op taakprestaties. 
Enkele eerdere studies hadden al effecten van belongingscues op reactieve 
prestaties gerapporteerd (Boehler, Hopf, Stoppel, & Krebs, 2012; Krebs, 
Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010), maar in die studies was de beloningsinformatie 
direct gelinkt aan taakrelevante stimuli. In dat geval kunnen sterkere stimulus-
responsassociaties voor steeds opnieuw beloonde stimuli het effect van 
beloning verklaren. In de huidige studie werd beloning volledig onafhankelijk 
van de stimulus-responsassociaties in de taak gemanipuleerd, waardoor het 
effect in onze studie met zekerheid toe te schrijven valt aan verhoogde 
reactieve controle door de beloningscue. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 gebruikten we EEG in een flankertaak om reactieve 
cognitieve controle te bekijken. Controle werd gedurende de trial aangepast 
door de verwerking van irrelevante flankers te onderdrukken. Deze vorm van 
controle gebeurde voor stimulusincongruente en responsincongruente trials. 
De conflict monitoring theorie conceptualiseert conflict dat controle uitlokt 
specifiek als responsconflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
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2001). In deze studie tonen we aan dat responsconflict niet noodzakelijk is om 
controle uit te lokken, maar dat taakmoeilijkheid controle in gang zet.  
In Hoofdstuk 4 tenslotte gebruikten we opnieuw EEG maar ditmaal om 
proactieve controle te bekijken. Er werd een cue getoond die taakmoeilijkheid 
aanduidde, waarna een mentale rekentaak moest worden uitgevoerd. Om 
enkel cognitieve processen te vatten gebruikten we een taak zonder directe 
motorrespons. In het interval tussen de cue en de taak zagen we een grotere 
amplitude voor de “stimulus preceding negativity” (SPN) voor moeilijke 
trials. Deze ERP component weerspiegelt zeer waarschijnlijk 
aandachtsprocessen (Brunia & van Boxtel, 2001). Onze bevindingen wijzen 
er dus op dat er meer controle werd uitgeoefend ten gevolge van de cue, en 
dat informatie over taakmoeilijkheid dus proactieve controle kan sturen.  
CONTROLE KAN SNEL, BINNEN DE TRIAL, VERHOOGD WORDEN 
Klassieke cognitieve controlemodellen omschrijven controle als een 
typisch traag proces, dat tussen trials optreedt (Botvinick et al., 2001; Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977). Veel voorgaand empirisch onderzoek ging dan ook op 
zoek naar trage effecten, tussen trials in een psychologisch experiment 
(Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). Daartegenover conceptualiseren 
associatieve controlemodellen controle als een associatief process tussen 
stimulus- of motorrepresenaties en controlerepresentaties (Abrahamse, 
Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016; Egner, 2014; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 
2009). Wanneer een stimulus getoond wordt, geraakt deze geassocieerd met 
een bepaalde mate van controle. Later zal de stimulus dan automatisch 
dezelfde controlerepresentatie opnieuw oproepen. Deze associatieve modellen 
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voorspellen dus dat controle ook snel, binnen een trial, kan optreden. Deze 
predictie werd getest in Hoofdstuk 2 en in Hoofdstuk 3. 
In Hoofdstuk 2 werd een visuele discriminatietaak gebruikt. Er werd 
ook een cue aangeboden die proefpersonen informatie gaf over een mogelijke 
beloning. Deze cue werd 200 ms voor, tegelijk met, of 200 ms na de start van 
de taak getoond. Door deze tijdsmanipulatie konden we nagaan hoe snel 
controle kon worden verhoogd, en konden we zo het tijdsverloop van 
controleprocessen bepalen. De voorspelling van beloning leidde tot verhoogde 
cognitieve controle. We toonden bovendien aan dat controle zeer snel 
geïmplementeerd kon worden, wanneer de beloningscue slechts 200 ms voor 
of zelfs gelijktijdig met de taak werd getoond. Aangezien de gemiddelde 
responstijd ongeveer 450 ms was, en beloning die simultaan met de taak 
getoond werd een effect had, kunnen we besluiten dat controle in deze taak 
binnen +- 400 ms voldoende kon worden aangepast om gedrag te beïnvloeden. 
Deze resultaten bieden dus evidentie voor associatieve modellen die snelle 
controle voorspellen. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 werd een flankertaak gebruikt in combinatie met EEG. 
Incongruente stimuli leidden tot verhoogde power in de theta frequentie, met 
een piek rond 160 ms na het presenteren van de stimulus. Dit soort 
verhogingen in theta power in congruentietaken wordt in de literatuur vaak 
omschreven (Cavanagh, Zambrano-Vazquez, & Allen, 2012) en deze 
thetaverhoging reflecteert waarschijnlijk de detectie van conflict in de frontale 
cortex (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014). Na deze detectie volgden er later in de trial 
controleprocessen, tussen 300 en 500 ms na stimulusaanbieding. We 
observeerden verhoogde power in de alphafrequentie in sensorische gebieden 
die instonden voor de verwerking van irrelevante flankers. Alpha oscillaties 
 180     CHAPTER 6 
zijn gelinkt aan verlaagde neurale activiteit (Laufs et al., 2003) en zelfs aan 
actieve neurale inhibitie (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010). Dat deze osciallaties 
sterker aanwezig waren in gebieden die irrelevante flankers verwerkten wijst 
er dus op dat de verwerking van deze flankers onderdrukt werd. Er werd dus 
cognitieve controle toegepast op een zeer snelle tijdsschaal, namelijk binnen 
+- 400 ms. Dit bevestigt opnieuw het idee van associatieve controlemodellen, 
dat controle snel en binnen een trial kan aangepast worden aan de 
taakvereisten. 
HET NEURALE TIJDSVERLOOP VAN COGNITIEVE CONTROLE 
In dit proefschrift wilde ik ook zicht krijgen op het tijdsverloop van de 
neurale processen onderliggend aan cognitieve controle. Stueedies die gebruik 
maken van fMRI hebben aangetoond dat een netwerk van frontale en pariëtale 
gebieden een grote rol speelt in controle (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Gitelman et al., 1999; Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014). Dit algemene 
fronto-pariëtale netwerk stuurt controleprocessen die worden 
geïmplementeerd in hersengebieden die specifiek bij de taak betrokken zijn, 
zoals sensorische verwerkingsgebieden (Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Polk, Drake, 
Jonides, Smith, & Smith, 2008; Weissman, Warner, & Woldorff, 2004). Deze 
bevindingen ondersteunen associatieve controlemodellen, die stellen dat 
controle inderdaad lokaal geïmplementeerd wordt, in gebieden specifiek voor 
de taak (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). Verder hebben fMRI-studies ook 
gesuggereerd dat reactieve controleprocessen in gang worden gezet door de 
detectie van (respons)conflict (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000), 
dat in de mediale frontale cortex plaatsvindt (Carter & van Veen, 2007). De 
grootste beperking van deze fMRI-studies is dat zij niet in staat zijn om een 
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precieze schatting te maken van de timing van deze processen. In dit 
proefschrift gebruikten we EEG precies om wel de tijdsschaal van deze 
processen te kunnen vatten en om neurale mechanismes te kunnen 
identificeren. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 maakten we gebruik van een gelateraliseerde 
flankertaak om activatie in specifieke sensorische hersengebieden te kunnen 
isoleren. Incongruente stimuli werden in slechts één visueel hemiveld 
gepresenteerd, waardoor ze enkel verwerkt werden in de contralaterale 
hemisfeer. Door activatie in deze contralaterale hemisfeer te vergelijken met 
deze in de ipsilaterale hemisfeer (waar congruente stimuli werden verwerkt) 
konden we activatie specifiek voor incongruente stimuli vatten. Deze methode 
werd eerder toegepast door Appelbaum, Smith, Boehler, Chen, & Woldorff 
(2011), maar zij konden niet bepalen of de specifieke effecten die ze 
observeerden te interpreteren waren als verhoogde controle (dus minder 
aandacht) voor incongruente stimuli, of juist verhoogde afleiding (dus meer 
aandacht) voor incongruente stimuli. In Hoofdstuk 3 bekeken we alpha 
oscillaties specifiek in de gebieden die incongruente stimuli verwerken. Hier 
zagen we een verhoging van alphapower, wat wijst op verlaagde aandacht, 
dus versterkte cognitieve controle (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010). Deze studie 
toonde dus aan dat controle geïmplementeerd wordt in specifieke sensorische 
gebieden, zoals voorspeld door associatieve controlemodellen. Bovendien 
observeerden we ook een verhoging in thetapower op frontale elektroden. Dit 
reflecteert wellicht een conflictdetectiesignaal in de mediale frontale cortex 
(Cavanagh & Frank, 2014). Deze thetaverhoging was ook gecorreleerd aan 
latere alphamodulaties: hogere theta was gelinkt aan meer onderdrukking van 
incongruente stimuli. Dit biedt evidentie voor het idee dat de mediale frontale 
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cortex controle in gang zet, die dan geïmplementeerd wordt in sensorische 
gebieden. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 toonden we een grotere SPN-amplitude en verlaagde 
alphapower in het interval tussen een moeilijkheidscue en de taak. De bron 
van de SPN werd in voorgaand onderzoek geschat in het fronto-pariëtale 
netwerk (Böcker, Brunia, & van den Berg-Lenssen, 1994). De modulatie van 
de SPN wijst er dus op dat dit netwerk actief werd ingezet om proactieve 
controle te bewerkstelligen. Dit idee werd ook bevestigd door intracraniale 
EEG-metingen in de posterieure parieëale cortex van een epilepsiepatiënt. In 
de posterieure pariëtale cortex, een belangrijk onderdeel van het fronto-
pariëtale netwerk (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), zagen we ook een verhoogde 
activatie voor moeilijke trials. Via intracrianale metingen konden we ook 
observeren dat er verhoogde activatie was tijdens de voorbereiding van een 
moeilijke taak in het dorsale striatum (meer specifiek posterieur putamen). Dit 
subcorticale gebied wordt samen met andere subcorticale gebieden vaak 
geactiveerd samen met het fronto-pariëtale netwerk (Gitelman et al., 1999; 
Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000). Het dorsaal striatum speelt een 
belangrijke rol in (gemotiveerde) cognitieve controle, tijdens de anticipatie 
van een beloning (Engelmann et al., 2009; Knutson, Adams, Fong, & 
Hommer, 2001; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011) of van een moeilijke taak (Krebs et 
al., 2012; Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, Dayan, & Dolan, 2013; Vassena et al., 
2014). Tenslotte vonden we ook verhoogde activatie voor een moeilijke taak 
in de hippocampus. Activatie hier reflecteert waarschijnlijk proactieve 
controle in een taakspecifiek gebied. De hippocampus is betrokken in rekenen, 
meer specifiek wanneer mensen opgeslagen rekenfeiten ophalen uit het 
geheugen (Cho, Ryali, Geary, & Menon, 2011; De Smedt, Holloway, & 
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Ansari, 2011) of voor moeilijke optellingen met overdraging (Kong et al., 
2005).  
Samengevat bieden de studies in dit doctoraatsproefschrift dus 
evidentie voor de betrokkenheid van het fronto-pariëtale netwerk en 
taakspecifieke gebieden in zowel reactieve als proactieve controle. Bovendien 
werpen de huidige bevindingen licht op de tijdsschaal waarop deze processen 
opereren. Controleprocessen in taakspecifieke gebieden kunnen op zeer korte 
termijn, binnen een trial, geïmplementeerd worden. Tijdens proactieve 
controle zagen we dat activatie in het fronto-pariëtale netwerk en in specifieke 
gebieden stelselmatig toenam naarmate de start van de taak naderde. 
CONCLUSIE 
Ten eerste bieden de empirische hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift 
evidentie voor de hypothese dat belonings- en moeilijkheidsinformatie 
cognitieve controle kunnen motiveren. Dit bevestigt verschillende 
controletheorieën en modellen (Shenhav et al., 2013; Verguts et al., 2015; 
Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Ten tweede demonstreren de huidige resultaten 
de snelle tijdsschaal waarop controle werkzaam kan zijn. Door het gebruik 
van tijdsmanipulaties en EEG toonden we dat controle snel, binnen een trial 
kan optreden. Dit biedt evidentie voor associatieve controlemodellen 
(Abrahamse et al., 2016; Egner, 2014; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). 
Bovendien kunnen deze resultaten een empirische basis vormen voor 
toekomstige modellen, die expliciet en preciezer de tijdsschaal van controle 
modelleren. Tenslotte werd verdere evidentie aangebracht dat het fronto-
pariëtale netwerk en taakspecifieke hersengebieden een belangrijke rol spelen 
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in controle. Daarenboven werd aangetoond dat deze neurale processen zeer 
snel, binnen een trial, kunnen aangepast worden. Deze bevindingen vormen 
een cruciale aanvulling op vroeger fMRI-onderzoek (bv. Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Gitelman et al., 1999; Polk et al., 2008).  
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